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As we approach the end of the twentieth century, the pace and depth o f change in the global 
economy is staggering. By challenging political boundaries and production frontiers, technology 
has affected not only economic systems, but political and social systems as well. The globalization 
phenomenon has created opportunities and challenges, but uncertainty has also increased. There is 
little consensus on issues o f theory and policy and the reaction o f some to persistent poverty and 
increased inequality is a growing sense of cynicism. The conflicting results and recommendations 
coming out of social enquiry do not help matters. In one school o f thought, competition and market 
forces are seen as a panacea for almost all economic ills. Trade is targeted as the most effective way 
to increase development and associated with this view is the belief that global economic 
liberalization will lead to unlimited economic and social benefits that will be broadly shared. Others 
are not so sine, and raise questions about the ability o f the world economy to sustain recent output 
and trade trends. The economic turmoil in East Asia towards the end o f 1997 may have served to 
confirm some of these fears, but the assumption that the economic performances o f a few countries 
in that part o f the world could be easily replicated has not gone unchallenged.
In a global economy involving States with varying levels o f economic strength, the impact 
o f liberalization on equality, both among nations and at the national level also remains an open 
question. The trade-off between equality and economic growth has for long posed a dilemma for 
governments and the question now has to be approached with new perspectives reflecting the costs 
o f particular kinds o f interventions. How to link their economies to global forces responding 
increasingly to freer markets also raises challenging questions for developing States. In a borderless 
world, the authority o f governments will be increasingly challenged, while the power o f the 
transnational corporations is likely to be reinforced. The trend is already towards larger corporations 
and larger groupings as new strategies emerge. In some ways competition may be increasing, but 
the text-book model of perfect competition has little counterpart in practice. The lack of allegiance 
by transnational operators to any particular state assures neither equity in the sharing o f benefits of 
growth nor unconditional access to technology. Neoclassical assumptions have to be approached 
with care.
A large number of developing countries, long dependent on the export o f primary products 
and in many cases to preferential markets, have remained marginalised. Within a framework of 
reduced protection and shifting positions o f comparative advantage, a common assumption is that 
these countries, regardless o f size and other constraints, can make a rapid reorientation in resource 
allocation towards creation of an efficient manufacturing sector with minimal levels o f external 
assistance and with under-developed infrastructures. High store is placed on a transparent trade and 
investment policy, a stable macroeconomic environment and the stimulating effects o f a ‘level 
playing field’. A longer time for adjustment to the new order is the major concession to the less 
developed players.
Caribbean countries are in various stages o f completion with respect to what has been termed 
‘the first generation’ o f reforms. They have gone a long way in ‘getting the prices right,’ but the 
hard task o f institutional reform, institution building and formulating clear long-term policies to 
facilitate movement to a more competitive plane remains. Though some growth has taken place, it
would be foolhardy to assume that these countries have been structurally transformed and are on the 
path to self-sustained growth. Poverty and unemployment remain at high levels, while public policy 
has been impotent in dealing with the problems o f underemployment and low productivity. The un­
satisfactory returns from expenditures in social sectors, such as health and education, point to the 
need for fundamental reforms. The rural sector has largely been ignored in the post-independence 
industrialization strategy which has increased rather than reduced economic vulnerability. The 
failure to appreciate the link between agricultural development and industrial development has been 
costly in both economic and social terms. The declining share o f agriculture in GDP, while a natural 
part o f the development process, might also be the result of the governments’ own policies which 
failed to direct adequate resources to the sector. The problems and complexities involved, as well 
as the time required in moving from an agriculturally-based economy to an urban-industrial one were 
badly underestimated. Pricing, exchange rate and trade policies often militated against growth in 
the agricultural sector.
A highly skewed production base and low productivity levels reflect the failure of 
development policy both at the national and regional levels. Access to preferential markets and the 
occasional commodity boom served to remove some of the pressures to rationalize the production 
structure and increase competitiveness. In a world driven by revolutionary changes in micro­
electronics, robotics, biotechnology, transport and telecommunications, the Caribbean can no longer 
ignore the imperative to use accumulated scientific knowledge to devise appropriate technology 
which could satisfy domestic, social and economic objectives. In this respect, educational 
institutions have not done very well, but this is part of the larger failure o f public institutions and 
policies, which must be systematically analyzed.
Caribbean economies are precariously perched and remain under stress. The issues facing 
the public finances are far from settled. The restructuring o f tax systems to take account of the trend 
towards lower tariffs and the need for new sources o f revenues remains an ongoing challenge. On 
the expenditure side, governments can no longer afford to solve problems by simply spending more 
money, employing more people or creating new institutions. Spending has to be done with greater 
purpose. Pension and other social programmes in particular have to be rethought to ensure viability 
and sustainability.
A great deal is yet to be accomplished to attain a competitive position. Much o f what are 
now being seen as ‘second generation’ reforms should have been addressed a long time ago. In a 
development setting the importance of non-economic factors is increasingly being recognized. A 
credible government is a sine qua non for economic development. Up-to-date laws and their 
effective enforcement help to define the social and economic environment. A high quality social and 
physical infrastructure are essential for higher levels o f productivity. An efficient and transparent 
regulatory framework is necessary to define the rules o f competition, investment and 
entrepreneurship. The development o f a robust financial sector is critical to development and 
appropriate regulations and policies are needed to allow the emergence o f structures which can 
increase financial savings and meet the investment needs o f the economy. High unemployment 
rates, even when output is growing, call not only for a critical look at the functioning of labour
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markets, but more fundamentally at development policy. Factors affecting access to credit, 
particularly by farmers and small and medium-sized businesses, have long been crying for attention.
Fundamental to these reforms is the need for new and innovative perspectives on 
development and governance. In the past, governments have assumed that with modem engineering 
techniques and technical advisers, development by central direction could easily be achieved. 
Policies have to become more inclusive. The failure to recognize the potential o f ‘social capital’ and 
to involve communities in their own ‘economic salvation’ has proved to be a major error in 
‘development from the top’ policies. As the social and economic damage from this approach is 
being assessed, development strategies remain vague and unformed with yet no clear focus beyond 
immediate survival. The relationship between the public and private sectors is yet to be defined. 
Incentives and the use o f resources in relation to the desired production structure need to be more 
clearly specified in both a regional and international context. This is critical to overall public policy. 
While increasing production and employment must rank high on the agenda, governments’ concerns 
in these areas cannot afford to ignore the impact on the environment. This is not a side issue in 
countries with limited resources. The export o f goods and services will impact on the use of 
resources and the quality of the environment. In the same way that mineral resources can be 
exhausted, tourism, the main service export o f the Caribbean can also reach the limits o f its 
expansion. The challenge o f greater trade and preserving the environment require an approach that 
is sensitive to concerns o f health and sustainability, but is not at the same time overregulatory to the 
point o f stifling growth and development. As the twenty-first century approaches, a major issue is 
not more State or less State, but a more effective State since there are situations where the market 
does not work and the State’s comparative advantage compels it to play an active role.
At the international level, a great deal of activity is taking place to forge a more liberal 
framework for the movement o f goods, services and capital, following the completion of the 
Uruguay Round. This environment will pose a strong challenge to Caribbean States in terms of 
existing trade patterns, exploring new trading links and devising tactical instruments and strategies 
to maintain control over development. With their fragile economies, Caribbean States are compelled 
to view with a great deal o f circumspection the headlong rush to rapid liberalization in every sphere. 
WhatevQjr contribution others may have to make, development must remain an internal responsibility 
subject to a high degree o f national consensus. Economic development is part o f the nation-building 
process, and if improperly conceived can lead to social stresses and the magnification of problems 
it was intended to solve. Economic results affect social cohesion. Accordingly, governments cannot 
ignore the effects o f policies on the social fabric and on commitment to the national effort. There 
are areas o f decision-making which the State cannot concede to anyone. The benefits countries get 
from foreign investment, for example, may depend on certain kinds o f policy-guidelines with respect 
to joint-ventures, taxation, the use o f local resources and technology transfer. The protection of 
resources from overexploitation and the sale o f land to foreigners are areas which would require 
continuous State oversight. Given the importance o f the media and communications sectors to 
cultural and national development, a policy informed by the need for local control could find broad 
acceptance in a transparent setting. In the search for economic security, farmers cannot be left to the 
manoeuverings o f powerful transnational corporations. The Research and Development necessary
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for the creation o f competitive and resilient production structures cannot be left to a weak private 
sector without research capabilities and a risk-taking culture. Governments have to be careful in 
moving from a situation o f too much intervention to one that reflects an abdication inimical to 
national development. Governments must create the space for a higher degree o f local thinking in 
policy formulation which should reflect specificities treated as insignificant in typical structural 
adjustment programmes. The approach to incentives, for instance, often assumes an entrepreneur 
with highly developed responses and operating in a well informed environment within an efficient 
institutional framework. The complexity o f the reform and development challenge ought not to be 
simplified. A fair amount o f damage has already been done by the assumption that problems that 
look the same all have common roots and can be attacked with the same facile solutions that ignore 
communal heritage and the fragmentations and ruptures that have resulted from attempts at 
modernization. Opportunities for properly conceptualizing development are arising, and Caribbean 
governments must grasp them.
The problems facing Caribbean countries have to be seen in a larger setting where new 
alliances are emerging to meet global challenges arising from the changing configuration of the 
world economy. The Caribbean has not only been slow in taking hard economic decisions, but has 
taken a great deal for granted in not questioning the durability and foundations o f traditional 
commercial ties and trading patterns. In this mind-set it was easy to condone the laggard progress 
o f regional economic integration and overlook its conceptual inadequacies. The potential for inter­
action with the emerging economic powers in the world economy seems to have evoked little more 
than passing interest. It is difficult to separate the performance of small open economies from the 
quality o f their international relations and their perspectives on global economic and political 
changes. Micro and macro problems at the domestic level are difficult to separate from the larger 
internal and external management concerns that help to define the space for decision-making. In the 
context o f narrowly conceived economic reforms, there is also need to elevate thinking to a higher 
plane that explicitly recognizes the link between economics and geo-political relations, and the 
nature o f the factors influencing the new alignments.
The paper comprises an introduction and five parts. The first outlines the recent economic 
performance o f the Caribbean countries and some of the salient issues and problems confronting 
policy-making. This is followed by a discussion on trading relationships and the prospects facing 
the Caribbean in the changing regional and world environment. The third outlines some of the 
challenges and issues facing State reform in the Caribbean. In the fourth section, an attempt is made 
to identify some o f the elements and considerations which need to inform the ongoing process of 
structural reforms. The final section presents some concluding observations.
While it is necessary at times to make reference to the experience o f the wider Caribbean, 
the discussion for the most part is confined to members o f the Caribbean Community and Common 
Market (CARICOM) and particularly the Anglophone component. The members o f CARICOM are 
Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Montserrat, Saint Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and 
Tobago. Suriname (a former Dutch colony) was admitted in 1995 and Haiti in 1997.
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Rapid changes in the global economy and significant differences in the rates o f growth and 
development among nations o f the world community have challenged many o f the early post-war 
ideas and conceptions of development. Interpretations o f the paths chosen by the ‘successful’ 
countries, however, remain controversial. While certain influences, factors and conjunctural events 
have been identified, development does not seem to have a unique function that could easily be 
replicated everywhere, given different historical circumstances and environments. Within the 
emerging general principles and trends, development frameworks or models still need to draw on 
particular circumstances formed by history, culture, attitudes and experiences. Failure to recognize 
this accounts for the limited success o f structural adjustment programmes in several countries.
Against the background of failed policies and growing poverty, there is increasing pressure 
on many countries to abandon unsuccessful paths and reformulate the development framework to 
achieve a more efficient use of resources. The experience of the fast growing economies of the 
world underscores the observation that factors of production are more complex and encompass a far 
wider range of elements than was thought to be the case many years ago and as reflected in economic 
theorizing of the 1950s and 1960s. Resources alone do not define the production frontiers. 
Technology is not static, but is constantly widening the space of operation and changing the way we 
look at size, location, market access and resource availability and use. Policies are seen to be critical 
to development and the new doctrines being enunciated draw heavily on neo-liberal principles 
requiring greater trade and investment openness, a more competitive environment, a liberalized 
financial system, flexible exchange rate systems and a more circumscribed role for the State. They 
also point to the critical need for heavy investment in human capital and changes in the relationship 
between the State and civil society.
The experience since the early 1980s has clearly shown that not all countries respond in the 
same ways to a given set of policies. Structural constraints and the institutional and cultural context 
have a critical bearing on the outcome. It is often difficult to separate short and medium-term 
adjustment policies from long term development objectives in situations where day-to-day 
management difficulties are integrally related to structural problems and rigidities in the economy. 
Stabilization is not a sufficient condition for sustained growth and development where the main 
challenge is to change the way economies are ordered and function and to achieve greater social 
well-being at the same time.
The need for Caribbean governments to rethink and reshape economic and social policies is 
being informed by several factors. The failure o f particular strategies to effect the desired 
transformation and to deliver expected outcomes is basic to the review process. Policy results have 
fallen short both in terms o f popular expectations and in effecting the structural changes needed to
1. THE CONTEXT FOR REFORM IN THE CARIBBEAN
Introduction
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strengthen the economic base. The success of some developing States with less endowments in other 
parts o f the world have helped to put this failure into even sharper focus.
Another set o f factors forcing Caribbean governments to adopt new paths to development 
or paradigms stems from changes in the global environment. The end of the cold-war and the spread 
of the market economy corresponds with the retreat of central planning and the ‘development State’ 
in its several roles as development promoter, entrepreneur, distributor and agency o f change. The 
shift from the State to the private sector as the engine of growth was a pragmatic change forced not 
so much by the declining capacity of the State to provide welfare benefits, but by the imperative to 
make economies more efficient and competitive. The weakening of protectionist forces in the world 
economy and the trends towards a more open and competitive world trading system have 
undermined claims for preferential trading arrangements regardless of their historical origins or their 
current rationale. Investment and aid flows have also been affected by developments in the global 
economy. Private foreign investment is being attracted to the export oriented economies which have 
been able to sustain high growth rates over a long period of time. The need for higher rates of capital 
formation and modem technology and perceived shortages in national savings and entrepreneurship 
have heightened the competition for foreign investment. At the same time, the removal o f exchange 
controls and the global integration of financial markets have increased the mobility of savings 
leading States to radically alter their approach to financial policy in order to encourage savings and 
discourage the flight of capital. Tax policies have had to change too, not only to encourage 
investment and effort, but to address issues of compliance, evasion and the elasticity of the tax 
system in a context where the State’s social responsibilities continue to grow.
With their middle-income status and increasing per capita income in most cases, Caribbean 
countries have found it increasingly difficult to access concessional development finance. Even 
before the end of the cold war which had a major influence on the dispensation o f aid, the declining 
trends with respect to the Caribbean was already evident. With some former donors now actively 
seeking aid, the competition for aid has intensified, and greater attention is being paid to the plight 
o f the ‘transition’ and very poor countries.
Traditional exports and tourism have contributed immensely to the standard of living which 
Caribbean States currently enjoy. The international environment, however, has been changing. 
Uncertainties in market conditions and frequent fluctuations in prices and production in the face of 
a persistent increase in the value of imports point to the need for a more diversified and dynamic 
export sector with the resilience to deal with changes in the market place. Policies to achieve this 
aim, have so far met with only limited success. Members of the Organization o f Eastern Caribbean 
States (OECS) 1 have traditionally run persistent trade deficits, but these have been offset by earnings 
from the service sectors and investment inflows. Remittances from nationals living abroad have also 
helped.
The increases in oil prices in the 1970s put a severe strain on the finances o f the oil importing 
countries o f the region. The debt crisis soon followed, with its threat to international monetary and 
financial instability providing a rationale for external technical and financial assistance to debtor
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countries. Recession in a number of industrial countries, increases in real interest rates and the fall 
in commodity prices in the early 1980s intensified the economic pressures on Caribbean States. The 
impact o f these external shocks on the macro-economic environment raised critical questions about 
the capacity o f these States to maintain internal stability by manipulating standard policy 
instruments. The fact that the global dimensions o f the crisis seemed to signal more fundamental 
developments in the functioning of the world economy than a temporary cyclical downturn, also 
raised questions about the relevance o f inward-looking policies in a world where the leading 
performers had developed dynamic export sectors.
The simplistic structural adjustment packages quickly conceived by the international aid 
agencies in the early to mid-1980s to restore economic calm failed to instigate turnaround in a 
number o f countries. In the Caribbean their limited impact not only raised questions about the 
problem of management in small, open, undiversified economies, but also about the real nature of 
Caribbean economic problems and the direction of reform. Stabilizing the internal and external 
balances had high social costs. Policy reforms designed to achieve results within a short to medium 
time-frame were soon acknowledged to require a much longer period for implementation. It was 
also realized that the success o f many policies depends on institutional reform and the interaction 
of governments with the civil society. Reforms hold different implications for the various groups 
and interests in the society and not all o f them are readily embraced.
In Caribbean economies, it is difficult to separate day-to-day management from fundamental 
problems in the economy. The nature and structure o f production are closely tied to government 
revenue, foreign earnings and the exchange rate. Production is highly concentrated, so a downturn 
in tourism or a drop in the price or production of sugar, bauxite, bananas or oil has a ripple effect 
throughout the economy. Economic diversification has long been a major challenge in Caribbean 
economies, and it is now widely recognized that the failure of import substitution within a highly 
restrictive framework has to give way to development options consistent with a more competitive 
setting. How to make the leap from a culture of regulation and controls to a market-oriented 
production setting is a major policy challenge. Perhaps even more challenging is the need to devise 
strategies which not only seek to maximize output per person, but which can involve the entire 
national community and share the benefits o f growth. Creating opportunities for different levels of 
skills have to go hand in hand with increasing production.
Recent economic performance
Whenever economic development and structural reforms are discussed in relation to 
Caribbean countries, the issues o f size and its constraints are bound to arise. As can be seen in Table 
1 both in terms o f population and land area, Caribbean States are generally quite small. Only three 
CARICOM countries have a population o f over one million. The total population o f CARICOM is 
around 6.3 million with an average GNP of US$2,714. This excludes Haiti2 which has a population 
o f 7.2 million. The total GNP of CARICOM, including Haiti, is US$ 19 billion which is about 30 per 
cent o f Chile’s, 3 per cent o f Brazil’s and 6  per cent o f Mexico’s. Many questions in economic
Table 1
Selected Demographic and Economic Statistics
Pop. Total Per Capita
Area Pop. Growth Pop. GNPa GNPa Import Export
km2 '000 Rate (%) Per (1995) (1995) Ratio1 Ratio2
Countries (1995) (1985-95) km2 USSmn US$ (1995) (1995)
CARICOM Countries
Antigua & Barbuda 440 65 0.5 148 495b 7,730c 105 86
Bahamas 13,942 276 1.7 20 3,297 11,940 59 53
Barbados 432 266 0.5 616 1,745 6,560 57 63
Belize 22,960 216 2.6 9 568 2,630 60 50
Dominica 750 73 -0.1 97 218 2,990 67 48
Grenada 345 91 1.0 264 271 2,980 62 47
Guyana 214,970 835 0.6 4 493 590 112 98
Haiti 27,750 7,168 2.0 258 1,777 250 30 10
Jamaica 11,424 2,522 0.9 221 3,803 1,510 66d 58d
Montserrat 102 10 -1.3 98
St Kitts-Nevis 269 41 -0.4 152 212 5,170 75 49
St. Lucia 616 158 1.4 256 532 3,370 69 69
St. Vincent 388 111 0.8 286 253 2,280 57 46
Suriname 163,270 410 0.3 3 360 880 98' 126'






Anguilla 91 10 3.6 110 61b 6,100
Aruba 188 80 425
Dominican Republic 48,734 7,822 2.0 161 11,390 1,460 28 27
Netherlands Antilles 960 200 1.0 208 2,300 11,000
.. not available a. current prices 1. Imports of goods and services as a % of GDP
b. GDP 2. Exports of goods and services as a % of GDP
c. Per capita GDP
d. 1994
e. 1993
Sources: World Bank, Atlas, 1997;ECLAC, Selected Statistical Indicators of Caribbean Countries, 1996.
9
theory are analyzed without reference to size, the assumption being that size does not matter. The 
exceptional performance o f small countries like Hong Kong (6.3 million people), Mauritius (1.2 
million)and Singapore (3.0 million) in recent years has raised doubts about whether size is a serious 
obstacle to development. Size, o f course, does carry with it certain constraints in terms o f resource 
availability and market potential. A small population goes hand in hand with a small Gross National 
Product and a narrow range o f skills. A small home market is often a disincentive to large-scale 
industries which require long production runs to reach optimum size and enjoy increasing returns 
to scale. Diseconomies o f  scale are associated with high unit costs of infrastructure, investment and 
production. Besides structural disadvantages, small island economies like those in the Caribbean 
are exposed to the devastating effects o f hurricanes, against which there is little or no defense. 
Agriculture is particularly vulnerable. A limited supply o f good agricultural land can also influence 
what is produced and the cost o f production. The scope for mechanization may be limited. Size and 
location are often seen as mixed blessings for Caribbean States, most of which are micro-island 
States. On the one hand major improvements of living standards do not require massive investment 
or huge export marketing opportunities. The “Caribbean’s close economic and communications 
links with Europe and North America and the large expatriate communities there, could provide the 
necessary resources and market niches for goods and service exports.”3 On the other hand, proximity 
to North America makes it easy for financial and human capital to migrate. Location between South 
and North America also attracts criminal activities, drugs and money laundering on a scale that puts 
the meager resources o f these governments under severe strain.4
In the Caribbean structural change has been slow. The view has been expressed that 
preferences and other forms of foreign assistance reduced the pressures for change. The heavy 
concentration o f production on a few mineral and agricultural products for export reflects the 
colonial legacy and the ineffectiveness of post-independence industrial strategies. The uncertainties 
associated with the markets for these products are now forcing the adoption o f more outward- 
oriented trade policies, but these need support over a wide front within a realistic time-frame. 
Developments in technology affecting transport and communications and the reduction o f protective 
trade barriers by most countries are altering the constraints of location and natural resource 
endowments. Policies are now recognized to have critical value. Notwithstanding the breakthroughs 
in technology and the effects o f globalization, size can have an economic downside, since small 
economies will have great difficulty generating the volume of savings necessary to finance the 
desired scale o f investment. Some very small countries do not even have the space for a modem 
airport. Because o f the size of the airport and the volume o f traffic, they are bypassed by major 
airlines. Even national governments which try to fill the gap have difficulty maintaining viable 
airlines which in most cases have to be subsidized to stay in operation.
Economic and financial management in small open economies raises additional problems. 
As can be seen in Table 1 more than half o f total output in most cases is sold abroad. Because of 
the nature o f the products exported and special marketing arrangements, devaluation o f the national 
currency to stimulate exports is not likely to have a great effect on demand. The heavy dependence 
on imported goods, too, limits the scope for expansionary fiscal policy. Narrow money and capital 
markets distort the savings/investment process and the situation is often compounded by regulations
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influencing competition among financial institutions and portfolio composition. In situations where 
a narrow range o f financial securities exists, the pressure for savings to move abroad is strong. A 
high level of domestic savings does not necessarily lead to a high level of domestic investment. But 
there can also be another anomaly in that while domestic savings are flowing abroad, a country can 
become increasingly dependent on foreign savings to finance development.
While possessing a number of common features, economic performance and the standard of 
living vary widely from one Caribbean State to another. A common feature is the tendency for 
periods o f boom to alternate with periods of recession. Gains made in one period can be quickly lost 
in economic downturns triggered by domestic factors or external shocks. A boom in commodity 
prices, capital inflows and the growth of resource-based sectors such as tourism are among the 
leading factors which lie behind the upswing phases in recent years. Foreign exchange is the fuel 
that drives these economies, and by expanding import capacity, foreign earnings make possible a 
higher level o f spending, and can lead to a temporary increase in welfare. Because of the high 
propensity to import, a higher level o f foreign earnings does not necessarily translate into a faster 
rate o f domestic capital formation. In Caribbean societies with their democratic political 
arrangements, domestic policies tend to be highly responsive to populist pressures, and the enhanced 
capacity associated with phases o f economic expansion can easily be dissipated in higher levels of 
consumption, or misdirected project selection and planning. The inability to sustain reasonable 
growth performances over long periods is not unrelated to modest savings rates and more productive 
use of resources. The ability to sustain growth over long periods on the basis o f internal structural 
changes is a major challenge facing Caribbean States.
A recent study has indicated that economies in the Latin American/Caribbean (LAC) region 
are among the most volatile in the world. The volatility of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth in the region “has been more than twice and the volatility of private consumption growth 
nearly three times, that experienced by the industrial economies.” 5 Except for Africa, the Middle 
East and North Africa, the LAC area is also more volatile than other developing regions. Some of 
the reasons cited for this situation include the following:
High terms o f trade volatility associated with the concentration of production and 
exports in a few primary commodities;
Unpredictability o f capital flows;
Volatile monetary and fiscal policies stemming from external shocks and interaction 
with the relatively weak fiscal, financial and monetary institutions;
Destabilizing exchange rate regimes;
Shallow financial markets and their limited ability to absorb shocks.
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The post-war development experience provides ample evidence of this volatility. The 
Caribbean economy in the 1950s revolved around a few basic sectors, viz., export oriented 
agriculture, mining, tourism and simple manufacturing. While available data for the 1950s indicate 
a growth in per capita income in most countries o f the region, in some economic expansion was 
impressive. In Jamaica, for example, total real production increased by 77 per cent between 1953 
and 1960 at an average rate o f 11 per cent per year. In Trinidad and Tobago, real GDP growth 
averaged over 13 per cent over the same period. In both these countries, the mining sector was a 
significant contributor to this performance. The data also indicate reasonably high investment rates 
in the period. While in Jamaica, the Gross National Savings (GNS) ratio averaged around 16 per 
cent in the late 1950s, the investment ratio averaged around 23 per cent. In Trinidad and Tobago 
Gross Domestic Investment averaged over 25 per cent in the 1950s, while the Gross Savings Rate 
was around 21 per cent. In Guyana and Barbados, too, Gross Capital Formation was averaging 
between 20 and 25 per cent o f total production, with domestic savings financing around 75-80 per 
cent o f investment on average.
The 1960s constituted a milestone in the post-war history o f the Anglophone Caribbean. The 
failure o f the British West Indies Federation as an instrument by Britain for granting independence 
to a number o f colonies in the Caribbean was quickly followed by a decision to allow the territories 
that so desired to attain political independence individually. With this new status, Caribbean 
governments began to assume a greater responsibility for social and economic development and to 
put in place a variety of controls, regulations and incentives to guide the process. The State saw its 
role as not only providing law and order and maintaining and improving the social infrastructure, 
but for one reason or another became increasingly involved in direct production. As was the case 
in a large number o f developing countries, creation of an industrial sector was embraced as the main 
goal o f development policy. Domestic production o f consumer goods previously imported, via the 
policy o f import substitution, was to be the basic strategy with tariffs and quantitative restrictions 
providing a protected environment. The theoretical underpinning to this strategy was that the 
expansion o f the manufacturing sector through new investment and the reinvestment o f profit, would 
absorb ‘surplus’ labour and generally raise the marginal productivity o f labour in the economy. In 
the small economies o f the Caribbean producing manufactures for foreign markets was seen to be 
an integral part o f the strategy, but this did not become an explicit part o f the policies adopted. 
Modernization became synonymous with industrialization, and the implicit assumption was that this 
modem sector could meet the needs o f the entire population.
In defining the development framework in a period o f high nationalism, political and 
economic objectives became closely intertwined, as the State attempted to straddle its several 
functions as promoter, investor, facilitator and distributor. Some policies lost their time horizons 
and some had no clear thrust. Tax policies, for example, gave confusing signals, while the policy 
toward foreign capital was ambiguous and uncertain. The foundations for much o f the later 
difficulties were laid in the 1960s and 1970s.
The 1960s, however, promised much as the euphoria o f independence and the promise of 
economic planning overwhelmed the concerns about size and limited resources. In this decade the
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Anglophone Caribbean economies grew by about 4 to 5 per cent per year in real terms. Suriname 
and the Dominican Republic also experienced growth rates in the region of 5 per cent. A favourable 
international environment, stable or increasing commodity prices, aid inflows, high levels of 
government spending and available opportunities associated with import substitution activities were 
the main factors behind the growth in the 1960s, and provided the basis for a great deal of the 
optimism in the period. Low inflation rates and low energy cost (petroleum was averaging between
2 and 3 US dollars a barrel) contributed to the favourable environment. The growth of GDP 
generally exceeded the population growth rate, so the growth rate o f per capita GDP was positive, 
in some cases exceeding 2.5 per cent per year.
The 1970s was a more difficult decade for the region, with some countries such as The 
Bahamas and Jamaica losing the momentum of the previous decade. While per capita real Gross 
National Product (GNP) grew by over 3 per cent per year in Barbados, Belize, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Suriname and the Dominican Republic, in Jamaica and The Bahamas it declined by an average rate 
of 2.8 and 2.9 per cent per year, respectively, between 1970 and 1980. In the OECS the performance 
was mixed, with per capita income declining in Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, and Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines. The dramatic increases in the price of oil benefited Trinidad and 
Tobago as an oil exporter but had a disastrous effect on the balance of payments and economic 
performance of the oil-importing countries of the region.
The 1980s was in some senses a defining period for Caribbean States. Some of the 
difficulties that reared their heads in the 1970s continued unresolved in the following decade in 
which some countries experienced lower growth rates while others lost gains made earlier. The 
difference in economic performance among States pursuing different paths to development or at 
different levels o f development raised a variety of questions with respect to the efficacy of particular 
economic policies and strategies. In the 1980s real GDP in the industrial countries grew by around
3 per cent per year on average as compared to 1 per cent for Sub-Saharan Africa, 8.4 per cent for 
East Asia and 1.6  per cent for Latin America and the Caribbean. Within the Caribbean some States 
far exceeded the average for the LAC region. The OECS and Belize, for example, which are 
regarded as weaker and more vulnerable grew by about 5 to 6  per cent per year. On the other hand, 
in 1993 real GDP in Barbados was at the same level as that of 1980. In Suriname and Haiti GDP 
hardly changed between 1980 and 1990, while in Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago it declined by 
27 per cent and 32 per cent respectively in the period. Following the end o f the oil boom, 
government real consumption expenditure in Trinidad and Tobago fell by 9 per cent between 1982 
and 1990 but private real consumption expenditure dropped by some 47 per cent and gross capital 
formation by 67 per cent in the period. The shrinkage o f the Trinidad and Tobago market not 
unexpectedly had an adverse impact on activities in other CARICOM countries.
In the industrial countries real GDP per capita increased by over 2.3 per cent per year in the 
1980s, as compared to 6.2 per cent for East Asia and 0.4 per cent for Latin America and the 
Caribbean. In Guyana real per capita GDP in 1990 was 12 per cent below that o f 1980 and 26 per 
cent below that o f 1970. In Trinidad and Tobago real per capita GDP fell by 30 per cent between 
1980 and 1990. In the OECS, however, real per capita GDP increased by about 4 to 5 per cent per
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year in the 1980s. In the 1990s, real GDP in the LAC region has been growing by an average of 
about 3.3 per cent per year as compared to 1 per cent in the 1980s and 6  per cent in the 1970s. In 
terms of overall growth Chile and Guyana have been among the front-runners in recent years, with 
growth averaging over 6  per cent per year. As can be seen in Table 3 countries like Barbados and 
Trinidad and Tobago have recovered from the depressed performance of the 1980s, but generally 
the growth rate for the region is quite modest.
Table 2
World: Growth of Real GDP and Real GDP Per Capita. 1966-2006a
(Annual Percentage Growth)
Growth of Real GDP. Per Capita. 1966-2006 Growth of Real GDP. 1966-2006
Countries 1966-73 1974-90 1991-95 1996e Forecast
1997-2006
1966-73 1974-90 1991-95 1996e Forecast
1997-2006
High Income 3.8 2.1 1.3 1.9 2.3 4.9 2.9 2.0 2.5 2.8
Low and Middle Income 3.8 1.4 0.5 2.7 3.8 6.7 3.3 2.3 4.5 5.4
Asia 2.8 4.3 6.8 6.4 5.7 5.5 6.2 8.2 7.9 7.1
Latin America 
and the Caribbean 4.2 0.4 1.4 1.7 2.7 6.9 2.6 3.2 3.4 4.2
Europe and Central Asia 5.5 2.2 -6.7 -0.8 4.0 6.6 3.1 -6.4 -0.3 4.5
Middle East and North Africa 5.8 -1.7 -0.1 1.4 1.1 8.7 1.4 2.6 4.1 3.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.0 -0.7 -1.1 0.8 1.2 4.7 2.2 1.5 3.8 4.1
World 2.9 1.2 0.5 1.4 2.0 5.2 3.0 2.0 2.9 3.4
a. based on 1987 prices and exchange rates 
e. estimated
Sources: World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries, 1997.
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1981-91 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996p
CARICOM Countries
Antigua & Barbuda 6.9 1.1 3.7 5.0 -4.5 5.8
Bahamas 3.6 -2.0 1.7 0.9 0.3 3.0
Barbados 0.9 -5.7 0.8 4.0 2.5 4.7
Belize 4.9 9.5 4.3 1.5 3.8 1.5
Dominica 4.0 2.7 1.9 2.1 1.8 3.2
Grenada 5.0 1.1 -1.2 3.3 3.1 3.1
Guyana -2.8 7.7 8.2 8.5 5.1 7.9
Haiti -0.7 -13.2 -2.4 -8.3 4.3 2.8
Jamaica 2.5 1.5 1.4 1.1 0.5 -1.7
Montserrat 6.1a 1.7 1.5 -0.8 -7.6 -17.7
St Kitts-Nevis 6.2 3.5 5.0 5.5 3.7 5.8
St. Lucia 7.0 7.1 2.3 2.1 4.1 1.9
St. Vincent 6.8 6.5 1.1 -1.2 8.3 1.0
Suriname -0.3 5.8 -4.4 -4.2 5.2 3.4
Trinidad & Tobago -1.7 -1.1 -2.6 5.2 3.1 2.8
Other Caribbean Countries L
Anguilla 8.9 7.1 7.5 7.0 -4.2 3.4
Aruba 4.0 5.0 5.9 5.7 3.9
Dominican Republic 2.7 8.0 3.0 4.3 4.8 7.3





Sources:ECLAC; Caribbean Development Bank; World Bank.
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As can be seen in Table 4 per capita income in the OECS now exceeds that o f Guyana and 
Jamaica respectively, and in the case of Antigua and Barbuda and Saint Kitts-Nevis, it is now higher 
than that o f Trinidad and Tobago. Interestingly, in the 1960s the larger Caribbean States such as 
Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were deemed to have greater potential than 
the smaller OECS States and were to be treated as the ‘More Developed Countries’ in the Caribbean 
Community in the context o f policies and measures designed to discourage polarization. Guyana 
is now regarded as one o f the poorest countries in the western hemisphere. The effects of the 
unsatisfactory economic performance of the region’s MDCs in the 1980s were felt not only on the 
flight o f skills and capital, but also on the pace o f economic integration which slowed down 
considerably. O f course, there is a school of thought which argues that with a higher level of 
integration, the region would have been better equipped to withstand the external shocks of the 
1970s and 1980s.
One o f the interesting phenomenon in the Caribbean is the ability o f a number of very small 
economies, some not yet independent, to use their limited natural assets, location and fiscal systems 
to generate relatively high per capita incomes and employment rates. Anguilla (population 11,000), 
the Cayman Islands (population 33,000), the Turks and Caicos Islands (population 15,000), the 
British Virgin Islands (population 19,000) and Aruba (population 84,000) generate per capita 
incomes in the region of between US$5,000 and US$20,000. Montserrat (still a British dependency) 
with a population o f 10,000 people enjoyed a per capita GDP of over US$5,000 before the recent 
series o f volcanic eruptions. The Bahamas (pop. 276,000) also enjoys per capita GNP of over 
US$10,000. Employment rates also tend to be high and some o f these countries have shown 
remarkable resilience in recent years in recovering from depressed situations created by decisions 
taken outside their borders. In Aruba, following the closure of the Exxon’s Largo refinery in 1985, 
un-employment soared to about 40 per cent. It is now estimated to be less than one per cent. These 
economies may never meet most o f the standard criteria in terms of structural change used to define 
a state of development, but by encouraging the development o f tourism and offshore financial 
activities they have been able to share in the international growth of these activities as the traditional 
sources o f income have faded.
Table 4
Growth of Per C apita  GNP. 1970-1995
Nominal Per Capita GNP (TJSS)
Average Annual 
Growth Rate of Real Per Capita GNPf%)
Countries 1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 1995
PPP
1970-80 1980-90 1985-95 1970-95
CARICOM Countries
Antigua & Barbuda 370 1,380 2,030 4,600 7,690 -1.7 4.7 2.7 4.9
Bahamas 2,300 3,450 7,150 11,510 11,940 14,710 -2.9 1.7 -1.0 1.7
Barbados 570 3,270 4,680 6,540 6,560 10,620 3.2 1.4 -0.2 1.9
Belize 590 980 1,130 1,970 2,630 5,400 4.8 2.5 4.4 3.9
Dominica 280 640 1,160 1,940 2,990 -3.1 3.0 4.0 2.5
Grenada 300 780 970 2,120 2,980 -0.6 5.1 6.6
Guyana 370 690 570 370 590 2,420 1.1 -3.2 0.8 -2.6





1,510 1,510 3,540 -2.8 -0.4 3.7 -0.8
Montserrat 5,730° 5,840c
St Kitts-Nevis 320 960 1,520 3,330 5,170 9,410 1.7 6.0 4.6 5.2
St. Lucia 340 890 1,210 1,904 3,370 3.0 4.2 3.9
St. Vincent 240 540 840 1,610 2,280 -1.0 5.7 3.9 3.7
Suriname 530 2,770 2,570 3,050 880 2,250 6.8 -5.0 0.7 4.3
Trinidad & Tobago 860 5,010 6,010 3,470 3,770 8,610 3.9 6.0 -1.6 -0.1
Other Caribbean Countries
Dominican Republic 350 1,190 810 820 1,460 3,870 3.3 -0.4 2.1
not available
a. estimated
b. per capita GDP, 1994
c. per capita GDP, 1994 
ppp. purchasing power pavity
Sources: World Bank, Atlas, Various Issues and World Development Indicators, Various Issues.
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Factor accumulation tends to rank very high in the literature as a determinant of output 
growth. In this connection, a great deal of attention tends to be centered on the level of saving and 
investment in an economy. There is some controversy over whether growth causes saving rates to 
rise, or a high level o f saving is a pre-requisite for growth. What the evidence does show, however, 
is that fast growing economies are associated with a high level of saving and investment (see Table 
5 ). Fourteen o f the world’s fastest growing economies over the past 10 years had a saving rate over 
25 per cent, and none had a saving rate under 18 per cent. At the same time 8 o f the world’s slowest 
growing 2 0  economies over the same period had a saving rate below 10 per cent and 14 were below 
15 per cent.6 Some recent studies seem to suggest that it is growth that drives savings rather than 
the other way around.7 Growth also tends to attract foreign investment which is often reluctant to 




Saving and Investment Rates in Selected Countries. 
Average. 1993-95
(% o f  GDP)
Countries (1) (2) (3) (4)
Grouped by GNP Per Capita
Saving Rates CAB GDS GDI Real G row th Rate (%)
Less than 10%
Bangladesh -2.6 8.3 15.4 2.1
Bolivia -7.8 6.8 15.2 1.7
El Salvador -0.9 4.7 18.9 2.9
Ghana -6.6 4.5 16.4 1.5
Senegal -2.8 7.5 14.2 -1.2
10-20%
Argentina -2.7 19.5 18.8 1.9
Canada -3.0 19.7 18.8 0.4
Denmark 2.1 21.0 14.9 1.5
Israel -4.5 13.9 23.2 2.5
M exico -4.8 18.6 20.9 0.1
21-30%
Brazil -0.9 21.9 21.0 -0.7
Chile -1.8 28.0 27.6 6.1
France 0.8 22.5 14.9 1.5
Germany -0.9 22.5 21.8
India -1.2 21.3 23.0 3.1
M auritius -3.4 23.4 29.5 5.7
Over 30%
China -0.4 41.5 41.2 8.0
Hong Kong 33.6 31.5 4.8
Japan 2.7 31.1 29.1 2.9
M alaysia -4.7 36.7 38.1 5.7
South Korea -0.8 35.6 36.1 7.6
Singapore 13.9 34.9 6.2
Thailand -6.3 36.2 41.6 8.4
not available
CAB -  Current Account o f  the Balance o f Payments
GDS -  Gross Dom estic Savings (difference between GDP and total consumption)
GDI -  Gross Dom estic Investm ent (sum o f all outlays on additions to capital assets, plus changes
in inventories
Source: W orld Bank, World Development Indicators, 1997; W orld Bank, Atlas, 1997.
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The savings ratio, that is, GDS as a proportion of GDP, not only varies widely across the 
Caribbean region, but for individual countries can also fluctuate wildly from year to year. In the 
1980s, most OECS countries had a savings rate of less than 15 per cent, but with the help of foreign 
resources, the investment rate averaged over 25 per cent, and this helps to explain the favourable 
growth experience in the period. In the larger territories the saving rates average less than 20 per 
cent, but in some cases, for example, Guyana and Jamaica, this has improved in the 1990s. The 
decline in the Trinidad and Tobago ratio from an average of around 40 per cent during most of the 
1970s, to an average o f 23 per cent between 1981 and 1991 corresponds with the significant drop 
in income in this period as a result o f the fall in oil prices. The investment rate in the larger 
Caribbean countries ranged between 18 and 32 per cent o f GDP during the 1980s and while the data 
for the 1990s indicate an improved performance for most countries, the ratio was in most cases less 
than 30 per cent.
While the concept o f ‘GDS’ gives an indication of the savings capacity of a country, it may 
not reflect resources available for domestic investment. The related concept of ‘GNS’ takes account 
of factor income payments and net transfers abroad. In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, for 
example, the GDS ratio averaged 25 per cent per year between 1985 and 1995 as compared to 17 per 
cent for the GNS ratio. If  account is taken of the consumption of fixed capital, the net national 
savings rate in this country has been averaging around 6  per cent of GDP since the mid-1980s. In 
the early 1990s the GNS ratio in Jamaica fluctuated between 11 and 24 per cent. In Guyana it was 
estimated to be around 13 per cent in 1994, while in Belize it has averaged 21 per cent in the first 
half of the 1990s.
Savings and Investment Ratios in Selected CAR1COM Countries. 1973-1995
Table 6
Countries 1973-80
Savings Ratio 1 
1981-91 1992-94 1993-95 1973-80
Investment Ratio2 
1981-91 1992-94 1993-95
Bahamas 25.7a 25.0° 14.7s 13.7a 18.6b 2 0 .8 2 0 . l h
Barbados 12.1 17.2 17.3
O00in 2 2 .8 18.9 12.3 13.1
Belize 18.7 2 0 .6 18.6 27.2 24.4 29.1 25.2
Guyana ' 2 0 .0 18.0 37.6 36.8 29.7 31.5 50.3 47.3
Jamaica 16.0 18.4 25.5 23.6 2 2 .8 23.8 31.8 27.5
Trinidad & Tobago 39.3 23.1 24.6 27.4 27.0 21.7 12.8 15.7
OECS
Antigua 21.5 20.9 23.9 33.8 e 2 1 .8 32.4
Dominica 7.4a 1.7 2.7 27.0d 16.0 19.7
Grenada 8.1 15.3 17.0 38.0 30.5 31.4
Montserrat -2.4 5.9 7.6s ., 43.3e 37.5 32.8h
St. Kitts-Nevis 14.Ia 12.8 23.2 20.3 34.3a 39.5 38.8 37.8
St. Lucia 7.1f 11.2 10 .2 19.1 34.3f 24.5 15.9 24.7
St. Vincent 12.0 13.0 11.7 34.6a 26.5 26.8 26.5
(1) Gross Domestic Savings as a % of GDP at current market prices




c. Gross National Saving
d. 1984-90
e. 1983-91 g. 1993-94
f. 1980 h. 1993 only
Source: World Bank, World Tables, 1995; CDB, Annual Report, Various Issues; Official Publications; CDB, Social and Economic 
Indicators, Various Issues.
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While governments in the fast growing economies are saving between 5 and 10 per cent o f 
GDP, government savings in the Caribbean tend to be small and often negative. Available evidence 
indicates that the poor performance o f the larger CARICOM countries during the 1980s coincided 
with a decline in real investment.
With respect to aggregate private savings, data are not readily available for all countries but 
one can get some indication o f their importance by deducting government savings from the overall 
figure which itself is a residual. In Trinidad and Tobago, for example, private savings, including 
depreciation, averaged 95 per cent of GNS in the early 1990s. Precise and up to date data on the 
contribution o f personal and corporate savings are also not easily available. In Trinidad and Tobago 
the contribution o f personal savings to total domestic savings amounted, on average, to more than 
three times the contribution o f corporate savings in the 1950s. A study using more recent data 
appears to confirm that in this country the propensity to save out of personal income is higher than 
that associated with corporate profits .8 In Jamaica, however, figures available for the 1950s and 
1960s indicated that corporate savings make a larger contribution to GNS than personal savings.9 
In recent years public savings in most countries of the region have been increasing, and in certain 
cases average over 3 per cent of GDP (see Table 7).
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Table 7
Central Government: Current Savings or Deficit (-3 as a %  o f G DP
Year Bahamas Barbados Belize Guyana Jamaica Trinidad & Tobago
1980 2 .8 2.7 4.7 -11 .6 4.0 2 1 .6
1981 2 .6 1.0 2 .0 -20.4 4.0 2 0 .2
1982 0 .8 0.9 1.3 -29.3 2.9 4.8
1983 0.3 2.4 0.1 -27.1 -8 .6 1.8
1984 0.4 0.5 -0 .2 -36.7 -1.4 1.8
1985 1.0 0.5 -2 .0 -18.0 -0.7 1.9
1986 1.4 1.6 2 .0 -5.0 5.1 -0 .8
1987 1.5 1.2 3.8 -27.2 3.6 1.3
1988 -0 .2 4.5 7.3 -10.3 2.3 -2.3
1989 -0 .6 4.5 8 .6 -4.9 4.1 -2 .0
1990 0 .2 0 .2 9.3 -14.6 4.9 -0.1
1991 -1.1 2.7 7.3 -16.8 6.1 3.1
1992 0.1 2.3 5.7 -11.3 7.3 -1.2
1993 0.1 3.3 2.9 1.9 6.7 1.4
1994 1.9 2.3 2 .6 5.4 6 .0 1.4
1995 1.8 3.2 -0 .6 6.5 7.4 2 .0
1996P 1.0 1.7 3.5 9.4 -0 .2 3.2
p. provisional
Source: IDB, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1996 Report; Official 
Publications.
Given the strong correlation which seems to exist between savings and investment, a major 
aim o f public policy in the Caribbean is to increase both public and private savings. The factors 
which affect government savings, however, are not the same as those that affect private savings. 
With respect to the latter, some o f the variables that have attracted attention are per capita income, 
financial intermediation, the rate o f inflation, the level o f taxation, and the availability o f  social 
security arrangements. The study o f savings can also be usefully approached from the consumption 
side. Some studies have shown that an increase in government savings can have a negative impact 
on private savings as a result of taxation and expenditure (wages and salaries) policies. The ability 
o f the government to save rests critically on the environment in which it operates. The efficiency 
o f the bureaucracy and the tax system, its inclination to levy user charges where feasible, access to 
capital funds, and the approach to subsidies are among the complex o f factors which may affect the 
level o f pubic sector savings. One study has found that the creation o f social and political 
institutions that reduce the degree o f political instability will have a positive effect on public sector 
savings. 11
The contribution o f foreign savings varies from year to year and from country to country. 
In recent years foreign resources have played a critical role in financing investment in countries like 
Saint Lucia and Dominica with low domestic savings rates (See Table 6  ). In the relatively more 
developed countries o f the region, however, domestic savings have financed the bulk of domestic 
investment. Foreign savings seem to have contributed on average around 20-30 per cent to gross 
domestic capital formation. The trends in localization in the 1960s and 1970s created a very 
uncertain climate for private foreign investment, leading to a decline in private inflows and capital 
flight. This development was not unrelated to the increase in the public sector borrowing as 
governments increased their role in the economy to offset declines triggered by changes affecting 
the main sectors o f the economy. Subsequently, the large share o f foreign exchange earnings taken 
by foreign debt service underlined the limits of ad hoc borrowing.
In order to supplement domestic savings with foreign savings and to access technology, an 
increasing number o f countries in the developing world are liberalizing their capital accounts and 
adopting investment-friendly policies. The competition for foreign investment has increased 
significantly in recent years. While net official development finance flows to developing countries 
have been on a declining trend during the 1990s, total private flows increased from US$44.4 billion 
in 1990 to US$244 billion in 1996, totaling US$938 billion between 1990 and 1996. Private 
investment accounted for almost half o f this total. Interestingly, the major recipient o f private capital 
flows have been the high saving/high growth countries o f East Asia and the Pacific which received 
over 40 per cent. Some 33 per cent flowed to Latin America and the Caribbean with Mexico, Brazil 
and Argentina accounting for just over 75 per cent. 12 It has been estimated that total net private 
flows to Latin America and Asia in 1996 alone exceeded total flows for the entire 1980s.13
As a result o f market-oriented reforms and privatization, the opportunities for investment 
have grown significantly in recent years as an increasing number o f countries become ‘creditworthy’. 
Transnational corporations are increasingly servicing foreign markets through establishment of 
foreign affiliates rather than through exports. The growth of global sales has exceeded that of 
exports of goods and services byafactor o f 1.2 to 1.3 since 1987.14
As far as the Caribbean is concerned, investment policies are becoming more open, but the 
subregion has received only about 2 per cent of net foreign direct investment flows since 1991. 
Though flows for most countries have increased in the 1990s, the pattern o f flow is highly skewed 
towards a few recipients. (See Tables 8 and 9). Aside from the Cayman Islands, which is an 
offshore financial centre, Trinidad and Tobago has attracted the largest volume, US$1.9 billion 
between 1991 and 1996 as compared to US$57 million in the period 1985-1990. Most of this 
investment, however, has been flowing into the gas-based sector, with the result that this, the most 




Inflows o f Foreign Direct Investment bv Country. 1985-1996 (USSm l
Countries
1985 - 
1990^ 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996**
Antigua & Barbuda 36 55 20 15 25 27 31
Aruba 22 185 -37 -18 -73 -6 30
Bahamas 2 55 73 118 137 171 210
Barbados 88 7 14 9 13 12 22
Belize 11 14 16 9 15 21 26
Cayman Islands 121 -9 27 447 447 470 510
Cuba - 10 7 3 14 9 12
Dominica 11 15 21 13 22 25 19
Dominican Republic 87 145 180 91 132 271 160
Grenada 10 15 23 20 19 16 19
Guyana 1 13 147 70 107 74 81
Haiti 7 14 8 8 2 2 3
Jamaica 37 133 142 78 117 167 175
Netherlands Antilles -22 33 40 11 22 10 11
St. Kitts-Nevis 23 21 13 14 15 20 17
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent &
22 58 41 34 32 35 39
Grenadines 7 9 19 31 51 31 45
Suriname -67 10 -30 -47 -30 19 7
Trinidad & Tobago 57 169 178 379 516 299 320
TOTAL 19 countries 373 952 902 1,285 1,583 1,673 1,737
♦Annual average. ♦♦Estimates. .. not available
Sources: UN World Investment Report, 1997.
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Table 9




Trinidad & Tobago 976 2,093 3,954
Cayman Islands 223 1,749 3,642
Dominican Republic 239 572 1,550
Jamaica 501 690 1,502
Bahamas 298 336 1,099
St. Lucia 94 315 554
Antigua & Barbuda 23 292 464
Netherlands Antilles 568 206 332
St. Kitts & Nevis 1 160 260
Barbados 102 169 256
St. Vincent & Grenadines 1 48 234
Aruba 131 2 1 2
Haiti 79 149 186
Grenada 1 70 183
Dominica 66 182
Belize 12 72 172
Cuba 3 57
TOTAL 3,118 7,121 14,839
*Estimated by adding flows. **Estimates. .. not available
Sources: UN World Investment Report, 1997.
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In the Caribbean, gross domestic investment (gross capital formation, or gross domestic 
capital formation) as a per cent o f GDP tends to be higher than the savings ratio (See Table 6 ). This 
is particularly so in the OECS where the investment ratio o f over 20 per cent in some cases is more 
than twice the savings ratio. Among the larger CARICOM countries, the investment performance 
seemed to have declined significantly from the 1970s at over 20 per cent in Barbados and Trinidad 
and Tobago and improved in Jamaica and Guyana where the investment ratio crossed 30 per cent 
in the early 1990s. Generally foreign savings in the form of grants, private investment and loans 
have made possible a higher level of investment than would have been warranted by the domestic 
savings effort.
Data on real investment are not available for all countries, but in the cases of Guyana and 
Jamaica, they give an indication o f a significant decline since the 1970s. In Trinidad and Tobago, 
real investment increased by an annual rate o f 12.7 per cent per year between 1973 and 1982, but 
since then it has declined to an annual rate o f 9.5 per cent per year. In Jamaica real investment in 
the early 1990s, was below the level of the 1970s. Guyana, too, experienced a steady decline until 
the early 1990s.
Available data on the contribution o f the public sector to capital formation in recent years 
amounts to less than 10 per cent o f GDP in most cases (See Table 10). In certain countries, such as 
Saint Lucia and Belize, public sector investment has exceeded capital spending by the private sector. 
Most public sector investment was in infrastructure which is not only underdeveloped in some 
countries o f the region, but has not been maintained in others.
Domestic capital formation
Table 10 
Contributions o f the Public and
Private Sectors to Savings and Investment
(Average 1990-1994)
Gross National Savings as a % of GDP Gross Investment as a % o f GDP
Countries Private Public Total Foreign Private Public Total
Antigua
Barbados1
18.7 -3.6 15.1 3.6 21.4 2 .6 24.0
15.0 2.4 17.4 -4.0 11.4 2.1 13.5




8.9 3.4 12.3 15.8 16.6 11.4 28.0
2 1 .2 4.3 25.5 11.1 28.4 8 .2 36.6
4.3 1.0 5.3 31.2 2 1 .8 15.2 37.0
Jamaica 18.7 11 .8 30.5
St. Kitts-Nevis2 
St. Lucia1
2 0 .6 7.0 . 27.6 38.8 6.7 45.5
2 .2 10.4 1 2 .6 1 1 .0 10.8 12.8 23.6
St. Vincent ,, 17.6 11 .6 29.2




Source: IMF, Country Reports.
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The deterioration of the utilities, transport, communications and social infrastructure in some 
Caribbean countries during the 1980s as a result o f financial problems, would have discouraged 
private investment and no doubt contributed significantly to economic decline in this period. Poor 
macroeconomic management would also have contributed to the decline. Rebuilding and 
modernizing the social and economic infrastructure is a prerequisite for economic growth and 
development. Making greater use o f existing capital stock also has to be on the agenda.
Given the common perceptions about the role o f private investment in the development 
process, a great deal o f attention is given both by academics and policy makers to identifying the 
critical determinants o f an investment-friendly environment. Among those featuring in these 
exercises are natural resources, the size o f the local market, the rate o f growth of per capita income, 
the macroeconomic environment, tax incentives, exchange controls, interest rates, the quality o f the 
workforce, the state o f the physical infrastructure, etc. A recent econometrics study done on the 
Caribbean found that the share o f investment in GDP was positively correlated with GDP growth 
and even more strongly with export growth l5. The effect of government domestic borrowing on 
local investment, the ‘crowding out’ effect, was uncertain. The commonly accepted view that 
investment was negatively related to the lending rate was not supported. The interest rate variable 
came out with a positive sign. The study also showed the interest rate spread to be positively 
correlated with investment and growth. In the ‘financial repression’ debate it is often argued that 
a real interest rate policy will encourage savings, investment and growth. The deposit rate variable 
was found to be negatively correlated with these variables.
It is well known that the results of statistical analysis are often strongly influenced by the 
variables chosen, the quality o f the data and even the time period studied. It is often difficult to 
quantify some o f the most critical influences, such as the effects of external economies, the 
perception of government's economic management, the investment climate, the effects of 
bureaucracy on decision-making, and so on. Not surprisingly, investment policy reforms tend to rely 
on what seems to be obvious relationships and areas where specific action can be taken such as tax 
rates, investment laws and regulations, bilateral treaties, institutional factors and so on. These all 
carry different weights in different countries, and therefore a common investment function applicable 
to all countries will be hard to find.
Accumulation policies in a liberalizing environment
There are many factors which impact on growth. Among them are technological innovation, 
a boom in exports, capital inflows, discovery and exploitation of some major natural resource and 
so on. Most countries, however, have found it difficult to sustain high growth rates over a long 
period of time. The ability of a few countries in South East Asia to do this has been associated with 
a significant increase in savings and investment rates. Savings rates in these countries were lower 
than in Latin America in 1965, but by 1990 they exceeded Latin America’s by almost 20 percentage 
points. At the same time while investment levels were about equal in Latin America and East Asia 
in 1965, by 1990 East Asia’s investment rates were nearly double the average for Latin America.16
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As can be seen in Table 5 the growth in per capita GNP of over 5 per cent per year is associated with 
savings and investment rates of over 30 per cent.
Current savings and investment rates in some Caribbean countries compare favourably with 
those in developed countries such as Canada, France, Germany and the United States. In the 
industrialized countries as a group the saving rate has been averaging around 2 2  per cent per year 
in the 1990s as compared to 21 per cent for domestic investment. An observation made with respect 
to the performance of fast growing developing countries, however, is worth noting. “We often fail 
to appreciate just how spectacular the rate of accumulation has been in the Third World compared 
to past historical standards. It took America more than six decades to do what the Third World has 
done in two or three: that is the investment ratios in the successful developing countries today are 
what they were in America in 1900 after 60 years or more of industrialization. In the absence of 
government intervention, the rate of accumulation in England during the first Industrial Revolution 
was about a third o f that in contemporary LDCs and the saving rate was less than half.” 17
A relevant question here is why are some countries with reasonably high saving and 
investment rates not growing at the desired rate, or not narrowing the gap with the developed 
countries. Part o f the answer may lie not only in the level of investment taking place, but where is 
the investment taking place and is it raising capital formation in strategic sectors of the economy. 
Is it raising productivity and is it developing the human capital resources needed for growth. Is the 
appropriate mix between public and private investment being achieved. While recognizing these 
issues, there is a view that even at current income levels, the Caribbean is capable o f saving and 
investing a much higher proportion of national income. This, it is often argued, would reduce 
dependency on foreign savings and minimize the problems associated with foreign indebtedness.
What should be the target? One observer has suggested that if  population growth can be 
controlled at 1 per cent per annum and GDP can grow at 6  per cent per annum, per capita income 
can double every 14 years. To achieve this level of growth performance the region requires 
“increased and more productive investments. Gross investment of at least 35 per cent of GDP at an 
incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) below 3 would help the Region to achieve its per capita 
income target.” 18 As indicated before, capital accumulation is a necessary, though not sufficient, 
condition for growth.
Development policy and the macroeconomic framework
In the Caribbean, both the countries that have undertaken structural adjustment programmes 
either on their own or in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank, as well as those that performed reasonably well in the 1980s, face certain common 
development and management challenges. Periodic favourable growth performances often mask 
deep-seated structural problems that contribute to vulnerability and instability. Though there have 
been some changes in the structure o f the economy inherited from the colonial period, in essential 
ways the functioning o f the economy has not changed. The Caribbean economies produce largely 
for foreign markets and satisfy almost all their consumer and industrial needs from abroad. The
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export base, however, is a weak one consisting largely o f agricultural and mineral products exported 
in raw or semi-refined form. Two of the major resource-based exports, sugar and bananas, are 
produced at relatively high cost and require special marketing arrangements to survive. Foreign 
earnings are not only affected by changes in market conditions but by natural factors such as 
hurricanes, drought and disease. The emergence of tourism has strengthened the foreign exchange 
earnings capacity of the region, but this activity itself operates in an unpredictable environment.
If the refining and processing of natural resources are excluded from the manufacturing 
sector, the latter for the most part revolves around a few simple activities reflecting the failure of the 
import substitution strategy pursued since the 1950s and particularly since the 1960s. The approach 
was generally the same as in Latin America where in order to encourage the domestic production 
o f consumer imports previously imported, a range o f incentives was offered, including the use of 
tariffs and non-tariffs restrictions to exclude competing imports. The incentives paid little attention 
to the effect on resource allocation and bore little relation to specific objectives such as employment 
and exports. In order to safeguard their local share o f the domestic markets, traditional suppliers 
responded by entering into licensing arrangements with local distributors for the assembly or 
packaging o f goods previously imported in ‘whole’ form. In most cases local value added was small 
and some of the licensing arrangements explicitly prohibited exports. In the absence of a long-term 
sequencing strategy, the manufacturing sector in the Caribbean has proceeded little beyond the 
assembling and packaging o f simple consumer products for the local and regional markets. The 
emergence o f the highly capital intensive gas-based industries in Trinidad and Tobago’s production 
landscape has to be seen as a distinct operation not related to the broader import substitution process 
associated with low value-added activities.
The ‘new’ production configuration reflected prevailing consumption patterns and income 
distribution. The small size o f the domestic markets effectively removed the benefits o f economies 
of scale and led to high per unit cost o f production. The emergence of monopolies in various product 
lines encouraged poor quality goods and allowed earnings (economic rent) that were higher than 
could be earned from exports. In this sense the strategy had a strong built-in bias against exports. 
Imports o f raw materials and capital goods have relied heavily on foreign exchange earned by the 
traditional resource based exports and tourism. Final consumer goods imports may have fallen, but 
imports of raw materials, intermediate imports and capital goods would have increased, resulting in 
little net foreign exchange saving. With the decline o f agriculture the region has become 
increasingly dependent on imported food. Some import substitution activities, for example motor 
car assembly in Trinidad and Tobago, not only involved a considerable wastage of capital, but their 
inefficiency led to a severe exploitation of the local consumer.
As a strategy to broaden the production and export base o f the economy and increase 
employment opportunities, the import substitution strategy pursued in the Caribbean has been a 
dismal failure. Unintentionally, perhaps, the incentives that were granted favoured capital intensive 
techniques o f production and carried an anti-export bias. An environment o f perpetual protection 
removed the incentives for greater efficiency. Initially, the infant industry argument was used to 
rationalize the protective structure, but with the persistence of high unemployment rates, protection
was often reinforced by other policies which militated against the development o f the tradable goods 
sector. Policies to encourage manufacturing based on natural resources either at the country or 
regional level were never strongly embraced, though the benefits o f such policies were widely 
recognized.
The failure o f the manufacturing activities to emerge as a significant sector in Caribbean 
economies and the relative neglect of agriculture, have raised several issues relating to resource 
allocation and the development options open to the small Caribbean economies in a fast changing 
world. One reason for the emphasis placed on manufacturing relates not only to its potential for 
exports, but because of the opportunities offered for employment and increasing productivity. The 
inward-looking policy framework, however, effectively stymied the possibilities for expansion and 
the transformation o f the economy.
The contribution o f manufacturing to GDP is generally less than 10 per cent in Caribbean 
countries. Most o f the activities are centred around simple manufactures including the processing 
of agricultural products. For example, in Trinidad and Tobago if we exclude petrochemical and oil 
refining from the sector, food, beverages and tobacco alone account for over 40 per cent of value- 
added of the total manufacturing contribution. With respect to employment, the sector in Barbados 
and Trinidad and Tobago accounts for about 10 per cent of the employed labour force.
The share of agriculture in GDP has been declining in almost all Caribbean countries (see 
Table 11). In Trinidad and Tobago it contributes 2 per cent as compared to 20 per cent in Belize. 
Agricultural exports have also been declining in most countries. In some countries, however, 
agriculture is still a significant employer o f labour though agricultural employment as a proportion 
of the labour force has also been falling. In 1995, 68  per cent of the labour force in Haiti was 
agriculture, 11 per cent in Trinidad and Tobago, 24 per cent in Jamaica and 33 per cent in Belize.
The Caribbean economies are now highly oriented to services, which in most cases account 
for over 75 per cent o f GDP. Tourism dominates the economy of Aruba, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Bahamas and Barbados and makes a significant contribution in Jamaica and the OECS. Following 
the example o f the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands, some countries have attempted to encourage 
offshore financial activities with varying degrees of success. In all the Caribbean countries, tourist 
expenditure has been increasing (See Table 12), but the high import content and the limited linkages 
with other sectors o f the economy have reduced the potential benefits of the activity to the region. 
The potential o f the large numbers o f visitors to the Caribbean as a market for a range of locally 
produced goods and services has not been fully exploited. While there are undoubted benefits 
accruing from tourism, the activity also has a downside in terms of its effect on the environment and 
on the price of land to nationals. In these areas public policy cannot remain unconcerned.
Table 11
Composition of G DP (at Current Factor Cost). 1970-1995
Agriculture1 Mining and Quarrying Manufacturing Utilities and other services
Countries 1970 1980 1990 1995 ~ 1970 1980 1990 1995~__________1970 1980 1990 1995 1970 1980 1990 1995
O ECS
Antigua & Barbuda 5 7 4 4a 2 2“ 12 5 3 2a 83 88 91 92*
Dominica 32 31 25 19 1 1 1 6 5 7 7 62 74 63 73
Grenada 20 25 17 10 _ - 4 4 5 6 76 71 78 84
Montserrat 17 4 3 6 1 1 1 - 6 2 3 83 89 94 90
St. Kitts-Nevis 30 16 6 6 1 - 3 15 13 10 77 69 80 84
St. Lucia 16 12 15 10 1 1 1 3 9 8 7 81 78 76 82
St. Vincent 24 15 19 13 _ - 3 11 9 9 73 74 72 78
O ther CARICOM
Bahamas 3 3b .. __b 3 3b 94 94b
Barbados 14 10 5 6 1 1 1 10 12 8 7 76 77 86 86
Belize 30 22 20 1 1 16 16 14 54 61 65
Guyana 19 28 43 41 20 16 10 16 12 12 9 11 49 44 42 32
Haiti 32' __c 15' 53'
Jamaica 7 9 7 9 13 15 9 7 13 11 19 18 67 65 73 66
Suriname 11 23d -  -  3 2d - - 13 14“ 73 61 “
Trinidad & Tobago' 6 2 2 2 22 42 24 27 9 f 6f 7f 8f 63 50 67 63
.. not available a. 1994 c. 1988 e. GDP at market prices 1. including forestry and fishing
- nil or negligable b. 1992 d. 1993 f. excludes oil refining and petro chemical industries
Source: CDB; ECLAC; National Publications
Table 12
To u ris t Expenditure. 1980-1996 (US$m)
1995 E x p .
Countries_________________________ 1980__________1985________1990_______ 1995________ 1996_______ as a % o f  GDP
Antigua 42 133 250 2 0 0 237 40
Aruba 138 121 353 521 604
Bahamas 595 995 1,333 1,346 1,450 39
Barbados 251 309 494 1,231 1,302 66
British Virgin Islands 42 68 132
Cuba 48 116 268 1 ,1 0 0 1,350
Dominica 3 9 25 28 30 13
Dominican Republic 168 368 750 1,552 1,747 13
Grenada 15 32 34 72 74 27
Guadeloupe 111 95 231
Haiti 46 69 75 90 96
Jamaica 242 407 740 1,069 1,128 21
Martinique 75 93 240
Montserrat 4 8 11
Netherlands Antilles 260 225 449 591 579
Puerto Rico 615 723 1,377 1,827 1,898
St. Kitts-Nevis 13 31 63 58 61 25
St. Lucia 33 90 154 204 2 1 0 39
St. Vincent 14 23 46 47 48 18
Suriname 18 9 11
Trinidad and Tobago 151 197 95





In the early 1960s, diversification o f the economy, full employment and greater self-reliance 
were seen as major objectives o f development policy. Against a background where Caribbean 
economies were driven by external factors and where key sectors o f the economy were in foreign 
hands, the need to reorient the functioning o f these economies and reduce economic dependence 
were seen as an essential part o f the transformation process. With a weak private sector, the State 
itself took the lead role in nationalizing what it saw as the ‘commanding heights’ o f the economy, 
and assumed the role o f ‘engine o f growth.’ In addition to its welfare responsibilities, the State’s 
involvement in the economy varied from country to country. Guyana was an extreme case. By 
1988, the Government had not only nationalized the major productive sectors, but controlled over 
80 per cent o f recorded import and export trade and 85 per cent o f total investment.19
Between the late 1960s early 1970s there was growing concern over the failure to diversify 
the economy and achieve growth and employment targets. In Trinidad and Tobago, the un­
employment rate showed a steady increase between 1970 and 1975. In 1973 foreign reserves 
reached its lowest point in many years, but the increase in oil prices in the 1970s significantly 
changed the picture. In Barbados and Jamaica the unemployment rate also exceeded 20 per cent by 
the mid-1970s, and while in Barbados the rate fell in the early 1980s, in Jamaica it continued to 
climb reaching over 27 per cent by the end of the decade. While Trinidad and Tobago as an oil 
producer benefited from the oil shocks o f the 1970s, the oil importing countries o f the region were 
severely affected. By 1976 the net foreign reserves position of both Guyana and Jamaica had already 
turned negative, and were to worsen further in the 1980s with the reduced earnings from the major 
traditional exports.
The 1980s was a particularly difficult period for the larger Caribbean States. Between 1976 
and 1980 the Barbadian economy grew by an average rate o f 5 per cent, but by 1992 total output was 
lower than the 1980 level. In Trinidad and Tobago, the decline o f oil prices in the early part o f the 
decade had an immediate impact on the reserves and revenue position of the government, but the full 
fiscal implications were delayed for a few years as the government drew on the public sector savings 
o f previous years. The country’s foreign reserves dropped from US$3,348 million at the end of 1981 
to US$127 million at the end o f 1988. In Guyana, total output declined by 25 per cent between 1980 
and 1990 while export earnings dropped by almost 50 per cent between 1980 and 1990. Reflecting 
the inability o f capital inflows to cover the current account deficits, foreign reserves moved from 
US$58.3 million in 1978 to US$4 million in 1988 and to US$29 million in 1990. In Jamaica the 
economy grew at an average rate of around 2.2 per cent in the 1980s, but the 1990 output level was 
about the same as that o f 1973. Despite a favourable balance on the services account, this could not 
offset the persistent trade deficits and the effects on foreign reserves which were equivalent to a little 
over one month’s imports in 1990. The OECS grew at an average rate o f over 5 per cent per year 
and were in a stronger position at the end of the decade. The deteriorating economic performance 
in the larger Caribbean States in the 1980s was reflected not only in output levels, but in employment 
and social conditions. In Trinidad and Tobago, for example, the unemployment rate increased from 
9 per cent in 1980 to 20 per cent in 1990. The initial reaction by the State in the Caribbean to the
foreign exchange and revenue crisis in the 1980s was to increase borrowing, rather than institute 




Countries 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Selected
CARICOM Countries
Antigua & Barbuda 20.5 6.8 6.7 7.8 6.7 7.4
Bahamas 16.6 12.2 12.0 12.3 14.8 13.1 13.3 11.1 12.0
Barbados 11.4 18.7 15.0 17.3 23.0 24.3 21.9 19.7 16.4
Belize 15.1 14.8 13.8 11.9 9.8 11.1 12.5 13.7
Jamaica 27.3 25.0 16.0 15.7 15.4 16.3 15.4 16.2 16.0
Montserrat 5.4 5.3 1.0 6.0 9.0 10.0 8.3
Suriname 16.0 17.2 14.6
Trinidad & Tobago 8.7 15.3 20.0 19.0 19.7 19.8 18.4 17.2 16.3
Other Caribbean Countries
Aruba 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.6
Dominican Republic 19.0 19.0 20.0 21.0 16.0 16.0 17.0
Netherlands Antilles 14.6 13.9 13.6 12.8 13.1
not available
Sources: IDB; CDB; ECLAC.
Generally, both the public domestic debt and public external debt grew in the 1970s and this 
trend continued into the 1980s. In Barbados, the outstanding external debt as a proportion o f GDP 
increased from 9 per cent in 1970 to 19 per cent in 1981. In Guyana, it moved from 30 per cent in 
1970 to 112 per cent in 1981 and in Jamaica from 16 per cent to 77 per cent over the same period. 
As can be seen in Table 14, borrowing by all countries increased during the 1980s in varying 
degrees. In most o f the OECS countries and Belize, with the improving fiscal positions and capital 
inflows, particularly in the latter part of the 1980s, public debt did not increase as quickly as it did 
in the larger countries, where public revenues came under sustained pressure largely as a result of 
the performance o f the external sector.
The increase in debt service payments in the 1980s accompanied by depressed earnings from 
exports resulted in a significant increase in the debt service ratio for some countries. A few had 
difficulty meeting debt service obligations. Guyana had already reached this position as far back as 
1981. The scheduled debt service ratio for this country increased from 24.4 per cent in 1981 to 98.4 
per cent in 1989. The actual ratio in the latter year was 11.5 per cent. In the case of Trinidad and 
Tobago, the ratio increased from less than 3 per cent in the early 1980s to over 20 per cent in the 
early 1990s, a trend reflecting the movement in oil prices.
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In the 1990s, the outstanding external debt has increased in a few cases, but the debt o f the 
largest debtors has fallen. The debt service ratio has also come down, as a result of the maturing of 
some loans, write-offs and rescheduling. It would be wrong to conclude from this, however, that the 
public debt is no longer an issue. In Guyana interest paid on the public debt in 1995 amounted to 
40 per cent o f current expenditure as compared to 43 per cent for Jamaica.
Table 14
Growth of the Outstanding External Debt, 1981-96
Countries 1981
External Debt (US$) 
1991 1996 1981
Debt as a % o f  GDP1 
1991 1996
Debt Service Ratio2 
1981 1991 1996
OECS
Antigua 57.7 260.0 223.6 46.0 61.6 48.3 8.2 2.2 1.5
Dominica 17.0 84.8 104.3 28.8 47.8 46 .5a 3.4 4.2 6.7“
Grenada 17.1 85.9 89.3 17.6 40.9 36.6a 3.7 4.3 4.9a
Montserrat 2.0 3.4 10.0 9.9 5.7 2.4 2.0 1.8*
St. Kitts-Nevis 10.8 36.8 54.3 20.9 21.5 23.2a 3.0 2.7 1.2a
St. Lucia 17.8 70.2 126.8 13.6 16.7 20.5a 1.3 2.0 bo
St. Vincent 15.6 58.7 87.4 21.2 26.2 31.8a 1.6 3.5 5.2a
O ther CARICOM
Bahamas 98.0 412.3 357.8 7.9 14.3 10.5 4.7 4.2 5.2
Barbados 176.1 466.6 362.9 19.0 27.5 24.0 2.6 19.6 14.2
Belize 54.5 150.6 216.9 34.8 41.4 42.0 1.4 6.7 9.5
Guyana 635.7 1,855.3 1,499.0 112.0 350.4 209.0 21.7 20.3 20.0
Haiti 423.0 906.0 800.0 26.1 35.8 28.0 9.2 10.2
Jamaica 2,293.1 3,874.4 3,231.9 76.9 119.6 59.2 28.6 25.7 19.9
Suriname 26.0 123.0 162.5 5.1 30.6 0.6 4.3
Trinidad & Tobago 1,050.0 2,195.4 1,875.7 15.3 67.0 36.5 2.4 20.0 13.7
O ther Caribbean C ountries
Dominican Republic 2,255.0 4,492.0 4,200 31.0 59.1 31.9 34.7 14.0 16.1
.. not available a. 1995 1 At market prices 2 Debt service payments as a % o f  export o f  goods and services
Sources: ECLAC; Caribbean Development Bank; IMF, Country Reports.
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Export earnings not only help to define import capacity, but also influence public revenues 
and governments’ ability to spend. The variability in recurrent revenue and the tendency for 
recurrent expenditure to increase at a faster rate than revenues result in public sector savings being 
very erratic. Rarely does public sector savings exceed 5 per cent o f GDP. Increased debt service 
payments associated with the growth of the public debt have made it more difficult to save. In the 
OECS though the debt service ratios may appear relatively low, interest payments alone may be 
taking between 10 and 20 per cent o f current revenues. Pressures on the central government finances 
have also come from the subsidization o f poorly run government-owned or controlled public utilities 
and a range of State-owned enterprises, some o f which were acquired as money-losing concerns. 
The failure o f governments, to transform State-owned producing concerns into efficient enterprises 
not only had fiscal implications but seriously undermined the performance o f the State in the 
capacity o f ‘engine o f growth. ’
Public sector investment programmes have depended heavily on borrowed funds and grants. 
The overall fiscal deficits as a per cent o f GDP in the 1980s averaged 4.2 per cent in St. Lucia, 1.6 
per cent in the Bahamas and 5.7 per cent in Belize, but was much higher in some of the other 
countries, for example, Grenada (24 per cent), Guyana (44 per cent) and Jamaica (14 per cent). The 
measures taken to improve the government’s savings in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago 
had a positive effect on the financing position in the 1990s as reflected in the overall deficit to GDP 
ratios. The division o f financing between domestic and foreign sources varies widely from country 
to country. The OECS with their restricted access to the international capital markets have relied 
heavily on external concessional assistance to finance development programmes. With respect to 
borrowing from the Central Bank, control is exercised not only through the provisions of the Bank’s 
Charter but the multinational ownership of the Bank makes it difficult for any member government 
to abuse its borrowing prerogatives. In the case of the larger countries, borrowing from the domestic 
banking system was more significant and in the case o f Jamaica and Guyana particularly, this was 
accompanied by a significant increase in the inflation rate. By the early 1980s, outstanding 
accommodation to the governments of these two countries, had already accounted for over 80 per 
cent o f the total assets o f the respective Central Banks, and this position was maintained throughout 
the 1980s. In Trinidad and Tobago, the government also increased borrowing from the Central Bank 
in the later 1980s to finance its activities when budgetary savings declined. With the adoption of 
stabilization programmes, the deficit/GDP ratio has generally come down to less than 5 per cent in 
the 1990s (See Table 15).
Table 15
Central Government Overall Surplus or Deficit (-)
as a % o f  G D P
Y ear B aham as Barbados B e liz e G uyana H aiti Jam aica Surinam e Trinidad
&
T ob ago
O E C S
1980 -2 .6 -5 .2 -4 .5 -3 1 .8 5 .4 -1 7 .3 1.3 7 .0
83 -14 .1 -3 .3 0 .4 -4 6 .0 -3 .8 -1 5 .9 -1 7 .0 -1 2 .0
84 -7 .2 -5 .2 7.1 -9 4 .0 -7 .4 -6 .2 -1 6 .0 -8 .8
85 -4 .5 -5 .2 -0 .8 -3 3 .8 -3 .5 -6 .0 -2 0 .0 -7 .2
86 -0 .5 -5 .3 -4 .5 -5 8 .8 -2.1 0.3 -2 6 .0 -5 .9
87 -0 .6 -5 .3 0 .4 -4 2 .4 1.5 -2 4 .8 -5 .9
88 -3 .0 -2 .3 7.1 -3 1 .6 -1 .5 -2 1 .3 -5 .7
89 -4.1 -0 .8 -0 .8 -6 .6 -0 .2 -1 4 .0 -4 .2
9 0 -2 .4 -6 .7 0 .7 -2 2 .9 -1 .3 3 .0 -6 .3 -1 .2
91 -4 .3 -2.1 -4.1 -2 0 .5 -0 .5 4 .4 -1 7 .4 -0 .2 -1 .7
92 -2 .3 -1.1 -6 .2 -1 0 .5 -2 .8 4 .2 -11 .2 -2 .8 -2 .0
93 -0 .7 -0.1 -6 .7 -7 .6 -3 .8 3.5 -8 .3 -0 .2 -2.1
94 -0 .6 -1 .8 -7 .4 -3 .8 -4 .3 1.9 -2 .3 0 .0 -1 .9
95 -0 .7 1.1 -4.1 -5 .8 -1 .9 1.0 0 .4 0 .2 -2 .7
9 6 -1 .9 -3.1 -1.1 -8 .3 1.6 -2 .4
n ot availab le
Source: ID B , E co n o m ic  and S oc ia l Progress in  Latin A m erica , V arious Issues, E C C B .
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The balance o f payments problems and indirectly the fiscal challenge that confronted 
Caribbean countries in the 1980s was fundamentally a terms of trade problem that was largely the 
result o f changes taking place in the global economy and the effects o f these on traditional exports. 
With a rising import bill, the absence o f a dynamic, competitive export sector undermined the 
region’s ability to benefit from the expanding world economy. External borrowing was used to help 
counter the external deficits, but the basic problems were more structural and required a different 
approach. The use o f the printing press to finance fiscal deficits in certain cases was quickly 
reflected in prices, pressure on the exchange rate and worsening o f the balance o f payments situation. 
Caribbean countries do not have a tradition o f using the Central Bank to finance expenditure, and 
generally the inflation rates reflect price movements in their major trading partners. In the 1960s 
inflation rates averaged less than 5 per cent per annum in the Anglophone CARICOM States and this 
has continued to be the case for most countries (see Table 16). A figure o f more than 10 per cent 
is rare. Guyana in the 1980s, Jamaica since the mid-1970s and Suriname in recent years have 
experienced inflation rates that are not typically Caribbean. All three countries are associated with 
fairly large depreciations of the nominal exchange rate.
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Table 16







1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Bahamas 8.1 6.8 7.1 5.7 2.7 1.4 2.1 1.4
Barbados 14.5 7.2 6.3 6.1 1.1 0.0 1.9 2.4
Belize 5.0 2.3 2.3 1.4 2.6 2.9 6.4
Dominica 7.2 5.6 5.5 1.6 0.0 1.3 1.7
Grenada 8.4 2.6 3.8 2.8 2.6 3.0
Guyana 10.6 19.7 2.3 2.6
Haiti 11.0 8.7 15.4 19.4 22.6 42.6 25.5 17.1
Jamaica 20.0 17.8 51.1 77.3 22.1 35.1 19.9 26.4
St. Kitts-Nevis 5.2 4.2 2.9 1.8 2.6 2.7 2.5
St. Lucia 15.3 6.2 5.7 5.1 0.8 5.8 2.7
St. Vincent & 
Grenadines 6.2 5.5 3.5 4.3 1.0 1.7 4.4
Suriname 10.2 15.1 26.0 43.7 143.5 368.5 235.6
Trinidad & Tobago 13.6 12.8 3.8 6.4 10.8 8.8 5.2 3.4
Brazil 38.8 513.4 440.9 1,008.7 2,148.4 2,668.5 84.4 18.2
Chile 178.0 24.0 21.8 15.4 12.7 11.4 8.2 7.4
Mexico 17.3 60.3 22.7 15.5 9.8 7.0 35.0 34.4
USA 8.4 6.1 4.2 3.0 3.0 2.6 2.8 2.9
.. not available
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Various Issues.
The exchange rate had not been actively used as an adjustment mechanism in the Caribbean 
until the 1980s, and this only in some countries. As can be seen in Table 17 the rates continue to 
remain fixed for long periods in certain States. There is a great deal of controversy surrounding the 
effectiveness o f exchange rate changes in correcting external disequilibrium in countries without a 
manufacturing base and dependent on external sources for not only a wide range of consumer goods, 
but for food, intermediate materials and capital goods. Rather than increase exports and reduce 
imports, as the textbooks suggest, devaluations or depreciations, can lead to increases in domestic 
prices and demands for higher wages and salaries which, in turn, may require further adjustments 
in the exchange rate. In Guyana, despite significant depreciation between 1980 and 1995 there was 
a persistent trade, current account and overall deficit in the balance of payments, throughout the 
period. In Jamaica, too, where there was significant depreciation between 1980 and 1995 the trade 
balance was persistently negative, while the current account was positive in only three years. In 
Trinidad and Tobago, where the depreciation was not as rapid, the recovery in the price o f oil from 
the low point o f 1986 may have been a more significant influence in the recurring positive trade 
balances since 1987 than the depreciation of the currency. The persistence o f the external
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imbalances in the face o f a decline in real wages reflects the structural nature o f the problem which 
could not be resolved by simply changing import and export prices.
With greater fiscal discipline and a strong foreign reserves position, the OECS countries have 
been able to hold a fixed exchange rate. However, the use o f the exchange rate to stimulate exports 
in the short term is acknowledged to be limited with the prices o f major exports quoted in foreign 
currency and a small manufacturing sector. With the fall in output by 12 per cent between 1989 and 
1993 and the precipitous decline in foreign reserves during the period, Barbados came under 
pressure to devalue it’s currency but opted to reduce domestic costs and increase productivity. The 
current surplus o f the balance o f payments has averaged 6.3 per cent o f GDP since 1992.
The continuous depreciation of some o f the region’s currencies since the early 1980s as part 
o f the effort to correct large external imbalances has raised the issue o f confidence in societies not 
accustomed to seeing such large and frequent changes in the external value of their currencies. Some 
national currencies have lost a great deal o f credibility as a store of value, a function which is being 
increasingly performed by the United States dollar. With the relatively high inflation rates in certain 
countries and the continuous fall in the external value o f the currency, holding savings in foreign 
currency accounts even when the latter are associated with a lower rate o f return, is seen as a way 
of safeguarding the value o f savings. Interestingly, even in countries with a history o f low inflation 
rates, like Trinidad and Tobago, there is a strong propensity for residents to hold their savings in 
United States dollars, and this raises questions about confidence in the currency. The removal of 
foreign exchange controls and the freedom to hold foreign currency accounts in local banks 
facilitates the process o f flight from the local currency. Even where the foreign currency accounts 
are held in local banks, these accounts can be seen as a conduit out o f the domestic savings stream, 
if  the resources from these accounts are not used in the interest o f the local economy. Paradoxically, 
the very arrangements which are being put in place to attract foreign capital can be exploited to take 
savings out o f the domestic system.
Table 17 
Nominal Exchange Rates. 1970-96
(Domestic Currency Per US Dollar)






1970 1.00 2.01 1.67 2.00 2.00 0.84 2.00 4.99 1.00 1.88
1980 1.00 2.01 2.00 2.70 2.60 1.78 2.40 4.99 1.00 1.78
1985 1.00 2.01 2.00 2.70 4.20 5.48 3.60 4.99 2.94 1.78
1986 1.00 2.01 2.00 2.70 4.40 5.48 3.60 4.99 3.07 1.78
1987 1.00 2.01 2.00 2.70 10.00 5.50 3.60 4.99 4.96 1.78
1988 1.00 2.01 2.00 2.70 10.00 5.48 4.25 4.99 6.34 1.78
1989 1.00 2.01 2.00 2.70 33.00 6.48 4.25 4.99 6.34 1.78
1990 1.00 2.01 2.00 2.70 45.00 8.04 4.25 4.99 11.35 1.78
1991 1.00 2.01 2.00 2.70 122.00 21.49 4.25 8.24 12.66 1.78
1992 1.00 2.01 2.00 2.70 126.00 22.19 4.25 10.95 12.57 1.78
1993 1.00 2.01 2.00' 2.70 130.00 32.47 5.81 12.80 12.77 1.78
1994 1.00 2.01 2.00 2.70 142.50 33.20 5.93 12.95 13.06 409.50
1995 1.00 2.01 2.00 2.70 140.50 39.62 6.00 16.16 13.46 407.00
1996 1.00 2.01 2.00 2.70 141.30 34.86 6.19 15.09 14.06 401.00
1997a 1.00 2.01 2.00 2.70 142.30 34.98 6.25 16.50 14.33 401.00
a. End of March
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Various Issues.
Real Effective Exchange Rate Index, 1986-96
(Base = 1990)
Table 18





1986 104.9 105.3 92.3 116.1 119.1 276.2 94.8 112.8 117.7 72.2 76.4 113.9
1987 100.6 103.2 98.7 107.7 107.1 142.2 95.7 110.7 100.8 82.1 93.0 105.6
1988 100.1 101.7 101.3 106.4 104.0 179.2 95.5 103.6 84.2 87.6 68.6 99.1
1989 101.2 103.7 97.8 104.9 108.7 141.6 89.2 105.6 101.8 89.5 85.1 97.7
1990 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991 100.6e 103.1 98.2 101.3 99.3 85.4 111.1 101.9 102.2 129.7 84.7 100.4
1992 100.3e 105.9 95.4 99.2 98.4 93.8 127.8 104.5 103.0 131.3 90.6 102.5
1993 106.6e 108.4 94.5 101.6 103.6 102.3 111.8 108.4 107.0 124.7 115.8 92.5
1994 106.8e 104.1 93.1 97.0 103.0 102.0 95.0 108.8 106.4 124.7 101.3 85.4
1995 103.4e 100.5 91.7 94.7 98.4 103.2 94.6 109.3 105.2 125.0 69.8 83.7
1996 105.Oe 101.0 96.6 100.5 111.5 105.6 85.2
.. not available e. estimated
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Various Issues.
Table 19
Current Account Surplus/Deficit (-) of the Balance of Payments
as a % of GDP
Year Bahamas Barbados Belize Guyana Jamaica St. Lucia Trinidad
&
Tobago
1980 -5.8 -2.5 -22.2 -5.0 -34.0 5.7
1981 -9.4 -12.4 -32.3 -10.3 -36.0 6.0
1982 -7.8 -3.7 -29.5 -11.6 -26.9 -7.5
1983 -6.8 -4.1 -32.3 -9.4 -4.1 -12.1
1984 -6.3 1.4 -2.5 -22.1 -13.3 -10.2 -6.0
1985 -0.1 4.2 4.4 -21.1 -13.0 -6.7 -0.6
1986 1.1 0.5 5.2 -25.2 -0.8 -3.1 -8.6
1987 -2.4 -1.3 3.4 -35.0 -4.1 -6.0 -4.7
1988 -2.6 2.8 -0.8 -24.2 1.3 -6.7 -2.0
1989 -2.7 1.5 -5.3 -31.8 -6.9 -20.7 -0.9
1990 -1.1 -0.6 3.8 -37.8 -7.3 -11.3 9.0
1991 -5.8 -1.6 -6.0 -34.0 -6.4 -16.7 0.0
1992 1.3 8.8 -6.0 -33.6 0.9 -11.4 0.6
1993 2.4 4.1 -9.2 -25.1 -4.4 -10.0 -2.3
1994 -0.8 7.5 -7.2 -18.7 0.4 -10.4 4.5
1995 -4.0 4.7 -2.9 -19.0 -5.5 5.2
1996p 7.4 -1.8 0.8
.. not available
Source: IDB ; CDB; ECCB.
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Towards a new policy framework
Notwithstanding the growth experienced by some Caribbean States in the 1980s, external 
shocks revealed serious weaknesses in the economic structure and shortcomings in economic 
policies. In Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname the decline o f foreign earnings, 
the emergence o f balance of payments problems, the drop in foreign reserves, increasing government 
indebtedness and the pressures on the government revenue reflected the emergence of a serious 
crisis. The limited effect o f the short term stabilization measures and the persistent difficulties 
facing economic management pointed to more serious structural problems relating the failure of 
development policies and the changes that had taken place in the international policy environment. 
Some countries such as Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago sought financial and technical 
assistance from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank which by this time had already 
began to link stabilization measures with policy reforms designed not only to reduce internal and 
external deficits, but to increase efficiency in the economy.
Structural adjustment packages addressed development strategy, competition and protection 
policy, the role o f government in the economy, incentives, market structures, tax reforms, subsidy 
policies, financial reforms and the exchange rate. In this new approach, private sector development 
was to be encouraged and market forces envisaged to play a greater role in resource allocation. A 
more active role was assigned to the exchange rate which was supposed to reflect more closely, the 
true value o f the currency. To increase public sector savings, government expenditures were reduced 
on many fronts, including the social services, and subsidies to goods and services sharply curtailed. 
In some instances wages and salaries were cut and the public sector workforce reduced, thus 
increasing the number o f unemployed. In keeping with the objectives o f a more circumscribed role 
for government and strengthening public revenues, inefficient and money-losing government 
enterprises were to be sold to private interests. Increasing exports was to be a major goal in 
redressing the external imbalance and this was predicated on a more open and competitive economy. 
Many forms o f quantitative restrictions on imports were removed in favour o f lower tariffs, and the 
exchange control regime modified. In certain countries, for example Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana 
and Jamaica, the fixed exchange rate system was abandoned in favour o f more flexible exchange 
arrangements. Growth was seen to hinge on a higher level of domestic and foreign savings. Greater 
openness required the removal o f restrictions on foreign private investment and the adoption of 
regulations to encourage capital flows. In most countries the financial regulations have been up­
dated to increase confidence in the sector and a more competitive and liberalized framework is 
increasingly being put in place.
Not all economies respond in the same way or in the same time-frame to a given set of 
incentives or stimuli. The stabilization/structural reform package has accordingly had mixed results 
in the Caribbean. The cuts in government expenditure which have included areas such as education 
and health have worsened social conditions. Reductions in government employment have also 
helped in creating a group o f new poor to add to the existing chronic poor thus worsening the climate 
o f social and political instability. Financial constraints bedeviling Caribbean governments have also 
impacted on maintenance and capital programmes, leading to a deterioration o f the social and
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economic infrastructure. The state o f schools, hospitals, roads, government buildings and bridges 
reflects governments’ reduced spending capacity. The deteriorating infrastructure has also 
negatively affected private investment since the state o f the utilities and infrastructure has an 
influence on costs and competitiveness.
With stabilization, some degree of growth has returned in the 1990s to countries that 
underwent serious stress in the 1980s. In Guyana where output in 1992 was still 27 per cent below 
that of 1976, real GDP has been growing by over 7 per cent per year since 1992. In Jamaica, too, 
there has been some growth, but output is yet to reach the level o f 1982. The Haitian economy 
continues to flounder, while the Dominican Republic’s economy has grown in eveiy year except one 
(1990) since 1986. These trends in production do not tell the full story. There is no automatic link 
between growth and employment in these economies. Growth does not necessarily lead to higher 
real wages or improve the distribution o f income. In all these economies the level of unemployment 
and social conditions remain a major concern. Reduction of public expenditure may improve the 
fiscal position, but can militate against human resource development and create conditions which 
do not encourage investment. The adoption of programmes intended to mitigate poverty has 
recognized this fact. Unfortunately, the ad hoc way in which they have been put together has 
reduced their effectiveness. Many of these programmes have suffered from lack o f adequate 
resources, proper targeting and administrative problems. It is widely acknowledged that the reform 
measures intended to bring about the kind of transformation that could increase income and 
significantly reduce un-employment and poverty involve a more complex process and a longer time 
period. Experience has shown that in implementing reform measures account must be taken of 
several factors including the institutional framework, the relationship between government and civil 
society and governance. Initially, social alleviation programmes might stand alone but increasingly 
they have to be integrated in general development programmes designed to create employment and 
raise the income o f the poor.
The challenge facing the Caribbean in the late-1990s
Several social and economic indicators reflect the gains made by Caribbean States over 
recent decades. Life expectancy at birth has increased to over 70 years in almost all the countries 
and this is comparable to the level reached in the developed countries. The infant mortality rate has 
also been falling, and the adult literacy rate is over 90 per cent in most cases. Ten Caribbean 
countries are ranked by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as countries with high 
human development, i.e., with an index o f over 0.800. In terms of per capita income, if  Guyana and 
Haiti are excluded, per capita GNP in current dollars ranged between US$900 for Suriname to 
almost US$12,000 for the Bahamas in 1995. Despite the difficulties in the 1980s, real per capita 
income has grown in a number of countries since 1970. This, however, is only one side of the 
picture.
In the first half o f the 1990s most countries of the region have returned to a positive growth 
path. The fiscal situation has been tightened and the pressures on the external account have been 
eased following the implementation of stabilization and structural adjustment measures. Foreign 
reserves have increased and the unemployment rate has fallen in some cases. The question of 
sustainability and policy reversal, however, remains a valid concern in a situation where there are
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high levels o f poverty amidst growing per capita incomes and an unfolding policy environment that 
must adjust to a more open trading framework. An estimate o f the number of poor depends on the 
choice of a poverty threshold. According to a recent World Bank Report the number o f people in 
the Latin American/Caribbean region living on less than US$1 a day (in 1985 purchasing power 
parity prices) increased from 91.2 million (22.0 per cent of the population) in 1987 to 109.6 million 
(23.5 per cent o f the population) in 1993. In other regions with the exception o f Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the proportion declined.
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Table 20
Selected Demographic and Social Statistics
Countries
Head Count Life 
Index Expectancy 


















Antigua & Barbuda 12 75 18 96.0 0.892
Bahamas 5 73 15 98.1 0.894
Barbados 8 78 13 97.3 0.907
Belize 35* 74 20 70.0 0.806
Dominica 33 73 17 94.0 0.873
Grenada 20 72 98.9 0.843
Guyana 43* 66 60 97.9 0.649
Haiti 65 57 72 44.1 0.338
Jamaica 34* 74 13 84.4 0.736
Montserrat
St Kitts-Nevis 15 69 31 90.0 0.853
St. Lucia 25* 71 17 82.0 0.838
St. Vincent 17 72 19 82.0 0.836
Suriname 47 70 33 92.7 0.792




Dominican Republic 21* 71 37 81.5 0.718
Netherlands Antilles 77 11
.. not available a. only those estimates, with an asterisk were calculated
using a similar methodology
Sources: UNDP, Human Development Report, 1997; World Bank, World Development 
Indicators, 1997; J.L. Baker, Poverty Reduction and Human Development in the Caribbean, 
The World Bank, 1997.
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With respect to the Caribbean itself, poverty varies from country to country and a recent 
study has estimated that it averages roughly 38 per cent o f the total regional population varying from 
highs o f 65 per cent for Haiti and 43 per cent for Guyana to 5 per cent for the Bahamas and 8 per 
cent for Barbados. “Income distribution is shared, though slightly less so than the average for Latin 
America. The poor include the elderly, children, the disabled, small scale farmers, unskilled 
workers, indigenous populations, and in some countries female-headed households and the under­
employed or unemployed, many o f whom are school leavers who have few skills with which to enter 
the labour market.”20 While stabilization and structural adjustment reforms may have worsened 
poverty through fiscal and exchange rate adjustments, the fact is that by the early 1980s the signs 
o f decline were already evident as those countries had failed to transform traditional production 
patterns into more resilient structures capable o f responding to global changes and sustaining higher 
levels o f income and employment. Among the factors which have been identified as contributing 
to poverty in the Caribbean are low economic growth, macroeconomic instability, deficiencies in 
the labour market resulting in limited job growth, low productivity and low wages in the informal 
sector, and a decline in the quality o f social services.21 In the Caribbean the increase in poverty has 
impacted particularly heavily on women, a high percentage o f whom are heads o f households with 
estimates for individual countries ranging from 22 per cent to 49 per cent. Unemployment rates are 
higher among women than men. In view o f the role women play in caring for children and the 
elderly, cutbacks in subsidies to services like health and education have increased the burden on 
women.22
The growth o f total production and per capita income with the existence o f high un­
employment rates and the inequities in the distribution of income reflect the orientation of 
development policy. The paucity o f data on employment and underemployment and the distribution 
o f income may also reflect the reduced priority given to these concerns in the process o f planning 
and strategy formulation. The separation o f production objectives from employment and poverty 
reduction targets assumed a strong redistributive role for the State which by spending on education 
and health could enhance the employability and earning power o f the expanding labour force. In 
light o f the increasing focus that is being placed on human development and its role in the growth 
process, issues relating to the level of spending and the efficiency of delivery systems are coming 
under critical review in the context o f a more rational approach to State intervention in the economy.
In most countries o f the region, public educational expenditures as a share o f GNP may have 
fallen between 1980 and the early 1990s, but the level o f  spending was not insignificant compared 
to many countries. In the early 1990s, the proportion for the Bahamas was 4 per cent, for Barbados 
7.5 per cent, Guyana 5 per cent, Jamaica 6  per cent and Trinidad and Tobago 4 per cent. The 
comparable figure for Chile was 3 per cent, for the Republic o f Korea 5 per cent and for Singapore 
3 per cent. With respect to health, total public expenditure (including social security systems) as a 
per cent o f GDP in 1990 averaged 3.6 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean as compared to 
6  per cent in the industrial countries and 1.28 per cent in East Asia. For individual countries the 
proportion for the Dominican Republic averaged 2.0 per cent in 1990-1995, Haiti 1.3 per cent, 
Jamaica 3.0 per cent and Trinidad and Tobago 2.6 per cent. The comparable figure for Mauritius
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was 2.2 per cent, for Malaysia 1.4 per cent, for Singapore 1.1 per cent and for Thailand 1.4 per cent. 
These figures do not reflect private spending in the Caribbean.23
The problem in the Caribbean it appears, is not so much the share o f income devoted to 
health and education which had a positive impact in some areas, but the efficiency o f the health and 
education systems and the returns to the national communities. Poorly managed health and 
education systems have not only resulted in the deterioration o f the infrastructure but also in the 
quality o f the workforce. Unemployment has been growing while the demand for certain kinds of 
skills remains unmet. An increasing number o f graduates remain unemployed or take jobs for which 
they are not trained. Failure to find employment locally can also encourage emigration and this 
contributes to a waste o f resources. Increasing the capacity of the State to spend depends on an 
expanding economy and when this does not happen, the competition for limited resources becomes 
increasingly intense. Only a small proportion of the population may be able to access private health 
and educational services. In developing societies, educational opportunities not only offer the means 
for transforming people into more productive factors but also help in reducing income inequities. 
The failure or inability to incorporate up-to-date technological progress in the production process 
has also contributed to the decline of productivity and stagnation in some sectors of the economy.
In 1975 real output per worker in Latin America and the Caribbean was higher than that of 
the high performing Asian economies (HPAEs) and the rest o f Asia and Africa.24 By 1985 this was 
still the case, but by 1992 the HPAEs had moved ahead with a productivity advantage of 32 per cent. 
In 1960 Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago had a higher real per capita GDP than both Hong Kong 
and Singapore, but by 1980 the latter two had soared ahead. Policy choices were a significant factor 
in these outcomes. The correction o f cost and price distortions is not sufficient to engender growth. 
While a stable macroeconomic environment is necessary for rationalizing the production structure, 
micro and sectoral policies have a critical role to play. The failure to restructure and reorganize the 
agricultural sector, for example, has been a major failure of Caribbean economic policy. Land tenure 
problems, size o f farms, the level o f technology, access to credit, pricing policy, incentives and 
marketing problems have plagued this sector for years. F ailing productivity and income have tended 
to make agricultural activities less attractive than the public sector and manufacturing where 
remuneration is generally higher. The growth o f tourism and its ability to pay higher wages and 
salaries also reduced the attractiveness o f agriculture. Policies to increase intersectoral linkages have 
also been lacking.
Not only have countries that are basically agricultural in nature become increasingly 
dependent on imported food, but opportunities to use the natural resource base o f the countries to 
develop higher value added activities have been reduced. The flight of people from the rural areas 
has worsened social conditions in the urban communities. The public sector, with bloated 
bureaucracies and a wages and salaries bill that has reached 50 per cent o f current expenditure in 
some cases, is being forced to ‘down-size’ given the pressure to generate savings. With the 
exhaustion o f assembling and packaging opportunities in the manufacturing sector, the scope for 
producing only for the local market is limited. Even the regional market for low value added import
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substitution products is saturated. The pressure to produce goods that can compete extraregionally 
is increasing.
Unemployment rates in the region remain high notwithstanding the recent declines in some 
countries. Even where employment has increased there is a question about the quality o f the 
employment. Some activities do not yield a living wage. The group o f ‘working poor’ engaged in 
low productivity or marginal activities has grown. Poverty has also increased as a result of the fall 
o f real wages and this raises other issues related to the functioning o f the labour market. One 
question that immediately arises is, to what extent does a fall in real wages lead to higher levels of 
employment. In other words, what is the wage elasticity o f labour demand. A related issue is the 
un-employment elasticity o f the wage rate, which gives an indication o f the extent to which workers 
and trade unions are prepared to exercise wage restraint in the event o f unemployment. These are 
empirical issues which have not been sufficiently researched and attention tends to be focused on 
lack of flexibility and institutional rigidities in the labour market. The argument is made that 
“intensified competition in a global economy and o f labour-saving technical progress requires 
flexibility in wages. Once created, unemployment is reinforced by ratchet effects; it becomes more 
and more difficult to find employment again when one has been out o f employment for a while. The 
unemployed lose qualifications relative to the employed; in some cases they may lose their social 
competence altogether. Unemployment can easily become persistent, and to overcome rising un­
employment in a self-reinforcing trap, it takes a comprehensive push of institutional change.”25
Labour unions are part o f the institutional landscape in the Caribbean. Some are even 
affiliated to political parties. Unions, however, are not immune to market forces. A high level of 
unemployment tends to weaken their power and bargaining strength. In view of the prevailing levels 
o f unemployment in the region, some governments have been moved to enact minimum wage laws 
to discourage exploitation. The level o f wages, however, has a great deal to do with productivity and 
the fundamental approach to the wage issue is to create employment opportunities and to increase 
the productivity o f labour.
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2. C H A L L E N G E S FR O M  TH E N E W  TR A D IN G  FR A M E W O R K
Introduction
All the indications are that the world economy will become increasingly globalized and 
integrated and countries that fail to ensure greater efficiency are unlikely to benefit from this trend. 
The new trading order to be established as a result o f the Uruguay Round is not fully in place, but 
the fundamental principle that underlies it is the belief that more open markets in goods and services 
will benefit both developed and developing countries. Protection as a development strategy has been 
greatly discredited and preferences enjoyed by some developing countries in the markets of 
developed countries are seen to be inconsistent with the new trading order. Not all countries are in 
a position to take immediate advantage of the opportunities created. Some developing countries 
have concerns about the pace of change, the degree of openness sought and the likely outcome in 
a situation where the playing field is made level, but the players are not all equal. There are fears 
about the proliferation of anti-dumping actions by some developed countries and the adoption of 
protectionist measures in the guise o f environmental or quality concerns. Already, one observes 
wide disparities among developing countries in terms of the pace of integration with the world 
economy. For example, using the proportion of trade to GDP as a measure of integration, the ratio 
increased by 1.37per cent between 1980-1983 and 1990-1997 for East Asia as compared to0.45 for 
Latin America and the Caribbean. For at least six countries in the latter group it declined. “Changes 
in ratios of trade to GDP matter because competition in global markets exposes exporters to new 
technologies, designs, products, and management techniques and provides access to imports that 
were previously unavailable or that embody new technologies that can contribute to productivity 
gains.”26
The composition of exports tends to have a critical influence on the pace o f growth of exports 
relative to production. Goods with a high income elasticity of demand (e.g. manufactures) tend to 
grow faster than goods such as primary products with low income elasticity and subject to volatile 
market conditions. Because o f their size, policies and historical circumstances, Caribbean countries 
have come to depend heavily on international trade. The export o f goods and services generally 
amounts to more than 40 per cent of GDP, while the import of goods and services ratio tends to be 
even higher. In certain cases the export ratio exceeds 80 per cent. Caribbean countries export 
mainly products for which demand is inelastic and for which they are largely price takers. From an 
almost total dependence on sugar cultivation for export since the eighteenth century, the post-war 
period has witnessed some diversification in economic activity, but the production structure is 
narrowly based, export-oriented and uncompetitive in several areas. In some cases, sugar 
production has stopped completely and has been replaced by bananas and tourism as the lead sectors. 
In most of the others sugar production has been declining, but is still relatively important in terms 
of employment and foreign exchange. Sugar and bananas are produced at relatively high cost and 
their survival has depended on special pricing and marketing managements, mainly in the United 
Kingdom market. Low value-added in the manufacturing sector has made it difficult for the 
Caribbean to take advantage of the market opportunities granted to the Caribbean in North America 
and Europe either within special arrangements or within the Generalized System of Preferences. The 
granting countries adopt rules of origin that ensure that the favoured countries are not used as
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conduits by other countries to penetrate their markets. At the same time, the heavy dependence on 
foreign sources for raw materials has made it difficult for Caribbean countries to satisfy value-added 
criteria. These arrangements have not helped a great deal in developing a manufacturing sector and 
diversifying the export base.
The trading nexus between developed and developing countries has also undergone 
fundamental changes in recent years. Because of the displacement o f natural resources by synthetic 
products and the more efficient use of raw materials resulting from technological developments, 
growth in the industrial nations no longer acts as an ‘engine’ that pulls along the poorer nations. At 
the same time, recent growth patterns have shown that growth in developing countries does not 
necessarily depend on the level o f activity in the rich nations.
The trend towards greater trade liberalization is being accompanied by a rapid growth in 
international trade, averaging some 6 per cent per year in volume terms over the last 10 years as 
compared to less than 3 per cent for world production. Not all countries, however, have shared 
equally in this growth. While exports of goods from all developing countries grew on average by 
around 5 per cent per year between 1981 and 1994, the average for East Asia and the Pacific was
11.8 per cent as compared to 4.3 per cent for Latin America and the Caribbean and 2.3 per cent for 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The result o f this uneven growth in trade is that some countries are losing 
ground in the world market place, while others are gaining. North America's share in world 
merchandise exports was around the same (16 per cent) in 1995 as it was in 1985, but Western 
Europe’s share increased from 40 to 45 per cent and Asia’s share from 21 per cent to 27 per cent. 
The share o f Latin America and the Caribbean, however, fell from 5.6 per cent to 4.6 per cent over 
the period.
The fact that dynamic export performance seems to go hand in hand with impressive growth 
rates in output has been a driving force behind the formulation of recent trade and development 
policies. The changing composition of world exports also gives some indication o f the structural 
changes in the world economy. Between 1985 and 1995, for example, the share o f agricultural 
products in world exports declined from 13.7 per cent to 11.8 per cent, while the share of mining 
products fell from 21.9 per cent to 10.5 per cent. The share of manufactures, however, increased 
from 61.2 per cent to 74.4 per cent over the period. With respect to this group o f products, there has 
been a shifting in the locus of production from North America and Western Europe to other 
countries, particularly those in East Asia. Countries like Mexico, Brazil, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
China and Thailand now account for a higher proportion of world exports of manufactures than they 
did in the early 1960s.
The changing world trading framework
Through regional trading arrangements and the adoption o f structural adjustment 
programmes, a large number o f countries were already committed to reducing trade barriers even 
before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1993. An increasing number of bilateral agreements 
outside the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) framework had not only raised fears 
about the future o f the multilateral framework, but had also inspired the proliferation of an increasing 
number o f regional groups in the 1980s and 1990s, both among developed and developing countries.
When the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established on 1 January 1995, most members were 
parties to at least one regional agreement that had been notified to GATT.27 Though the decisions 
flowing out of the Uruguay Round have strengthened the multilateral framework, it has not 
dampened the enthusiasm to accelerate the pace of regional integration, which countries see not only 
as a defensive measure, but as a necessary platform for developing an export base and for interacting 
with the larger world community. Between 1990 and 1995 intra-NAFTA merchandise exports as 
a percentage of total exports increased from 42.8 per cent to 46.2 per cent. Over the same period 
intra-Mercosur trade increased by over 300 per cent, accounting for 20.4 per cent of total exports in 
1995 as compared to 8.9 per cent in 1990.
Since the mid-1980s, integration groupings particularly in developing countries have taken 
on new life, and most of them are now seen less as a protection strategy to encourage import 
substitution and more as a framework to encourage production and exports. While removing barriers 
to intraregional trade, tariffs against third countries have also come down. Average applied tariffs 
in Latin America are generally between 10 and 20 per cent. MERCOSUR, the Andean Group, 
CARICOM and the Central American Common Market (CACM) all have common external tariffs 
averaging between 9 and 13.5 per cent, although significant exceptions persist for individual 
countries.28 Integration is increasingly being seen as encompassing much more than the removal of 
trade barriers.
The results of the Uruguay Round continue to see regional movements as not being 
inconsistent with the multilateral trading system. The Round achieved further cuts in tariffs, but 
even before it concluded, unilateral, bilateral and regional actions had already recognized the 
benefits of competition and larger markets. These developments may also have been a reflection of 
a growing loss of confidence in the multilateral framework represented by GATT in which an 
increasing share of trade was being conducted outside the Agreement. The results of the Uruguay 
Round reinforces the trend towards greater trade liberalization in a multilateral setting by adopting 
a more comprehensive approach to the question. Of particular interest to developing countries is the 
decision to reduce non-tariff barriers to trade which had proliferated in recent years. Among the 
most important quantitative restraints scheduled for removal are those in textiles and clothing 
applied under the Multi-fibre Arrangement. These restraints are to be phased out in four steps, 
starting 1 January 1995 and ending 1 January 2005. The results of the Round address not only 
border measures, but a whole range of factors which affect competition and also includes an 
agreement on services, the General Agreement on Services (GATS) and one on ‘ideas’, the Trade- 
Related Aspects Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). With respect to services, two initiatives were 
underway, the first relating to the trade in basic telecommunications services came into effect in 
February 199S while the agreement relating to the liberalization of financial services was to come 
into effect on 1 March 1999, at the latest. The TRIPS Agreement is based on “a recognition that 
increasingly the value of goods and services entering international trade resides in the know-how and 
creativity incorporated into them. The TRIPS Agreement provides for minimum international 
standards of protection for such know-how and creativity in the areas of copyright and related rights, 
trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, the lay-out design of integrated 
circuits and undisclosed information.”29 It also contains provisions aimed at the effective 
enforcement of such intellectual property rights and for the settlement of disputes. Developing 
countries have a transition period for bringing their legislation and practices in conformity.
The industrial counties account for about two thirds of world imports of agricultural goods. 
Non-tariff barriers in the form of bans, quantitative restrictions, variable import levies, minimum 
import prices and discretionary import licensing have been more important than tariffs in protecting 
agriculture in both developed and developing countries. Domestic and export subsidies are also to 
be reduced. In this way agricultural trade has been brought more in line with the rules and discipline 
of the GATT, although reforms are likely to be stretched over a period of 6 to 10 years. Non-tariff 
border measures, such as import quotas, are to be converted to tariffs that provide the same 
protection. These tariffs are then to be reduced by an average of 36 per cent for developed countries 
and 24 per cent for developing countries.
In order to achieve greater transparency in the international trading framework a new 
institution has been created. The WTO which was established on 1 January 1995 replaced the GATT 
which concerned itself largely with obstacles to trade in goods. The WTO not only has a potentially 
larger membership than GATT (128 at end of 1994 as compared to 132 for WTO at end of October 
1997) but also a much broader scope including trade in goods, services and intellectual property. 
WTO membership to date accounts for more than 90 per cent of world trade. Countries that become 
members must accept all of the obligations of the GATT and its corollary agreements (with few 
exceptions) negotiated in the Tokyo and Uruguay Round. For many countries, particularly 
developing countries, this carries a stronger commitment, since they are obligated to substantially 
more trade obligations than previously required under the GATT regime. As far as dispute 
resolution is concerned, the WTO consolidates the various dispute provisions of the GATT accord 
into a unified and more effective dispute mechanism. “Countries can no longer block the 
establishment of arbitration panels, or ignore their findings as they could under GATT. And 
although they may appeal, the decision of the Appeals Body is final. Every stage of the process is 
subject to strict time limits, and countries that fail to comply faced authorized trade sanctions.”30
Challenges facing Caribbean trade
As indicated earlier, Caribbean countries are extremely dependent on foreign trade as a result 
of small domestic markets and a narrow production base. Foreign exchange earnings revolve around 
a few activities and with the decline of traditional exports various kinds of incentives have been used 
to diversify the export base, but these have produced limited results. The Bahamas depends almost 
exclusively on tourism and offshore financial activities. Tourism generates about 75 per cent of 
GDP, while banking and financial services contribute about 15 per cent. Antigua and Barbuda and 
Barbados have also become highly tourism-dependent following the decline of sugar cultivation. 
In the former country, tourism provides about 75 per cent of foreign exchange receipts and directly 
accounts for about 12 to 15 per cent of GDP. In Barbados, sugar and its by-products still account 
for about 20 per cent of domestic exports, but receipts from tourism tend to be more than four times 
those of domestic exports. Three products, sugar, bananas and citrus concentrates contribute about 
70 per cent of Belize’s domestic exports. In Guyana, sugar, bauxite, gold and rice account for over 
80 per cent of domestic exports. In Jamaica, exports are also highly concentrated in sugar, bananas 
and bauxite, but tourism expenditure amounts to around 90 per cent of earnings from domestic 
exports. In Trinidad and Tobago, petrochemicals production based on the country’s natural gas 
reserves has been increasing in recent years and this activity, together with exports of petroleum and 
petroleum products, accounts for about 75 per cent of earnings from domestic exports. In the other
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OECS countries, sugar and bananas dominate the export trade but tourism has emerged as a major 
foreign exchange earner. In St. Kitts-Nevis, for example, tourism expenditure tends to be around 
twice that of earnings from exports. In addition to the products stated in Table 21, other domestic 
exports consist largely of agricultural products, and simple manufactures involving, in some cases, 
assembly or refining operations. Traditionally, the OECS countries have run a persistent trade 
deficit and this is normally covered by earnings from services, mainly tourism and capital flows.
Table 21
Main Domestic Exports (Most Recent Year)
(Percentages of Total)
Petroleum Cocoa
Sugar Citrus & Bauxite Nutmegs
& & Petroleum & Petro­ &
Countries By-products Bananas Concentrates Products Alumina chemicals Gold Mace
Barbados 23
Belize 35 15 20
Dominica 39
Grenada 10 36
Guyana 26 18 20






Trinidad & Tobago 2 47 26
Sources: IMF, Staff Country Reports.
60
As can be seen in Table 22, the trade partners of Caribbean countries are also highly 
concentrated. The United States is by far the most important, both as a source of imports and as a 
market. While for a few countries, such as Jamaica and Barbados, the share of exports to this 
country has increased in recent years, for others it has declined. Despite an institutional relationship 
with the European Union (EU) in the form of the Lomé Convention, trade has been declining. The 
Caribbean/Canadian Trade Agreement has not had any great impact on trade between the two 
partners. CARICOM as a market varies from around 5 per cent for Jamaica to over 40 per cent for 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Intra-CARICOM exports has grown very slowly and is estimated 
to be less than 20 per cent of total exports.
Table 22
CARICOM’s Direction of Trade, 1988 and 1995
(Percentages)
Country/Group Imports Exports1
1988 19952 1988 19952
CARICOM 9 10 13 183
Other Caribbean 3 2 7 7
Canada 6 4 6 5
USA 40 46 42 35
Latin American Integration Association 8 9 3 6
Central American Common Market 1 1 1
European Community 19 14 24 20
of which UK 10 7 16 10
European Free Trade Association 1 1 1 3
Japan 5 5 1 1
Other 8 8 3 4
Total 100 100 100.0 100.0
.. less than 1 per cent
1. includes re-exports
2. excludes Antigua, Guyana, Grenada, Suriname.
3. when all countries are taken into account, this figure is likely to come down to around 13 per cent.
Source: CARICOM Secretariat.
As far as the relationship between the growth of output and the growth of exports of goods and 
services is concerned, the picture was mixed. For a number of countries, notably, Barbados, Haiti, 
St. Kitts-Nevis and Suriname, output grew faster than trade during the 1980s. In the 1990s, 
however, this trend seems to have been reversed in most cases.
The Caribbean countries are members of different blocs and trading arrangements that came 
into being under circumstances which have undergone immense change in an increasingly dynamic 
economic and political international environment. CARICOM, for example, was conceived in the
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1960s in response to concerns about size and vulnerability in a protectionist world economy and 
against the background of integration initiatives in Western Europe and Latin America. The Lomé 
Convention emerged as an instrument to coordinate the aid effort of Western Europe to a group of 
former colonies in Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific. It was also an instrument that ensured reliable 
access to food, raw materials and markets for European countries. The opening up of the world 
economy, the impact of technology on raw material use and the desire to globalize trading 
relationships have significantly reduced the importance of the Lomé Agreement to Europe. The 
United States Caribbean Basin Initiative was a security/political initiative with an economic 
rationale. With the end of the Cold War, emphasis has shifted to the drug problem which threatens 
its social well-being. The spread of the market economy and moves towards global free trade has 
increased the scope for economic alliances which already transcend geographical and cultural 
boundaries. Several new forces and influences are operating in the world economy and even where 
special considerations may be required, new devices and instruments will have to come into play. 
The recent WTO ruling on bananas gives a clear signal of the philosophical orientation of the new 
order and the urgency for change.
In the following section we look at the prospects facing the Caribbean in its major trading 
arrangements.
The Lomé Convention
The Lomé Convention, which takes its name from the capital of Togo where the first four 
Conventions were signed, has its origins in the desire by the various European imperial powers and 
their former colonies to preserve highly valued trade and aid relationships following the granting of 
independence. A number of different types of agreements preceded the first Lomé Convention in 
1975 which brought together under one umbrella, a group of African (both French and English- 
speaking), Caribbean and Pacific States in a cooperation framework with the European Community. 
Since 1975, there have been four Lomé Conventions, each building on the experience of the former. 
Though the Convention was normally signed for a period of five years, the Fourth was given a 10- 
year duration for the period 1990-2000, but the financial protocol was for five years. Provision was 
made for a mid-term review which took place in 1995 and the revised text was adopted in Mauritius 
in November 1995. This was the first time the Convention was signed outside of Lomé, the capital 
of Togo.
The Lomé Convention is essentially, a negotiated, contractual agreement between the 
European Union and a group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, almost all of whom 
are former colonies of European countries. While the ACP suppliers benefited from access to a 
guaranteed market and relatively favourable prices for their major exports, the EU countries were 
simultaneously assured of a supply of critical raw materials and food. Since 1975, the membership 
of the Convention has been increasing. The first Lomé signed in 1975 involved 46 ACP States and 
nine European nations. The revised Fourth Convention adopted in Mauritius in November 1995, 
had as signatories 70 ÂCP States (47 African, 15 Caribbean and 8 Pacific) and 15 European 
countries. The Caribbean subgroup includes the CARICOM countries, Haiti, the Dominican 
Republic and Suriname. The total population of the ACP States numbers 570 million as compared 
to 370 million for the 15 EU States.
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The Lomé Convention is a financial, trade and technical assistance package administered by 
a number of institutions within a defined set of rules and regulations. The financial assistance 
provided under the Convention is channeled through two sources: the European Development Fund 
(EDF) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). The latter not only administers the risk capital, but 
also provides loans from its own resources based on interest rates subsidized from the EDF. Starting 
in 1958 with the earlier association arrangements, there have been eight EDFs (including the most 
recent). The 1995 EDF is for 12,967 million ECU, while EIB resources amount to 1,658 million 
ECU, as compared to the 1990 EDF of 10,800 million ECU and EIB funds of 1,800 million ECU. 
Financial aid increased by 22 per cent between 1990 and 1995, while the ACP population increased 
by 24 per cent. If the financial package of 14,625 million ECU were to be divided by the total 
population, the average will be 26 ECU per person over five years, or about 5 ECU per person per 
year.
While the EU is the most important source of finance for some ACP countries, for others the 
trade package is considerably more significant. Basically the EU allows ACP countries access to 
its markets without insisting on reciprocal arrangements. The Convention states that “Products 
originating in the ACP States shall be imported into the Community free of customs duties and 
charges having equivalent effect” (Article 168 of Lomé IV). ACP exports to the EU, however, are 
not all treated in the same way. Some like sugar, rum and bananas are covered by special protocols. 
A select list of other agricultural products, for example, beef and veal, fishery products, processed 
fruit and vegetable products, fresh or chilled fruit and vegetables, cereals and rice are imported from 
ACP States on a conditional basis, so as not to frustrate the implementation of the Common 
Agricultural Policy. The bulk of the products, including manufactured and processed goods, fall 
under the provisions of the ‘Trade Cooperation’ Chapter which states the terms under which they 
can enter the EU market. Duty free entry into the EU market depends on the satisfaction of the 
value-added and processing criteria stipulated for various products or classes of products.
Trade development between the EU and the ACP was envisaged as a major plank in the 
cooperation framework. Not only has the share of ACP exports in world trade been declining, but 
the share of ACP exports to the EU has also been falling. This share fell from 6.7 per cent in 1976 
to 2.8 per cent in 1994 (see Table 23). Latin America’s share has remained fairly steady at around 
5 per cent, but Asia’s share increased from 4.2 per cent to 13.1 per cent over the period. ACP 
exports to the EU are dominated by a few primary commodities such as sugar, bananas, crude 
petroleum, uncut diamonds, cocoa beans and copper. Manufactured goods amount to less than 40 
per cent of exports.
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Table 23.
Developing Countries’ Share of EU Imports. 1976-1994 (%)
Country Group 1976 1980 1985 1990 1992 1994
ACP 6.7 7.2 6.7 4.7 3.7 2.8
Asia 4.2 5.9 6.5 11 13.6 13.1
Latin America 5.3 5.1 6.5 4.6 5.1 5.4
Mediterranean 6.1 6.1 8.1 6.5 6.2 6.1
All Developing 
Countries
44.8 42.4 34.7 31.2 29.2 34.2
Source: European Center for Development Policy Management, Beyond Lomé IV: Exploring
Options For Future ACP-EU Cooperation, 1996, p. 2.
Although there has been some liberalization of the rules of origin over the years, this has not 
impacted significantly on the supply base. Looking at the picture from an European perspective, the 
EU buys more than it sells to the ACP which is not required to grant reciprocal trading arrangements. 
For various reasons, the EU has become less dependent on ACP’s raw materials, and this is a factor 
that would influence its own position as it seeks to rationalize its trading relationship. Only a few 
countries (e.g. Mauritius) have been able to take advantage of the opportunities offered in the EU 
market. Two traditional products which are of major concern to the Caribbean are sugar and 
bananas, which are covered in special protocols. More needs to be said on those arrangements, which 
will be affected by the new trading rules.
Bananas
Bananas are a tropical fruit grown almost entirely in developing countries. Their production 
in the Caribbean on a relatively large scale corresponds with the decline of the sugar economy, 
particularly in the post-war period. Total banana exports from the Windward Islands comprising 
Dominica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Grenada increased from 6.7 thousand 
tonnes in 1954 to 279.8 thousand tonnes in 1992. While bananas are also produced in Jamaica, 
Suriname and Belize, they are of greater importance to the economies of the Windward Islands. 
Over 35 per cent of the agricultural land in Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Saint 
Lucia are under banana cultivation. In Grenada it is about 4 per cent. Banana exports amount on 
average to over 50 per cent of domestic exports in the former three countries and for about 20 per 
cent in Grenada. Bananas are not only an important cash crop that can be cultivated throughout the 
year but they generate most of the jobs in these countries. Direct employment in the banana industry 
as a percentage of the active working population was estimated in the late 1980s as follows: 
Dominica 50 per cent; Saint Lucia 45.5 per cent; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 54 per cent and 
Grenada 7 per cent. Government revenues are also critically dependent on the banana industry.31
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Because the fruits are grown mainly by small farmers on land not ideally suited to 
production, cost tends to be high. Hurricanes periodically decimate the crops. The main market for 
Caribbean bananas is the United Kingdom, which in the late 1960s sourced as much as 95 per cent 
of its requirements from the Caribbean. Protection was provided by a specific duty on bananas from 
countries outside the Commonwealth Preference Area and by quota restrictions on bananas from 
Latin America. After Britain’s entry into the EC in 1973, it continued to protect Caribbean bananas, 
importing Latin American bananas only to make up shortfalls from the Caribbean.
All EU countries have their favoured suppliers and they use national regulations, as was 
permitted by Article 115 of the Rome treaty, to control imports. For Spain, it is the Canary Islands; 
for France it is the Overseas Territories and former colonies in Africa; for Portugal it is Madeira; for 
the United Kingdom it is the Caribbean. Italy derives some 15 per cent of its supplies from Africa. 
The Latin American producers supply virtually 100 per cent of the Belgian, Danish and German 
markets; over 90 per cent of the Irish and Dutch markets, 85 per cent of the Italian market as well 
as 12 per cent of the United Kingdom market. Total imports into the EU market in 1994 was 5.0 
million tonnes of which the United Kingdom accounted for 567.5 thousand tonnes or only 12 per 
cent. With the expansion of the EC three distinct banana regimes took form:32
(a) A preferential market in France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece for either 
EU and/or ACP producers;
(b) A duty free market in Germany;
(c) A market subject to a 20 per cent tariff in Denmark, Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg.
With the move to form a Single European Market by removing all tariff and non-tariff barriers, the 
fear in the Caribbean was that bananas would be able to move freely within Europe, thus displacing 
the high cost producers, such as the ACP suppliers. Protocol 5 of Lomé IV, however, gives an 
undertaking to the ACP as follows:
“In respect of its banana exports to the Community markets, no ACP State 
shall be placed, as regards access to its traditional markets and its advantages 
on those markets in a less favourable situation than in the past or at present.”
Faced with this situation, the EU made some compromises in the new banana regime (NBR) 
which came into effect amidst a great deal of controversy on 1 July 1993. The NBR instituted a 
common market organization for bananas, replacing the various national banana import regimes 
existing in the member States. “The new Community -wide set of measures for bananas included 
duty-free access for traditional ACP suppliers and a tariff quota of 2 million tonnes for third country 
shipments and non-traditional ACP sources combined.”33 Following the initiation of the dispute 
settlement proceedings by Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, a GATT 
panel ruled in their favour on a number of issues and following negotiation, a tariff quota of 2.2 
million tonnes of bananas was agreed for Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Venezuela, which 
in turn agreed not to ask for adoption of the panel’s ruling. The NBR not only met with opposition
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from Latin American producers, but also from some EU members and was challenged in the 
European Court of Justice and reported both by the United States and some Latin American States 
to the WTO. The United States incidentally is not a producer of bananas, but was acting on behalf 
of its transnationals which dominate the production and marketing of bananas in Latin America. A 
recent ruling of an appellate panel has upheld the March 1997 WTO decision that the European 
banana regime is illegal and the arrangement will either have to be extended to all banana exporters 
or terminated.
The banana issue has affected Caribbean-Latin American relations. The former States are 
higher cost producers, but hold an insignificant part of the European market in one EU country. The 
Latin American producers dominate the world trade in bananas, accounting for some 75 per cent of 
world exports. The major players in the trade, however, are United States Transnational 
Corporations (TNCs), viz., United Brands (Chiquita), Standard Fruit (Dole) and Del Monte. With 
respect to the EU market which is second only to the United States, the three United States banana 
TNCs hold 66 per cent of the EU market divided 43 per cent to Chiquita, 13 per cent to Dole and 10 
per cent to Del Monte.34
The Sugar Protocol
Following Britain’s entry into the EU the special arrangements governing the importation 
of cane sugar from Commonwealth sources had to be accommodated. Sugar imports in the EU are 
now governed by Article 213 and Protocol 8 of the Lomé IV Convention. The ‘Sugar Protocol’, it 
should be noted, is not an integral part of the Convention. It is part of the document, but has not 
been subject to the same five-year negotiating process as are the rest of the matters covered.
Protocol 8 states that the Community, but in practice mainly the United Kingdom, 
“undertakes for an indefinite period to purchase and import, at guaranteed prices, specific quantities 
of cane sugar, raw or white, which originate in the ACP States and which these States undertake to 
deliver to it.” For each listed country there is a quota. Prices paid are fixed annually and are linked 
to those paid to EU sugar beet farmers, which are generally higher than world sugar prices.
Unlike the banana arrangements, the present regime for sugar is not incompatible with the 
completion of the EU’s Single Market because the sugar protocol is already an EU-wide regime.
The future of the Lomé Convention
Speculation on the future of the Lomé Convention is taking place not only in the context of 
the single European Market and the new GATT rules, but perhaps more importantly against the 
background of changes in the world economy and the shifting geopolitical configuration. The EU’s 
political and security interests have changed, and the newer members do not share the same 
historical ties as between the original members and their former colonies. The effectiveness of the 
Convention as a trade and development instrument is also being questioned, given the inability of 
the majority of ACP States to significantly diversify their exports and the fact that the ACP has 
among its membership all of the world’s 50 least developed countries. Aid fatigue in the EU and 
the failure to develop even elementary administrative capacity in some countries have raised basic
questions about the Lomé arrangement. Reasons for the modest achievements range from the 
bureaucracy associated with the administration of the Convention to insufficient effort on the part 
of ACP States.
There is a widely-held view that the Lomé Convention will not survive in its present form 
after the year 2000. A Green Paper published by the European Commission for discussion has 
outlined a number of scenarios. The fact is that even though membership of successive Lomé 
Conventions has been increasing, the environment in which the Convention functions has been 
changing. At the global level the conclusion of the Uruguay Round has not only produced profound 
institutional changes in the world trading system but had removed many of the distortions which had 
crept into that system. Tariffs on manufactures in both developed and developing countries are 
scheduled to come down further over the next few years. Agriculture is back under the multilateral 
discipline and voluntary export restraints are expected to be abolished within four years. The Multi- 
fibre Arrangement will also be phased out. But even outside of the Uruguay discussions many 
developing countries, with IMF and World Bank prodding, were reviewing their trade policies and 
reducing protectionist trade barriers in order to encourage greater efficiency. In Europe itself the 
formation of a Single market is bound to have implications for the EU’s external trade policy.
The proliferation of integration arrangements is another feature of the evolving world 
economy. The European Union has increasingly been negotiating bilateral agreements with single 
countries and groups of countries. The privileges which the ACP once enjoyed in the EU market 
have been eroding over time. As pointed out earlier, the ACP for various reasons has not been able 
to take advantage of the opportunities offered in the European markets. In fact the ACP States have 
often complained that the EU grants to some third countries have better preferential access than that 
available to ACP States on a number of products of particular interest to them. The reduced tariffs 
agreed to by the EC in the Uruguay Round will further reduce ACP preferences, given the 
requirements of the MFN provision. For the Caribbean, Europe is seen as a distant market, except 
of course for the traditional exports, such as sugar, bananas and rum. Transport costs can be a 
disincentive to the development of exports to this market.
Not only has EU-ACP economic relations not grown at an impressive pace, but intra-ACP 
relations have also failed to develop on any significant scale, notwithstanding the provision for 
cumulative value added in the convention in meeting rules of origin criteria and incentives for 
regional development.
In this new climate of liberalization, non-reciprocal arrangements are likely to become less 
and less a feature of international trade. In the event that ACP countries grant reciprocal access to 
other developed countries in any arrangement, similar concessions will have to be extended to EU 
countries. Caribbean countries cannot take high costs and inefficiency as an unchangeable condition. 
If reciprocity is accompanied by increasing efficiency, the cost of domestic production may not be 
as high as is sometimes made out to be.
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Following the collapse of the West Indies Federation in 1962, most of the individual units 
subsequently achieved political independence from Britain, but the question of viability and 
vulnerability associated with small size was an ever present one. The decision to continue existing 
forms of functional cooperation and to pursue economic integration was founded in this reality. It 
was believed that Caribbean cooperation and integration was not being fired so much by the 
‘doctrines of integration economics’ but by deeper socio-political and historical forces. “Caribbean 
regionalism is the outgrowth of more than 300 years of West Indian kinship -  the vagaries of the 
socio-economic political history of a transplanted people from which is evolving a Caribbean 
identity.”35 After almost three decades, the pace of economic integration has remained slow and 
stuttering, as national sovereignty has yielded grudgingly to regional policy and objectives. The 
effort to construct a regional architecture to complement and reinforce national structures and 
policies is often subverted by failure to agree on or implement basic and critical instruments. 
Differences in the level of development and the competitive way regional States view each other 
provides part of the explanation as each State sees itself as having its own peculiar problems for 
which it must take responsibility. Within insular nationalistic settings certain habits and structures 
have taken root and resist change, notwithstanding the pressure for greater efficiency. A 
fundamental factor is that intraregional transactions form only a small part of total economic activity 
and focus is more on external interaction, which is seen to be more critical to national development. 
As a force in Caribbean economic transformation, CARICOM remains weak, undeveloped and 
unsure of its potential or objectives. It is always striving to catch up with events driving global 
changes. Ironically, an uninspiring record of achievements has undermined confidence in the 
movement, weakened commitment and reinforced the position of those who see the regional effort 
as irrelevant to national development.
CARICOM, which came into being in July of 1973 with the signing of the Chaguaramas 
Treaty in Trinidad and Tobago grew out of the less ambitious Caribbean Free Trade Agreement 
(CARIFTA) adopted in 1968. The Chaguaramas Treaty is not a purely economic one, and envisages 
cooperation in three main areas:
(a) Economic integration, as represented by the Caribbean Common Market which 
replaces CARIFTA. This envisages market integration, coordinated or joint actions in production, 
joint actions in extraregional trade and other economic transactions and a Special Regime for the 
Less Developed Countries.
(b) Cooperation in non-economic fields and in the establishment and operation of 
common services (e.g. health, education, examinations, shipping, air transport, meteorology, 
scientific research, etc.) and
(c) The coordination of the foreign policies of the independent member States of the
region.
CARICOM is more than a free trade area, but not quite a common market. While the 
Chaguaramas Treaty recognizes in its preamble the importance of the ‘optimum utilization of
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available human and natural resources of the Region’, only small and tentative steps have been taken 
towards the free movement of labour and capital. Labour is a very sensitive issue, given the high 
levels of unemployment and the strong trade union movement. Only in 1996 was a decision taken 
to allow the free movement of University graduates and media personnel in the region, but the need 
for work permits can easily frustrate this objective. Different levels of development and different 
degrees of dependence on tariffs for revenues have made the adoption of a Common External Tariff 
(CET) a frustrating exercise. The CET is in its third phase, subject to exemptions and affected by 
different degrees of compliance.
The CET is not the only area where progress has been slow. Many issues identified in the 
1960s and 1970s as critical to Caribbean cooperation and development received scant attention, 
particularly in the difficult period of the 1980s when the absence of effective regional mechanisms 
to assist member States was deeply felt. Structural and institutional problems continue to plague the 
agricultural sector where the need for rationalization has long been recognized. In the area of 
foreign policy, the member countries do try to coordinate their positions on some issues, but the 
unilateral approach is not uncommon when national interests take precedence over regional 
concerns. In the area of foreign representation, there has been little attempt to achieve more effective 
use of resources expended on this instrument, notwithstanding the financial stress under which 




CARI COM-Common External Tariff Rates
CATEGORIES 1-1-1993 to 31-12-1994 1-1-1995 to 31-12-1996 1-1-1997 to 31-12- 1997 1-1-19S
Agricultural Inputs 0 0 0 0
Non-competing primary inputs 5 (LDC’s 0-5) 5 (LDC’s 0-5) 5 (LDC’s 0-5) 5 (LDC’s 0-5)
Non-competing intermediate inputs 5 (LDC’s 0-5) 5 (LDC’s 0-5) 5 (LDC’s 0-5) 5 (LDC’s 0-5)
Non-competing capital inputs 5 (LDC’s 0-5) 5 (LDC’s 0-5) 5 (LDC’s 0-5) 5 (LDC’s 0-5)
Competing primary inputs 20 15 10 10
Competing capital goods 20 15 10 10
Selected imports 20 15 10 10
Competing intermediate inputs 25 20 15 15
Non-competing final goods 25 25-30 20-25 20
Agro-industry 30-35 25-30 20-25 20
Garments 30-35 25-30 20-25 20
General manufactures 30-35 25-30 20-25 20
Agriculture 40 40 40 40
LISTA Suspended rates Suspended rates - -
LIST B Suspended rates LDC’s Suspended rates LDC’s - -
LIST C Minimum rates Minimum rates Minimum rates Minimum :
LIST D Parts I and III Suspended rates LDC’s Suspended rates LDC’s - -
Safety 0 0 - -
The adoption of an industrial programming policy to encourage a more optimal use of scarce 
capital resources has proven difficult in a region where members are competing with each other for 
investment. The formulation of a foreign investment policy and a rational structure of incentives 
which were at one time seen as crucial to the goal of greater self reliance now commands less 
urgency. Though some steps have been taken recently to facilitate the regional movement of capital, 
there still exists a wide range of obstacles, some of which are not readily transparent. With respect 
to air and sea transport regional cooperation has been elusive.
In the 1960s, the decision to approach integration with a free trade area was not without 
controversy. One view originating largely in the academic community was that since intraregional 
trade was already largely unimpeded, the more sensible approach was to integrate the production 
sectors, developing a diversified regional manufacturing sector based on the Caribbean’s natural 
resources. Such strong linking of the Caribbean economies was not seen to be politically feasible 
at the time, though its worth as a longer-term goal was recognized. The approach adopted was 
largely to facilitate the ongoing import substitution process at the national levels. Intraregional trade 
has grown very slowly, reflecting the competitive nature of Caribbean economies. In the 1960s 
intra-regional exports amounted to around 6 per cent of total domestic exports. In the 1970s this 
grew to around 8 to 9 per cent, and reached around 13 to 14 per cent in the early 1990s.
The emergence of balance of payments problems in the latter part of the 1970s and the failure 
to implement large parts of the Chaguaramas Treaty led to the first major review of the integration 
process by the end of the decade. The Report noted that despite “the great efforts that have been 
made in the post-independence era, economic, social and human progress in the region taken as a 
whole have not advanced at the rates which would be considered satisfactory by most people. Large 
pockets of chronic poverty in both urban and rural areas, endemic unemployment and deficiencies 
in basic amenities continue to characterize the lot of the region’s population.”36 This was in 1981. 
The situation did not improve in the 1980s, particularly in the so-called ‘More Developed 
Countries’: Guyana, Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. The distinction between ‘more 
developed’ and ‘less developed’ has become increasingly blurred since the early 1980s. 
Intraregional exports as a percentage of total exports are estimated to have declined from 10.3 per 
cent in 1973 to 8.3 per cent in 1980. Writing in 1992, the West Indian Commission commented as 
follows, “Overall, progress in developing a CARICOM economic space has been depressingly 
slow, coming to a complete halt for long periods and suffering reverses all too often.37
With the challenges emanating from developments in the world economy, and with the 
increasing trends towards regionalism, Caribbean integration is now receiving a great deal more 
attention. The frustrating unanimity rule has been amended and most decisions can be taken with 
a three quarters majority. A decision has also been reached to establish a Single Market and 
Economy by 1999 and to encourage greater integration in the monetary and financial field. With 
an original population of 5 million people CARICOM had always faced the problem of reconciling 
the desire to deepen the movement with the need to widen the community. After more than two 
decades following the signing of the Chaguaramas Treaty it had done neither. Suriname with a 
population of410,000 people and a per capita GNP of US$900 was the first new member to join in 
1995. Haiti with a population of 7.2 million people and a per capita GNP of US$250 was
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conditionally admitted in July 1997. With the admission of Haiti and Suriname the population of 
CARICOM is now 14 million. The application of the Dominican Republic has been put on hold.
In the context of what is taking place in the international arena and given the need for 
C ARICOM to strengthen its diplomatic clout, the idea of continuing with the original core countries 
had become increasingly irrelevant. The view cherished by some that widening should await 
deepening was difficult to maintain in a context where deepening was proceeding very slowly and 
individual markets were being unilaterally opened under structural adjustment programmes. Very 
slowly Caribbean and Latin American countries were being integrated under the oversight of the 
World Bank, the IMF and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). With the formal admission 
of Suriname and Haiti, the shift away from the essential Anglophone nature of CARICOM is 
beginning to take place.
There appears to be no clear strategy with respect to expanding the integration arena, the 
sequence of steps or the ultimate goals. Decisions, however, are being made in a way that challenges 
old divisions and concepts and points to a much larger and complex configuration of space, language 
and culture. In 1994, for example, a major step was taken with the formation of the Association of 
Caribbean States (ACS) which includes several Latin American countries belonging to other 
subgroupings.38 With a population of close to 215 million and a total GNP of US$500 million, the 
ACS was conceived as an organization intended to foster discussion on matters of common interest 
and to promote integration including the liberalization of trade, investment, transportation and 
related areas.
In keeping with the need to develop new trading partners, CARICOM has signed a number 
of agreements with neighbouring States. These include a CARICOM-Mexico Joint Commission in 
1974 aimed at providing training and technical assistance and to promote trade and other exchanges. 
This was followed by a CARICOM-Brazil cooperation Agreement in 1989 and a CARICOM-Cuba 
Joint Commission in 1993. The signing of the CARICOM-Venezuela Trade and Investment 
Agreement in 1992 created for CARICOM States a one-way duty free access to the Venezuelan 
market and provided a framework to encourage investment and joint ventures. In 1996 the Andean 
Development Corporation and CARICOM entered an agreement with the aim of advancing the 
integration process through the creation and promotion of joint ventures and investment 
opportunities. Partial scope.agreements between Guyana and Venezuela and between Venezuela and 
Trinidad and Tobago are also in place. These agreements, however, have generated very little new 
trade or investment.
The United States Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the Canada/Caribbean Agreement 
(CARIBCAN)
The United States CBI and CARIBCAN are basically the same kind of agreements. They 
are one-way free trade arrangements that allow a select group of developing countries in the Western 
Hemisphere to export most of their products duty free to the American and Canadian markets, 
respectively. The CBI is wider in scope, including as it does certain Latin American countries in the 
Caribbean and Latin America, while CARIBCAN applies largely to CARICOM States and the still 
dependent British territories in the Caribbean. In both cases, there are value-added criteria to be met,
and certain sensitive products are exempted. In both cases, too, safety clauses operate to protect 
industries threatened by exports from the beneficiaries. Both arrangements came into being with the 
promise of financial aid and the adoption of measures to encourage foreign investment.
Though both CBI and CARIBCAN were intended to encourage trade and development, the 
fact that they discriminated in favour of some countries was seen as violating the most favoured 
provision of the GATT and a waiver of contractual obligations was sought and obtained under the 
provision of Article XXV. Though the Canadian Government has attached no time limit to 
CARIBCAN, the waiver obtained in 1986 was for a period of 12 years, running until 1998, but this 
could be extended. In CBI II reference to the termination of the Act in 1995 was removed, and no 
time-frame was included. This does not, however, mean that provisions of the Act (e.g. the value- 
added or eligibility criterion) cannot change.
The United States’ CBI, or more precisely the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 
1983, was signed into law by President Reagan on 5 August 5 1983 and implementation began on 
1 January 1984. The initiative followed the failure of the United States, Venezuela, Canada and 
Mexico to agree on the conditions for an aid package to the region. Initially, 27 countries were 
named as possible beneficiaries but countries could be added or subtracted depending on certain 
conditions. Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands actively participate in the CBI 
notwithstanding their peculiar status as United States possessions. These two countries are given 
special treatment. To protect their rum exports, for example, excise taxes are returned to the 
respective treasuries of those islands.
The Initiative proposed that exports from approved beneficiary countries should enter the 
United States market duty free. Eligibility requires that products be grown, produced, or 
manufactured in the beneficiary countries. Products which are merely assembled or packaged do 
not qualify. Of course, there are exclusions such as textiles and apparel, leather goods, tuna, 
petroleum and petroleum products, watches and watch parts. Sugar was to receive duty free 
treatment, but only up to a certain limit. Quotas could be changed arbitrarily. Under the 
arrangements existing prior to the CBI, it was estimated that some 87 per cent of Caribbean Basin 
exports already entered the United States market duty free. The argument put forward for the CBI 
was that some of the duties that were still in place were in sectors of special interest to Basin 
countries. They also limited export expansion into many non-traditional products. It was also 
argued that the global reasons used for excluding certain products from the United States 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) were not relevant to the Caribbean Basin. The complex 
structures of the GSP itself militated against the ability of small inexperienced countries to take 
advantage of the opportunities offered.
For goods to qualify for duty-free entry at least 35 per cent of the appraised value of the 
article imported into the United States must consist of the cost or value of materials produced in one 
or more beneficiary countries and/or the direct cost of processing operations performed in one or 
more beneficiary countries. Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands are defined as 
beneficiary countries for purposes of this requirement. The CBI was linked to promises to put in 
place incentives to encourage investment and to provide training and assistance for private sector 
development.
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The first CBI has been succeeded by a second CBI (1990) in which one of the most notable 
modifications has been the removal of the termination date. The arrangement, however, can be 
terminated by Congress at any time, particularly if it concludes that the social, political and 
economic conditions which led to the CBI are no longer present. This is not a situation that can 
encourage long-term investment.
When assessing the CBI, it is difficult to separate the effects of this programme from others 
such as the GSP. What can be gleaned from Table 24 is that while for some countries, such as 
Dominican Republic and Jamaica, the value of exports to the United States increased between 1983 
and 1995, for others, such as Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago it fell. Values, it should be noted, 
can be affected by fluctuation in prices. Repeatedly, Caribbean countries have been making the case 
that not only products of relevance to them are excluded from the arrangement, but their economic 
structure makes it difficult for them to satisfy the value-added criterion and there is need for a more 
flexible approach.
The same point has been made to Canada with respect to CARIBCAN which came into 
existence in 1986 as a trade aid and investment package designed to removed obstacles to almost all 
exports of the Commonwealth Caribbean entering the Canadian market. Excluded products initially 
included textiles and clothing, footwear, luggage and hand bags, leather garments, lubrication oils 
and methanol. CARIBCAN does not exempt Caribbean exporters from the taxes and regulations 
which govern the importation or sale of goods in the Canadian market. For a product to qualify, a 
minimum of 50 per cent of the ex-factory price must originate in any of the beneficiary countries or 
in Canada. Local value added can be “cumulated” among the countries of the region.
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Table 25








Antigua N.A. N.A. N.A. 97 5 92
Bahamas 452 1,746 -1,294 661 171 490
Barbados 195 205 -10 201 52 149
Belize 36 29 7 100 56 44
Dominica N.A. N.A. N.A. 25 7 18
Dominican Republic 632 855 -223 3,017 3,511 -494
Grenada N.A. N.A. N.A. 27 6 21
Guyana 36 75 -39 141 129 12
Haiti 366 352 14 551 138 413
Jamaica 452 307 145 1,421 895 526
St. Kitts-Nevis N.A. N.A. N.A. 58 24 34
St. Lucia N.A. N.A. N.A. 81 36 45
St. Vincent N.A. N.A. N.A. 42 8 34
Trinidad & Tobago 728 1,357 -629 689 1,054 -365
N.A. negligible or not available
Source:IMF, Direction o f  Trade Statistics Yearbook, Various Issues.
Besides the excluded products, Caribbean countries repeatedly complained about the high 
value-added criterion. Responding to these concerns, Canada subsequently reduced the exclusion 
list, leaving textiles and methanol. Caribbean rum was also given greater access to the Canadian 
market. Canada has responded to the general concerns by increasing financial aid and undertaking 
debt write-off.
As in the case of the CBI, it is difficult to assess the effect of CARIBCAN in Canadian- 
Caribbean trade relations, given the fact that Canada also has a GSP in place. Canada has had a long 
relationship with the Anglophone Caribbean, particularly in the areas of trade and investment. 
Between 1986 and 1995, exports from some Caribbean countries actually fell (see Table 25). In the 
case of Guyana and Jamaica, their export trade has traditionally been dominated by bauxite.
The access accorded Caribbean countries to the United States and Canadian markets through 
the CBI and CARIBCAN has been affected by the terms accorded to Mexico through NAFTA. To 
the extent that these exceed in scope and depth those granted to the Caribbean, the latter would find 
itself in a less favoured position. Of particular interest to the Caribbean would be those products, 
such as apparel, which are excluded from the CBI and CARIBCAN. Lower production costs in 
Mexico are also a factor to contend with. NAFTA membership would also have enhanced Mexico’s 
attractiveness to foreign investment.
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Table 26
Canada’s Trade with Selected Caribbean Countries. 1986 and 1994 (US$m)






Antigua N.A. N.A. N.A. 5 9 -4
Bahamas 21 21 0 15 13 -24
Barbados 31 15 16 22 14 8
Belize 3 1 2 3 9 -6
Dominica 1 8 -7
Grenada 3 1 2
Guyana 3 19 -16 6 138 -132
Jamaica 52 103 -51 62 151 -89
St. Kitts-Nevis N.A. N.A. N.A. 5 2 3
St. Lucia N.A. N.A. N.A. 7 1 6
St. Vincent N.A. N.A. N.A. 2 N.A. N.A.
Trinidad & Tobago 65 38 27 67 15 52
N.A. negligible or not available
Source:IMF, Direction on Trade Statistics Yearbook, Various Issues.
In the United States the acceptance of NAFTA was not without controversy. There is still 
a heated debate about the effects of the Agreement on domestic wage rates and employment. Not 
only has the United States Congress failed to give the President ‘fast track’ authority, but calls for 
NAFTA parity for Caribbean States have also gone unheeded. Though some countries led by Chile, 
have expressed interest in joining, NAFTA itself has not been seeking new members and attention 
by hemispheric countries is increasingly being focused on the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA) scheduled to come on-stream by 2005.
The emerging hemispheric trade framework
Amidst the global efforts to liberalize multilateral trade, there has been a strong upsurge in 
regionalism in recent years. This has been in response to the difficulties that were associated with 
the GATT itself and a reflection of the increasing attention being given to the role of competition 
and markets in export development. While some new arrangements have come into being, old ones 
which floundered for years are seeking new ways and adopting new mechanisms to accelerate the 
process of integration. The European Union, which is the world’s largest grouping next to NAFTA, 
has not only been deepening cooperation but has been expanding both in Europe and other regions 
through trade agreements with individual countries and groups of countries. In this hemisphere a 
number of initiatives have recently been taken, and these are worth noting since they are likely to 
have a significant influence on regional and, even perhaps, world trade policies in the years ahead.
The entry into force of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement in 1989 culminated 
over a century of attempts to liberalize the movement of goods and services between these two 
countries. The coming into being of NAFTA in 1994 was even more significant, not so much 
because of its size, but because it brought together the two most developed countries in the
hemisphere with a developing country. NAFTA is not a simple trade agreement requiring 
reciprocity. It is far broader in scope covering, among other things, conditions for fair competition, 
the removal of barriers to services, action to increase investment, provisions of protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights in each party’s territory and an institutional structure for 
the implementation and application of the agreement. The inclusion of Mexico in the expanded 
arrangement troubled some countries, but also raised the expectations of other hemispheric 
developing States which saw in NAFTA the first step in the implementation of the “Enterprise for 
the America’s Initiative” (EAI) announced by former President George Bush in 1990, and which had 
as its goals the establishment of a hemisphere-wide free trade zone. The change in administration 
in the United States in 1992 seemed to have put the process on hold and it was not until the Summit 
of America’s meeting in Miami in December of 1994, that the vision of a hemisphere-wide grouping 
was raised again. Thirty-four leaders, including President Clinton, from the western hemisphere 
committed themselves to the creation of a FTAA by the year 2005. Following this meeting, a 
number of working groups have been set up to address particular issues. The attractiveness of the 
FTAA concept is that it involves a market of 750 million people and a GNP of over US$9 trillion 
(average per capita US$12,000), which makes it larger than the present European Union both in 
terms of population and GNP (see Table 27).
There are, of course, a number of integration movements among the developing countries 
of the hemisphere, dating back to the 1960s. While for many years little advance was made, more 
recently there is a new urgency and a new attitude in the context of the increasing abandonment of 
protectionism as a strategy of development, and the need for mechanisms to deal with the challenges 
emanating from the new world trading order. In 1980 the Montevideo Treaty establishing the Latin 
American Integration Association (LAIA) superseded the 1960 Montevideo Treaty establishing the 
Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). In the LAIA framework, liberalization is carried 
out on a sectoral basis through two mechanisms: Regional Scope Agreements, covering all members 
of LAIA, which gives preferential treatment on a regional basis, and Partial Scope Agreements, 
conducted by subgroups of LAIA which offer preferential treatment to the signatories only. It is 
through a Partial Scope Agreement that the current economic integration initiatives are taking place. 
The LAIA in 1995 includes a wide range of agreements comprising MERCOSUR (Mercado Comun 
del Sur or Southern Common Market), the Andean Group, the Group of Three (Colombia, Venezuela 
and Mexico) and some bilateral and sector agreements. This process has allowed some groups to 
go ahead of others. In MERCOSUR trade has not only been growing faster than GDP, but from the 
beginning of 1995 MERCOSUR was able to put in place a Common External Tariff, thus making 
the group a customs union.
One of the features of the emerging trade architecture is the extent to which integration 
groups are being connected through bilateral arrangements. For example, just one month before the 
FTAA was announced in Miami, the NAFTA countries had announced their participation in the 

















Exports as % 
o f GDP 
(1994)
CACM 29.9 37.421 l,252a
Costa Rica 3.4 8,884 2,610 40
El Salvador 5.6 9,057 1,610 13
Guatemala 10.6 14,255 1,340 19
Honduras 5.9 3,566 600 41
Nicaragua 4.4 1,659 380 24
Andean Grout) 101.2 212.566 2,100a
Bolivia 7.4 5,905 800 17
Colombia 36.8 70,263 1,910 17
Ecuador 11.5 15,997 1,390 26
Peru 23.8 55,019 2,310 9
Venezuela 21.7 65,382 3,020 29
M ERCOSUR 201.9 882.834 4,373
Argentina 34.7 278,431 8,030 7
Brazil 159.2 579,787 3,640 7
Paraguay 4.8 8,158 1,690 27
Uruguay 3.2 16,458 5,170 18
Other Latin Am erica
Cuba 11.0
Chile 14.2 59,151 4,160 28
Dominican Republic 7.8 11,390 1,460 24
M exico 91.8 304,596 3,320 13
Panama 2.6 7,235 2,750 37
NAFTA' 384.5 7,978,298 20,750a
European Union2 372.0 7,979,000 21,448a
CARICOM 3 6.4 17,130 2,676a
ACS4 215.2 502,000b 2,460a
Note: The members of the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 




1. Canada, United States and Mexico
2. 15 countries
3. Thirteen Commonwealth Caribbean countries plus Suriname. With Haiti the population will increase to 13.6
million and total GNP to US$18,907 million giving an average per capita GNP of US$1,390.
4. Association of Caribbean States. The ACS includes the CARICOM States and the following countries:
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and 
Venezuela. Guadeloupe, Guyana and Martinique are Associate Members.
Source: World Bank, Atlas, 1997; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1997.
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ment its membership in NAFT A by negotiating trade and technical assistance agreements with Chile, 
CARICOM, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia and the Central American countries. It also joined the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ( APEC) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). Of course, it is also a member of the newly and loosely formed ACS and 
NAFTA. MERCOSUR and the Andean Group signed an agreement in April 1998 to create a South 
American Free Trade Area (SAFTA) beginning in the year 2000. Free trade agreements are also 
being contemplated with neighbouring countries. Frustrated with its attempts to get into NAFTA, 
Chile has negotiated trade agreements with MERCOSUR and the EU and is also entered into a 
bilateral agreement with Canada. It has already signed agreements with Bolivia, Colombia, 
Venezuela and Ecuador. It has also been admitted into the APEC Group. In most cases the share 
of intra-group exports in total exports is not high. In 1995, it amounted to 43 per cent in NAFTA, 
but in the case of MERCOSUR it was around 20 per cent, in the Andean Group 12 per cent, in the 
CACM 19 per cent and in CARICOM around 13 per cent. Intra-hemispheric trade amounted to just 
over 50 per cent.
Where does the Anglophone Caribbean fit into all this. As we saw earlier, the CARICOM 
countries have not been able to take advantage of the preferential markets to which they gained 
access. Preferences have largely served to protect traditional commodities. Caribbean countries still 
need to develop a manufacturing sector that goes beyond the simple assembly and packaging of 
foreign goods that cannot meet the required value-added criterion. Markets in themselves are not 
enough and greater attention needs to be paid to problems affecting production. In recent years, 
development and macroeconomic policies in some States have been addressing the question of 
quality and competitiveness, and this provides a good basis for further diversification of the 
production structure. The CARICOM market is small,39 and this is certainly not enough to attract 
large-scale investment or to provide the economies necessary to bring down costs. The more 
developed countries of the region are increasingly looking for outside opportunities and, in this 
connection, more intense efforts are being made to attract foreign capital which is expected to bring 
entrepreneurs, marketing connections, technology, etc. Trinidad and Tobago expressed a desire to 
join NAFTA, but the question of relationship with groupings that require reciprocity is one that has 
to be studied more carefully, because some advantages with other groupings, such as the EU, could 
be lost.
With the Lomé IV Convention coming to an end in the year 2000, and with the new 
hemispheric configuration taking shape, reciprocity is an issue which must be addressed at some 
stage. If by accepting reciprocity Caribbean countries can gain more effective access to the markets 
of partner countries, the benefits from this in the medium term may far exceed those of existing 
arrangements which do not require reciprocity, but offer uncertain and highly qualified access. Some 
CARICOM countries are in a better position to deal with the issue of reciprocity than others and this 
may lead to some parting of the ways where trade relations with third parties are concerned. New 
bridgeheads may enhance the prospects for CARICOM which, incidentally, does not have the same 
significance for all its members.
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Notwithstanding the results of the Uruguay Round, many impediments to the free flow of 
goods, services and investment still exist in the global trading framework. Many areas of trade 
policy remain far from transparent. One reason for the continued interest in regional movements has 
to do with the desire of the participants to achieve liberalization beyond what has been agreed to 
within the global/multilateral framework. Because of their nearness to each other and common 
interest, members of regional groupings are able to pursue cooperation in areas that go beyond trade 
and investment. When there is a fair amount of homogeneity, cooperation can also be advanced at 
a faster pace with appropriate measures to accommodate the less advantaged.
Caribbean countries are caught in an economic maelstrom with both regional and 
international dimensions. The trends towards a more globalized and integrated world economy have 
unleashed forces which are affecting both the rich and poor nations and adjustments are being forced 
in both groups. National policy autonomy has been greatly reduced. Even before the end of the 
Uruguay Round the conditionalities associated with structural adjustment programmes had already 
challenged the model of national and regional import substitution in the Caribbean, where stagnation 
had already undermined the regional commitment and reinforced nationalistic tendencies. The slow 
movement towards development of a diversified competitive manufacturing sector and the threat 
posed to traditional exports are now forcing Caribbean countries to examine all the options and make 
hard decisions. Hemispheric changes have been profound, but technology has shrunk the world and 
now make possible alliances inconceivable two decades ago. The democratization of Latin America 
has been accompanied by a radical change in trade policy, and the reinvigoration of the integration 
movements reflects a deeper and more serious commitment to regional development.
In the evolving scenario, the Caribbean has to reposition itself. Differential and special 
treatment is becoming less important in the world economy, while concessional assistance is 
becoming increasingly difficult to access. The rapidly intensifying competitive environment may 
pose a challenge to current trade and development policies, but it also offers opportunities, 
particularly for small States with limited markets and resources. There is no doubt that preferences 
have influenced present lines of production and a major question to be faced is identifying the mix 
of domestic policies and external trading arrangements that could lead to a more optimal use of 
physical and human resources without producing economic and social dislocation. Caribbean 
countries are not only small, but are at differing stages of development and have different economic 
structures and tax systems. Some have large agricultural sectors, while others have a more 
diversified base and are better placed to make the transition to a more competitive setting.
There are various schools of thought about how the Caribbean should proceed in 
restructuring its present external trading relationships, most of which have had little effect in 
transforming national economic structures. The Caribbean is located in the western hemisphere 
midway between Latin America and North America, but still historically linked to Europe. The 
imperative to change the form of the Lomé Convention comes not only from the EU’s desire to 
globalize its external relationships, but from the need to conform to WTO disciplines. Both with 
respect to the EU and the emerging integration trend in the hemisphere, the essential principle which 
has to inform the Caribbean’s choice of external trading relationships must revolve around the need
Towards a new trade strategy
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for a transition period to rationalize existing production structures and for a geographic and policy 
framework which can encourage the creation of competitive and resilient economies. For the right 
‘trading atmosphere’ there is no reason why some Caribbean countries should not be prepared to 
grant reciprocity. Joining group with group at a still delicate stage may be too much of a complex 
process at this point. The present trend is to allow individual members of the various groups to 
explore wider commercial contacts with other groups and States that are not incompatible with 
regional obligations and objectives. Such a process in time could create a network of relationships 
which leads to an increasingly larger trading space. The hemispheric concept could be realized from 
below moving upwards rather than through an imposed superstructure in which some countries 
would find difficulty fitting.
Both within the ACP group and among the developing countries of the hemisphere, the 
development of South-South cooperation has been disappointing. The use of strategies to encourage 
complementary development has been highly elusive. Countries often at a similar stage of 
development have resisted arrangements which would put them on a competitive plane. Vested 
interests have had a deep influence on national policy-making. The new global environment, 
whatever its weaknesses and uncertainties, by challenging the culture of protection across the board, 
could in time lead to greater South-South trade, once appropriate policies are in place. The market 
potential in developing counties is often greatly underestimated as a result of inability to market 
goods and services.
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3. THE ROLE OF THE STATE AND THE IMPERATIVES OF STATE REFORM
Some general issues
Pressure to deregulate and liberalize their economies while retreating from involvement in 
the direct production of goods and services has not reduced the importance of governments to the 
developmental processes in poor countries. If anything, in the emerging competitive environment 
a greater responsibility is thrust on the State to provide direction, to ensure a competitive and up-to- 
date regulatory framework and to formulate and implement policies which reduce inequities in the 
society. In an age where information is power, the modem State has to be well-informed and 
sensitive to daily developments, both internally and externally. It has to explore opportunities for 
cooperation with other governments in fields which can benefit the local economy. It has to know 
how to mix its political concerns with its economic interests. Diplomatic skills have to be a basic 
asset of modem governments. The State has to interact with other governments in regional and 
international organizations, and maximizing benefits from membership in these organizations has 
to be a major objective. For small States, membership of such organizations can be an expensive 
matter. In negotiating agreements with other countries or groups preparatory work is essential, and 
the State has to be backed up by an organized and efficient bureaucracy. The private sector can help 
in formulating a position, but the State represents the interests of the entire society . A ‘captured’ 
State is an ineffective State. The vision of the State has to transcend partial interests and must reflect 
the well-being of the entire society. At all times the State must know what its options are and what 
are the costs and benefits associated with various alternatives. Research and monitoring of the 
economic and social environment have to be a structured and ongoing process in strategy 
formulation. For small countries, particularly, Statecraft and development diplomacy must go hand 
in hand.
External relations are an important complement to the function of the State at the domestic 
level. What the role should be, however, at the domestic level is not without controversy. While 
some favour minimal State interference, others point to the experience of certain fast growing States 
in East Asia, which involved a proactive State exercising varying levels of intervention to deal with 
issues of market failures and structural weakness. There are several different perspectives and 
interpretations of the role the State has played in these countries, but for good reason the State is 
widely recognized as a critically important player and an agent of change. The market needs the 
State for its orderly functioning.
The State has the power to change or make laws. The State is impartial (or should be) and 
has a legitimate right to be concerned about all groups or sectors in the society. The State as the 
conscience of the society has to pay attention to the social impact of economic policies. There are 
some things which only the State can do. Or put differently, there are some goods and services 
which only the State can provide. In the same way that a capable and efficient State can assist 
development and provide a higher level of welfare, an incompetent or poorly functioning State can 
be a hindrance to development. It is not enough for the State to have good intentions. The State 
cannot distribute what it does not have. The State occupies a unique position among actors in the 
social and economic fabric of each country and unless its role is informed by imagination, constant
review, cost effectiveness, a long-term vision and the exercise of functions that reflect its 
comparative advantage the overall outcome is bound to suffer.
In recent years, the threat to the legitimacy of the State has come from several quarters. The 
use of State authority by ruling cliques to brutalize opponents or to coercively maintain their stay 
in power served to weaken the moral basis of the State. Corruption of the State apparatus and the 
practice of patronage and clientelism have helped in creating parallel or informal economies in many 
countries, which by-passed formal rules and regulations. Declining foreign exchange earnings 
resulting from both internal and external developments and lower public revenues reduced the 
governmental capacity to deliver goods and services in a context where populist policies had 
significantly raised expectations that governments had unlimited resources and could not go 
bankrupt. Fiscal problems accompanied by stabilization programmes impacted on governments’ 
ability to hold or attract personnel with high-level technical skills and this further weakened 
administrative and management capacity. The attempts by governments to govern societies with 
archaic or irrelevant laws and poorly functioning institutions in many cases took a heavy toll on 
social order, the administration of justice and the economic and investment environment. A major 
reaction to what was seen as a weakened and ineffective State (the delegitimization of the State) was 
the emergence of a variety of non-governmental organizations and other groups offering alternative 
solutions to persistent social and economic problems.
If the State has retreated in the face of attacks on its ‘unwieldiness’, its inefficiency, its 
amorphous presence and the increasing globalization driven by private sector interests, there is an 
emerging view that while the State must change, it must not wither away. In some areas there is 
need for more State. The State must retool itself and rethink its role to guide the process of change 
in a progressive and equitable manner. Equity and fairplay must continue to rank high in the 
concerns of the State. No system has yet delivered the completely just society. There is nothing 
wrong with a welfare function related to economic performance and delivered cost effectively. More 
than any other agent, the State is the conscience of the society and has to take both the short and 
long view and, therefore, must be concerned with the use of resources, the implications for future 
generations and the effects on the environment. Individuals concerned with daily survival and 
corporations preoccupied with profits tend to take the short view. Even in the present, theoretical 
life expectancy rates bear little relationship to actual mortality outcomes. The use of resources, the 
environment and the efforts to reduce or eliminate poverty are linked and raise critical issues for 
which the State must take paramount responsibility and provide practical guidelines in the context 
of internal and external pressures stemming from the internationalization of these issues.
Liberalization does not necessarily mean laissez-faire. There is no consensus on the role of 
the State, but the discussion has moved away from arguments of the 1980s about ‘too much or too 
little State’ to focusing on measures to achieve a more capable and efficient State to improve 
governance, mobilize resources and increase efficiency in an increasingly competitive environment.
A number of things that the State does can also be performed by the private sector. Given 
the revenue constraints and the rapid growth of public expenditure in both developed and developing 
countries, a great deal of attention has come to focus on the growth of the State, its performance in 
its various roles and the reform needed to make it a more effective actor and instrument. There is
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a widespread discussion over what the State should do and what it should not do. Where the State’s 
functions are concerned, generalization is always a difficult matter. In every country, the State has 
evolved in a particular political and social setting and reflects a range of historical factors and 
cultural values which may differ from place to place. In most developing countries the absence of 
a strong local private sector and the need to establish basic services encouraged the State to assume 
the role of ‘engine of growth’ (development promoter) and to put in place institutions and policies 
which could achieve this end. The State also assumed a welfare function using the tax system to 
finance a range of services, without discriminating among beneficiaries in terms of ability to pay. 
Expenditure often increased as a matter of course because these seem to be areas of high social 
value, but little attention was paid to the delivery system, efficiency, the quality of the service or 
the impact on the human resource base.
The first generation of reforms concerned itself with stabilization and, in some cases, resulted 
in increased unemployment and poverty without necessarily offering any promise of growth and 
development. Arbitrary cuts in expenditure to generate a budget surplus damaged both human and 
physical capital and further undermined the prospects for recovering from the initial crisis. 
Programmes to alleviate poverty which have come mainly as an afterthought, have generally been 
highly inadequate or misdirected. Increasingly, the approach is to deal with the question of poverty 
within the overall conceptualization of development that takes account of the specification of the 
particular case.
The Caribbean experience
In the Caribbean, the State has come to occupy a large and somewhat ambiguous role in the 
economic and social landscape. Following the achievement of political independence from Britain 
beginning in the early 1960s, the governments of the Caribbean countries saw the State as not only 
providing law and order, but as playing a catalytic role in the development process. The State was 
to provide not only the framework of incentives and regulations, but the social and economic 
infrastructure. This role assumed an increasingly larger dimension as the State began to acquire 
privately-owned enterprises in the production sectors for a variety of reasons including the need to 
save jobs or to take control of the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy. In the highly nationalistic 
atmosphere of the 1960s and 1970s, a large and visible foreign private presence in key sectors of the 
economy was seen to be.inconsistent with the idea of political independence. New foreign 
investments were to be guided by investment codes which sought to define the spheres and terms 
of participation of foreign investors. Regulations governing the operations of the financial sector 
were also adopted to encourage greater local control and to retain a greater share of domestic savings 
for national development. These were backed up by stringent foreign exchange controls that were 
intended to support a fixed exchange rate system.
The State also assumed welfare functions, using the tax system as a redistributive 
mechanism. Some basic services, like health and education, were provided free while others were 
supplied at rates that could not cover the cost of production. Unlimited access to the offers of the 
Central Government removed the pressures to achieve efficiency.
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With increasing population and growing demands for State services, the State bureaucracy 
increased significantly. To cope with the burgeoning administrative demands, the tendency was to 
employ more people rather than seek a solution through reorganization and increasing productivity. 
At the same time, wages and salaries were kept at levels below those prevailing in the private sector, 
thus making it difficult to attract skilled persons to the upper echelons of the public service. At the 
lower levels, wages and salaries in the public sector are generally higher than those in the private 
sector. In a number of cases, wages and salaries have grown to the point where they account for 
more than half of recurrent expenditures (see Table 28). In recent years the proportion has fallen in 
a few cases, for example in Trinidad and Tobago, as a result of structural adjustment programmes. 
Transfers and subsidies normally range between 10 and 35 per cent of recurrent expenditure. Part 
of the explanations for the figures at the higher end is to be found in the performance of State-owned 
companies. Many of the enterprises acquired by government were losing concerns, which did not 
even attract the interest of the private sector. Some profitable ones deteriorated as a result of a 
failure to improve management and accounting systems and to modernize their operation to increase 
efficiency and competitiveness. The result was that added demands were placed on the finances of 
the central governments. And this included the servicing of loans contracted by State-owned 
enterprises which the latter could not service.
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Table 28
Selected Central Government Revenue and Expenditure Ratios, 1995
As a percentage of GDP As a percentage of Current Expenditure
Tax Current Total Wages & Current Interest
Countries Revenue Exp. Exp. Salaries Subsidies & Payments
Transfers
Antigua 18 23 27 51 7 13
Bahamas 17 17 19 57 10 14
Barbados 28 30 31 38 29 19
Belize 19 20 26 55 11 10
Dominica 24 26 31 57 12 10
Grenada 25 23 27 53 22 9
Guyana 32 25 39 25 10 40
Jamaica 35 27 34 36 13 43
St. Kitts/
Nevis1 21 25 29 51 13 11
St. Lucia 22 23 33 54 16 4
St. Vincent 24 24 27 55 15 7
Trinidad &
Tobago 25 26 28 37 32 20
1. 1994
Source: IMF, Country Reports.
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The external shocks of the 1980s, and the impact on foreign exchange earnings on the 
governments’ fiscal positions exposed not only weakness in the economy, but raised questions about 
the sustainability of welfare programmes and the level of State spending. Even before this, recurrent 
revenue was having difficulty keeping pace with the growth of recurrent expenditure. With the 
exception of Trinidad and Tobago in the oil boom years, budgetary savings were never significant, 
and for most countries the fiscal position deteriorated in the 1980s. Governments increased 
borrowing both locally and abroad to finance both capital programmes and consumption. Debt 
service payments as a proportion of government revenue and as a proportion of foreign exchange 
earnings increased to levels which forced expenditure reductions in other areas. In a number of cases 
the capital budget itself was reduced, resulting in a deterioration of the physical and social 
infrastructure. Real current expenditures in the social sectors (e.g. health, education, social security) 
also fell, resulting in worsening human conditions and a lower quality work force in a situation 
where questions were already being raised about the quality and effectiveness of the services 
provided. This had other consequences. An environment lacking in high quality social services not 
only makes it difficult to attract trained people, but also encourages residents with marketable skills 
to migrate, thus worsening the investment climate.
The economic crisis in which the Caribbean finds itself, increasing poverty in some cases 
and the changes in the global environment have forced Caribbean governments not only to review 
their development policies, but the role of the State as well. In a number of cases, the public service 
has been trimmed, but in certain instances the incentive schemes used to do so have lost the youngest 
and most talented, thus leaving a very weak base for development. At the same time, critical areas 
of the public service remains understaffed. In all the countries with a large State-enterprises sector, 
privatization programmes have been instituted thus reducing transfers and subsidies from the Central 
Government. Generally, health and education delivery systems are functioning under stress and are 
in need of urgent overhaul and modernization. .The existence of unemployment with shortages of 
skills in a number of areas reflect the lack of planning and coordination in economic management. 
Inappropriate or poorly functioning health and education systems have major direct implications for 
the quality of the work force and ultimately for the country’s ability to compete.
The State and development
The economies in the Caribbean have often been described as ‘mixed economies’ i.e. a 
mixture of State involvement and private enterprise. The State went beyond the provision of law 
and order, rules and regulations or essential services. The range of controls adopted to manage the 
economy and encourage development underwent little review and their distortionary effects are to 
be seen in the uncompetitive structures which make it difficult to compete in the domestic or foreign 
markets. Interaction with the global economy is taking place in a very limited way. The growth of 
trade and investment goes hand in hand with development. These countries are being challenged 
by the globalization process but they are not all benefiting from it. The growth of world trade and 
investment which has already reached record levels is likely to be further bolstered by the results of 
the Uruguay Round which not only relate to border restrictions but to a whole range of domestic 
policies which were once thought to be the exclusive preserve of national decision-makers.
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In the emerging trading environment the practice of the ‘control model’ in the pursuit of 
development is becoming increasingly difficult to defend or sustain. No State could be unaffected 
by the economic and political forces shaping international policies. At the same time, the adoption 
of completely free markets without a role for the State is fraught with difficulties. The challenge for 
the State is to identify its ‘comparative advantage’ and to assume those functions which will enable 
it to perform effectively in a rapidly changing environment.
Increasingly, the view is that the private sector should be the ‘engine of growth’ and the 
State should act as facilitator creating an environment and a regulatory framework conducive to 
economic activity. Rhetoric is not the same as administrative efficiency. A credible State, it can be 
argued, is the foundation for social order and development. This means several things. First it 
means that the State must have a clear idea of its role, what is expected of it and its relationship to 
civil society. It must seek to operate not only efficiently but incorruptibly and with transparency. 
Its legislative function is crucial, and its aim should be not only to identify gaps and weakness in the 
law, but must seek to enact and update laws quickly. Laws must be enforced and administered 
efficiently, but because some laws are outdated their enforcement is often problematical.
Though the State must make it a habit of continuously reviewing its laws, there are some 
laws on the books of Caribbean States which have not been touched in decades. Laws and practice 
embody social and economic policy but very often they do not reflect current thinking and run 
counter to Stated intentions and objectives. When this is taken together with public institutions that 
are not functioning properly expected outcomes do not materialize.
In most countries of the region structural adjustment programmes have only been partially 
completed. The return of growth in some cases has led to some degree of complacency and the 
threat of regression is ever present. Trade and exchange control liberalization has gone a long way 
in some countries but the regulatory framework relating to operation of competition and monopoly 
is far from established in most States. Company laws have been slow to change and uncertainties 
in the business environment persist. Revenue and protection objectives in relation to national tariff 
structures and the CARICOM common external tariff are not yet settled. The system of fiscal 
incentives is in need of review as are the laws and regulations relating to foreign investment and the 
ownership of property. Rigidities in the labour market persist, while conciliatory procedures are 
slow and outdated and are in urgent need of overhaul. Fiscal reforms remain a major challenge as 
States grapple with the problems of rationalizing the public service, instituting incentives, reducing 
debt levels, funding pension schemes and privatizing State enterprises. Given the requirements of 
infrastructural development there is need for a framework which can encourage private sector 
involvement. Careful thought also needs to be given to the role the private sector can play in 
providing more efficient and modem health and education services.
There is a great deal that the State can do to improve the macroeconomic environment and 
encourage production, beyond the measures captured in stabilization and structural adjustment 
programmes. Some of these have deep historical and emotional roots and may require a longer 
period. But the State must be resolute and not allow inertia to set in.
In the light of past experience, it is important for governments to keep a balanced 
perspective on new ideas and thinking which carry pretensions of universal appeal, but often have 
serious shortcomings in specific applications. In the 1960s and 1970s there was a widespread 
assumption in developing countries that a highly centralized State using technical skills and modem 
planning techniques could transform agrarian societies into industrial economies and solve all the 
problems of poverty. While some growth was achieved, distortions increased and limited 
transformation occurred. The effects of this approach was not only felt in the structure of production 
but in the functioning of societies and in social values.
In the 1980s a high State presence came to be seen as part of the problem and a shrinking 
of the State, a greater role for private enterprises and the removal of controls to allow a greater 
freedom for market forces came to form the main planks of the medium term adjustment 
programmes. Markets and competition were proclaimed as the new mantra to remove all the 
constraints to development. Of late, however, a middle ground is emerging in which an effective 
and credible State is seen as a partner in the development process. In this paradigm the approach 
takes into account social relationships and practices which have proven their worth in sustaining 
communities, but which may not be found in textbooks and official reports. One of the concepts 
now in vogue is ‘social capital’ which refers to the economic value of shared norms and networks. 
It is not as easy to define as physical or human capital. The term itself may be new, but the social 
relationships and practices it covers have a long history in communities all over the world where 
people have confronted common problems by pooling their resources and know-how in cooperative 
actions. Social interactions can take place through simple everyday activities and by generating trust 
make greater cooperative interaction possible. Social capital is not a nebulous concept and addresses 
issues conventional economic theory has identified as impediments to development. Peter Evans40 
had summed up the benefits of social capital in four categories:
1. It lowers ‘transaction costs -  When you can count on the people you are working with 
(or trading with or borrowing from or lending to) you can focus on your main goals instead of 
worrying about enforcement and monitoring.
2. It increases information flows -  When a community is closely connected, useful ideas 
will spread quickly so that everyone can take advantage of them;
3. It makes promising but risky ventures easier to try -  When individuals feel they can 
count on their friends and neighbours they are more likely to try new strategies that will improve 
their lives, even if it means taking risks;
4. It makes possible coordinated pursuit of common goals -  a foundation of trust and 
experience in relying on other members of the community makes it possible to tackle and sustain 
more complicated projects.
Since the concept of social capital links production and welfare at the same time, public 
policy has much to gain by fostering the development of social capital, some of which has already 
been destroyed in many communities. In the Caribbean, for instance, the disappearance of the 
extended family, the reduced status of key people like teachers and midwives and the waning of
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informal financial mechanisms like ‘sou-sou’ and ‘lend-hand’ are seen as a loss of social capital 
which is reflected in the reduced abilities of people in many communities to cope41. At the same 
time there can be negative aspects to the expansion of social capital when members of a group or 
profession favors some sections of the community and discriminate against others. Exclusion has 
economic implications which can rupture a community.
Public policy can help in a number of areas. Governments can insist on access or entry rules 
being made more transparent. Rather than impose its ideas and products on local communities, both 
governments and local groups can become partners or co-producers in conceptualizing and 
undertaking projects with assets and resources from both partners complementing each other. 
Information on local problems and conditions can be critical to the success of an undertaking. No 
partner may have a monopoly on expertise and cooperation has a synergetic effect which enhances 
the chances of success. The State also has information on markets and technology which local 
communities may not have and can set up channels for the easy flow of such information to various 
groups.
The State and poverty
Development and poverty are closely linked. In a sense they are two sides of the same coin. 
It is impossible to discuss one without discussing the other. Poverty did not begin with the 
implementation of structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s, though in many cases 
retrenchment in the public sector, cuts in wages and salaries and reduced government spending in 
the sectors created a new group of poor to add to the chronic poor who did not benefit from ongoing 
development strategies. It is possible too, that without the adoption of structural adjustment 
programmes, the poor in some cases might have suffered even more.
While growth in aggregate output may help, growth by itself may not be sufficient to deal 
with the problems of poverty. It is known that growth can take place without an increase in 
employment or a reduction in inequality. It is widely acknowledged that since worsening social 
conditions can be destabilizing, the implementation of SAPs needs to be accompanied by measures 
to assist the poor, if reforms are to be sustained. How to do this has generated endless studies and 
a great deal of controversy that has often left governments more confused than ever. The tendency 
has been to put in place a variety of social programmes as adjuncts to SAPs, not so much to reduce 
or eradicate poverty, but to mitigate or ameliorate social conditions. Many of these programmes 
were poorly informed in terms of knowing who the poor are, the nature and causes of poverty, the 
location of the poor and the needs of the poor. In the absence of a proper framework of 
administration, safety net programmes have only limited effects.
Increasingly, the view is that poverty reduction and eradication must be an integral part of 
development programmes. Development must target both economic and social objectives so that 
growth, employment and equity are not seen as incompatible objectives achievable only in 
theoretical constructs. The premises on which the State acts must be re-examined, if civil society 
is to participate in decisions which affect its well being and also to ensure that State adopts an 
appropriate approach. The State must acquire a good knowledge of the poor and the causes of 
poverty in particular situations.
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Whatever functions the State may be asked to assume or demit and whatever areas it may 
be asked to take under its purview, there is widespread agreement that it has a social responsibility 
for the way the society evolves and for holding the community together. It must be concerned not 
only with the growth of income but with the distribution of that income, with unemployment and 
with poverty in its various manifestations. Poverty is not good for anyone -  not for the poor, not for 
the government, and not for society. It can lead to political instability which itself can affect 
investment, growth and development. It can lead to an increase in crime and it can also impact on 
the environment. In the 1970s and particularly in the 1980s, certain extreme positions emerged 
which argued for the retreat of the State and the promotion of competition and market forces as the 
instruments that would lead to greater participation in the world economy, which was seen as 
fundamental to the solution of domestic, social and economic problems. This was as unproductive 
as the other extreme view which held that high State control could bring about the desired 
transformation outcomes.
It is widely accepted that while economic growth itself does not necessarily lead to increases 
in welfare for the general population, it helps. The sharp decline in living standards in the 1980s and 
the difficulties created by structural adjustment programmes led to the view that poverty as a 
problem needs to receive special focus. The early approach was to simply try to alleviate the 
problem by making transfers and spending more on training and temporary relief and unemployment 
programmes. This was done in an ad hoc fashion without necessarily identifying who are the poor, 
what was causing the poverty, what were the needs of the poor, or where was poverty greatest. The 
approach was to mitigate rather than reduce or eliminate poverty. The effort was often vitiated by 
political patronage, corruption and clientelism. The unsatisfactory outcomes associated with poverty 
alleviation programmes had strong basis in some of the assumptions on which these programmes 
were formulated. “It is an excessively idealized notion to assume that the ‘powerless’ can easily be 
empowered and by means such as training (intensive or extensive), ‘legalizing’ their seizure of 
‘captured’ land, making ‘micro-entrepreneurs’ of them, providing them with all the services (clean 
piped water, proper sanitation and solid and liquid waste disposal, access roads, secure shelter, and 
so on). First of all, the delivery ability and sustainability of the initial intervention has to be 
questionable, as well as expectations of decisive beneficial outcomes.... Secondly, standardized re­
education and training programmes hardly meet the necessary requirements of transmitting 
educational and technical progress to persons, especially the most disadvantaged at a level and a pace 
which they can absorb and over a sufficient period of time to ensure continuity of leamt new 
capabilities. Several of the poor are poor because they are less-motivated, more socially maladjusted 
slower learners than others also afflicted by poverty. It should not be expected that such persons 
could ‘over-night’ become entrepreneurs, own account workers, and responsible wage earners.”42 
The contention is that while there may be a case for immediate and direct relief, this should quickly 
be transformed into a programme of social development. The elimination of poverty is not a concern 
strictly for the poor but part of the larger programmes of social development.
With governments facing fiscal problems, it is difficult to increase social expenditures to 
meet the desired levels in critical areas. The challenge is to increase the quality of services through 
institutional reorganization, training, improved infrastructure, use of up-to-date materials and 
techniques. Greater spending does not always correlate with a larger volume of services or services
of a higher quality. With respect to the provision of water in Trinidad and Tobago, for example, 
almost half the water is wasted through leaks in the distribution system and consumers pay for this.
In the context of alleviating or eradicating poverty, there is considerable debate over not only 
how much governments allocate to various areas, but on the relative distribution as well. Though 
there are many causes of poverty, the contention is that certain areas such as education, are closely 
correlated with poverty and income distribution. In one study done on Latin America, education was 
found to be the variable with the strongest impact on income inequality and poverty. On average, 
one-fourth of total inequality was explained by the level of education.43 Other studies have come 
to similar conclusions.
The question relating to the efficacy of the State involves not only what the State does, but 
how best to achieve its objectives. While trying to streamline the State bureaucracy and reduce costs, 
it has to be kept in mind that the efficiency of the State depends critically on having a range of skills, 
and, therefore, the need for an appropriate reward structure must not be underestimated. A 
simplified system of rules and regulations should help in minimizing corruption, but a structure that 
demands accountability provides a better safeguard against abuse of authority and the wastage of 
funds. At all times, the State should aim at maintaining the respect of the civil population if the 
population is to operate within the framework of law.
Increasingly, a decentralized State is being seen as a necessary mechanism in more effective 
governance. “For far too long, large-scale technocratic development projects in developing countries 
have been directed from above, administrated by a distant un-coordinated and occasionally corrupt 
bureaucracy which is insensitive to local needs and concerns. Thus, projects have not involved the 
local people who have simply been treated as objects of the development process. Vast sums of 
money have been spent in the name of the poor, but very little has actually reached them. Even 
when it does reach them, it often perpetuates a cycle of dependency and an attitude of malfeasance 
and opportunism among the poor with an eye to milking the State cow for its uncertain bounties.”44 
But decentralization may have problems of its own, since local elites may try to appropriate for 
themselves a large share of State spending. Still, decentralization offers opportunities for local 
participation in decision-making and for the State to draw on local resources using self-help and 
other techniques to assist poor communities.
Enhancing the position of the private sector
It is impossible to discuss the role of the State without focusing on the private sector. 
Surprisingly, the capacity of the private sector is often taken for granted. It is often assumed that 
once bureaucratic efficiency is increased, macro-economic stability restored and the regulatory 
fetters are removed, the private sector will be transformed into a dynamo capable of achieving what 
the State with all its powers could not do. Governments themselves will benefit since the 
“depoliticization of decision-making and the improved efficiency resulting from privatization will 
enable governments to reduce public outlays, cut taxes, reduce budget deficits, and shrink public 
sector borrowing.”45 There is a tendency to assume that simply transferring an enterprise from the 
public sector to the private sector would lead to increased efficiency, since the concern of private 
owners with profit and limited access to finance will force them to take the actions necessary to
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reduce losses. The capacity of the private sector in many developing countries including those in 
the Caribbean is not well developed. Years of competition with the State for domestic savings, 
protection from competition, inability to access credit or up to date technology, limited experience 
with export marketing, high taxation, rigidities in the labour market, and inefficient government 
institutions have affected the growth and development of the local private sector.
In the context of the need to reform the State’s finances, it was common to assume that the 
aim of State divestiture or privatization was mainly to rid the public sector of money-losing or badly 
managed enterprises which constituted a drain on the limited finance of the Central Government. 
The longer-term objective in rationalizing State-ownership, however, is to create a division of labour 
which enhances the production framework in a way which leads to a more efficient production of 
goods and services. Privatization does not reduce the management responsibility of the State. Some 
form of controls may become redundant as the new private owners may have obtained ownership 
with conditions that allow greater flexibility in pricing and operations. Since divestiture could lead 
to a concentration of ownership in private hands, or transform a State monopoly into a private 
monopoly, new regulations may be needed to ensure competition and prevent the exploitation of 
consumers. Besides the regulatory framework, the performance of the private sector rests critically 
on the existence of up-to-date and transparent laws, the availability of a skilled and healthy labour 
force, the State of the physical infrastructure, a functioning capital market, a tax system that is not 
burdensome, labour legislation and conciliatory procedures appropriate to domestic conditions and 
access to modem technology. In the Caribbean, not enough attention has been paid to the 
importance of Research and Development (R&D) and adapting existing technologies to local 
conditions. To be effective in developing countries, the market-friendly model requires a very strong 
working relationship between the State and the private sector, since the removal of some basic 
constraints to private initiative and the creation of a conducive environment for investment require 
the synergism of State-private sector cooperation. An essential requirement in forging a more 
creative relationship has to be a clear understanding of the roles of the respective partners within a 
transparent, legal and operational framework. The areas and levels of State intervention are not 
unique and can vary from one situation to another.
One of the major development challenges facing Caribbean States is undoubtedly the 
creation of a vibrant private sector able to respond to the opportunities being created through 
liberalization and deregulation. Producing for a larger, more competitive market or even for the 
local market without protective cover requires a different mind-set from one accustomed to 
producing in an environment with little or no competition. Producers have to be more innovative, 
more responsive to external market developments, more sensitive to technological improvements, 
pay more attention to R&D and acquire greater technical and marketing skills. Since these issues 
are linked to the expansion of the economy, the growth of exports and the creation of jobs, the State 
must have a direct interest and its own policies have to mesh with the requirements of the private 
sector. It is difficult, for instance, for the State to maintain an education system that does not take 
into account the direction of development policy and the skill requirements of the economy without 
contributing to an increase in unemployment.
For historical and other reasons, the State and the private sector in the Caribbean have not 
always had a very strong and productive relationship. Sometimes it has been positively suspicious
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and antagonistic. Laws affecting private sector operation are often enacted without an adequate 
private sector input. Government Development Plans in the past have been articulated without a 
great deal of consultation with people engaged in private activity.
Based on size, national origin and integration into the formal economy, the private sector in 
the Caribbean can be divided into four groups:46
1. Local, small-scale and informal entrepreneurs;
2. Local and mainly small and medium-scale enterprises;
3. Locally established and resident entrepreneurs with non-Caribbean origins or
affiliation;
4. Non-resident, non-Caribbean, foreign business.
In terms of employment and diversity, the first group is by far the most significant. It 
includes not only the self-employed and street vendors, but an increasing number of cooperatives 
formed to advance the interests of their members. The second group, which is also indigenous, is 
more formal and organized, with activities spanning agriculture, processing, production and 
assembly of consumer goods and a range of service industries. It is difficult to separate the third 
group from the second, except that in the latter the scale of operations and networking may be larger 
and the managers or owners may be of foreign nationality or the descendants of second or third 
generation immigrants who may be still viewed as outsiders. The fourth group can be divided into 
two categories: the exclusively off-shore oriented operations related to the assembly of products for 
foreign markets and off-shore banking and other financial activities. The other relates to the large 
plants and tourism complexes drawing on local natural resources, using high level technology and 
marketing expertise, producing mainly for a foreign market. These operations involve a high degree 
of foreign ownership and management expertise.47
The increasing withdrawal of the State from direct production requires it to play a more 
active role in helping the private sector to become more efficient producers by providing the kind 
of assistance needed. To do this, it has to increase its knowledge of the sector, its dynamics, its 
historical origins, its structure, its strength and weaknesses. It is now widely agreed that while 
poverty allocation or amelioration programmes have their place, the cornerstone of poverty 
production has to be increased employment and output. The informal sector in most Caribbean 
countries has been growing even in the face of contraction in the formal sector and has provided an 
important cushion for both the chronic poor and the new poor. This says something about the 
dynamics and resilience of the sector. There is not a great deal of information on this sector. In 
Trinidad and Tobago, it has been estimated that the informal sector accounts for 23 per cent of 
employment as compared to 43 per cent for the formal private sector and 34 per cent for the public 
sector.48 The sector which has grown as a result of economic pressures and the instinct to survive, 
has received increasing attention since it can provide insights into poverty and offer guidelines for 
government actions which have traditionally favoured the formal sector. There is a widely held view 
that with properly structured incentives, land reforms, access to improved technology, credit
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availability and training, the sector could make a significant contribution to employment and income. 
There is also a view that too much formalization could stifle entrepreneurship.
The desire in the 1960s and 1970s to localize the economy as far as possible and to create 
an industrial base overrode serious consideration of the implications of size and the effects of some 
of the incentives adopted. The distortionary effects of the regulatory framework took a heavy toll 
on output and efficiency. Consumers paid a high price. Not only was the approach to protection 
based on the infant industry argument badly administered, but it was widely felt that some fiscal 
incentives were resulting in an unnecessary loss of revenue to governments, since the incentives did 
not appear to rank high among the factors influencing the investment decision. The efficacy of 
incentives needs to be reviewed regularly to determine whether they conform to market signals and 
the objectives of competitiveness and resource allocation.
With increasing liberalization, the policy of greater localization of ownership and decision­
making of earlier decades has given way to more open policies toward trade and investment, but 
many of the existing practices and regulations relate back to the earlier period. The State may wish 
to have a regulatory framework that facilitates foreign investment, but may still wish to exercise 
control over the sale of land, work permits, the right to borrow locally, the disposal of waste, the 
pricing of natural resources, etc. The issue very often is not the right of the State to exercise some 
control over development but the transparency and quickness of the decision-making process. In 
restructuring the role of the State in the Caribbean, the problems being addressed have to be put in 
perspective and context. Failure to do this could result in increased chaos and confusion.
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4. ELEMENTS IN THE STRATEGIC POLICY FRAMEWORK 
IN FURTHERING THE REFORM PROCESS
An overview of the reform and development process
In a dynamic setting where information is being generated and transmitted with increasing 
speed, knowledge on comparative situations and new ideas is continually changing the way problems 
are viewed and remedies proposed. Fresh insights, the postwar development experience, the 
perception of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the development race and the outcomes of structural 
adjustment programmes since the mid-1980s, have thrown up a range of new perspectives which 
have challenged many commonly held notions of economic growth and altered the composition of 
typical development functions. The strong State-driven strategies of the pre-1980s have come under 
critical review but experience suggests that there are effective roles that the State can play. The lure 
of the market-driven paradigm is also being tempered by concerns of equity and the sustainability 
of reforms in situations where poverty is widespread or increasing. In most countries of the 
hemisphere, average GDP growth rates in the 1990s have exceeded those of the 1980s, though they 
are still generally below those of the 1970s. There is a large measure of agreement on the contention 
that economic growth can reduce poverty but it can also reinforce inequality. It can also reasonably 
be argued that poverty reduction can also lead to growth.
Despite increasing knowledge on how key economic variables respond to certain policy 
decisions, it would be wrong to conclude, however, that the uncertainty and the controversies 
surrounding the implementation of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) have disappeared, and 
there now exists a consistent and unassailable body of ideas and policies which provide clear 
direction to development and the eradication of unemployment and poverty. Ideological positions, 
unfamiliarity with the development terrain, insufficient knowledge on specific issues and situations 
often mar diagnosis and can be reflected in proposed solutions and remedies. The most powerful 
in terms of financial leverage are not necessarily the most knowledgeable or best informed. The 
general principles of reform culled out of a variety of experiences must take into account local 
priorities, the stage of development, the social structure, the distribution of income and the 
functioning of markets and institutions if reforms are to be effective and if they are to make the 
desired impact. Many a programme of reform has suffered not only from improper pacing and 
sequencing but from an insufficient input of local thinking in analysis, conceptualization and even 
implementation.
With hindsight, and with a growing body of evidence following the adoption of emergency 
or quick-fix stabilization and structural adjustment programmes, there is an increasing degree of 
consensus in certain areas. The extreme position that all types of government interventions are 
harmful and that market forces and competition once let loose will remove all obstacles to 
development and usher in uninterrupted growth have now given way to propositions which call for 
a judicial mix of markets and governments. “Put simply, governments need to do less in those areas 
where markets work, or can be made to work reasonably well, and they need to do more in those 
areas where markets alone cannot be relied upon.”49 There still remains, however, a great deal of
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ambiguity and controversy over what is termed ‘the market-friendly model’ and the ‘strategic role’ 
a State may be called upon to play beyond the provision of public goods and macroeconomic 
stability. The argument has gone beyond what the State should do, and what it should leave to the 
private sector. The limited impact of structural adjustment programmes, the failure of the centralized 
State, the increasing degradation of the environment, the breakdown of the rural economy, the 
disintegration of rural communities and the growth of the informal sector have put the spotlight on 
the State’s relations with civil society.
With the drift of people from rural areas to urban centres and the increasing pressure on the 
social services, the State is being forced to take into account the traditions and practices of 
constituent communities as it seeks to refashion new modalities of government to counter the 
consequences of ineffective development policies, unacceptable levels of poverty, environmental 
damage and the challenge of globalization. What the State does not do is often as significant as what 
it does do. The State is a social construct and must have a clear idea of the strength and weaknesses 
of its constituent communities. National financial and development institutions often fail in a real 
sense because their operations do not take into account social realities and operate on structures 
fashioned by experiences of little relevance to local challenges.
Against the background of persistent budgetary and balance of payments problems there are 
many questions which have come to be asked of the structural adjustment programmes adopted in 
the 1980s, as a reaction to the emergence of internal and external disequilibrium in some Caribbean 
countries. The deflationary effect of stabilization policies had to be quickly supplemented by 
policies which could rekindle the growth process. The package of reforms widely used drew 
heavily on the experience of a small number of fast-growing economies in East Asia. The first 
generation of SAPs focused heavily on trade policy and fiscal reforms and assumed that within three 
to five years, a major restructuring of production would take place leading to increased income and 
employment.
SAPs have in some cases managed to reverse the slide and in a small number of others even 
helped in bringing about a moderate growth rate but generally they have failed in effecting the kind 
of transformation envisaged. Average GDP growth rates in the Latin American/Caribbean region 
in the period 1990-1996 ranged between -4.3 per cent for Haiti to 9.3 per cent for Guyana and 7 per 
cent for Chile. The average for the region was 3.3 per cent. If Guyana and Haiti, which incidentally 
rank as the poorest countries in the hemisphere, are excluded the average growth rate in CARICOM 
countries ranged between -0.1 per cent for the Bahamas, the wealthiest in terms of per capita income, 
to 3.8 per cent for Belize in the period. The OECS group averaged around 3 per cent. With this 
modest growth performance, poverty levels in Caribbean countries remain high and there has been 
little impact on the deteriorating social conditions that followed the adoption of SAPs in some cases. 
The adoption of safety net programmes to cushion the effects on the poor have suffered from a 
variety of deficiencies including unclear targeting, financial inadequacy and unsustainability and 
lack of an overall policy framework. It may not be an exaggeration to say that more resources have 
been expended studying the poor than helping the poor. With respect to SAPs, the time-frame for 
achieving results was generally too short, given the nature of the problems being addressed and the 
importance of institutional reforms in effecting change. The tendency to assume that a standard 
solution could be applied across the board without too much concern for the historical orientation
of the economy, the level of development, the distribution of income and wealth and institutional 
structure affected the outcome.
Nevertheless, the post-independence development experience in Caribbean countries has not 
been one of utter failure. Notwithstanding small size, limited resources and an unpredictable 
international environment they have been able to generate a moderate standard of living as reflected 
in per capita income, the level of employment and in health and education standards. Human and 
physical capital accumulation, though not at the level and of the quality it could have been, exceeds 
that in a large number of developing countries. This performance, however, has depended heavily 
on tourism and a narrow range of agricultural and mineral exports and access to preferential 
marketing arrangements. The effort to use import substitution as a way of diversifying and 
modernizing the economic base not only met with limited success but by increasing dependence on 
imports and concentrating on the local market, increased the vulnerability of the economies. 
Fluctuations in domestic production and external shocks have from time to time threatened internal 
economic stability and exposed the precarious nature of these economies. Recent trends in 
international trade policy and in the global economy, however, have narrowed the development 
options but also opened up new opportunities which call for radical changes in approach and 
development policy. At the international level the phenomenal growth in gross border flows of 
trade, services, investment, technology and cultural values is a reflection of the diminished 
importance of government restrictions and the challenge to regional and world cooperation. Old 
approaches will not work in this situation.
Globalization is a complex process and has an up side as well as a down side. While some 
communities may be blissfully unaware of the evolving trends or their impact, the Caribbean 
countries are open economies with economic performance and standards of living closely tied to 
trade and investment flows. More and more, Caribbean countries have to live by their wits and this 
calls for quick responses and more optimal use of human and physical resources as they seek to 
create resilient structures in a rapidly changing environment. The old boundaries of partnership have 
to be re-examined. In the face of collapsing security, economic and political alliances and traditional 
ties are coming under pressure as countries seek new alignments to enhance their position in the 
emerging new world order. Territoriality is taking on new meaning as States seek to refashion 
trading relationships in response to economic imperatives and competitive forces. Maps are being 
redrawn and governments have less power than they think. Global markets are being integrated 
largely through the transnational corporations which are constantly revising production and 
marketing strategies to meet global competition. With the liberalization of capital movements 
foreign markets are increasingly being serviced through the establishment of foreign affiliates rather 
than through exports of goods and services, the mode still largely used by developing countries. 
It has been estimated that the growth of global sales has exceeded that of exports of goods and 
services by a factor of 1.2 to 1.3 since 1987.50
T o survive in the contemporary world environment, the Caribbean has to reposition itself and 
develop new ways of thinking which would allow it to respond quickly and innovatively to external 
changes. The assumption in the 1980s that simply freeing up markets and prices in the context of 
a more stable, macroeconomic environment and transferring the ‘engine function’ to the private 
sector would restore economic strength was not well founded. Supply conditions have not
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responded convincingly and the persistence of structural weakness has raised questions not only 
about the adequacy of the programmes themselves, but of the nature of poverty and 
underdevelopment Structural adjustment programmes literally assumed away critical dimensions 
of the development problem by thinking that liberalization and deregulation by themselves could 
unleash the creative forces that could increase efficiency and production to the desired levels. 
Rigidities in capital and labour markets were seriously underestimated as was the power of the States 
to shake off vested interests and undertake regulatory and institutional reforms in a fairly short time. 
The capability of the State itself was an issue in terms of devising and implementing a coherent set 
of policies and fashioning an efficient and incorruptible bureaucracy.
The failure of industrialization as a transformation strategy must be seen as part of a larger 
failure involving the conception of and approach to development, economic management, the 
functioning of institutions, the use of resources and public sector efficiency. The early post­
independence strategy was an urban-based one that largely ignored the possibilities for rural and 
agricultural development and the contribution of the latter to social improvement and broader-based 
development. Attention was often focused on urban poverty and the continued failure to address the 
problems of the rural sector only served to worsen the problem. Growth, it was assumed, would take 
care of income and employment, and the government apparatus would address the distribution issue. 
Development was seen largely as a technical and engineering function relying heavily on modem 
planning techniques and technology. Heavy store was placed on the accumulation of physical 
capital. There was no deliberate attempt to enhance or build upon the ‘social capital’ that existed, 
or to use as far as possible local raw materials and resources as the basis for a manufacturing sector. 
With stagnant or declining output in the 1980s, increased demand for public services was met by 
increased government spending and borrowing. In order to meet the need for increased revenues, 
the tax system became increasingly complicated and their incentive function lost a great deal of their 
effectiveness. Tax evasion and avoidance increased as the State took on an air of greater 
intrusiveness. With declining growth, governments became increasingly desperate and sometimes 
irrational.
Reform in many areas has been slow and painstaking. Most of the existing laws and 
regulations are a hangover from the colonial period and early post-independence years, and bear little 
relationship to present day challenges and realities. In most cases they are complex and lack 
transparency. Land tenure practices are a major problem affecting agricultural development and 
housing, even though the State is the largest owner of land in the Caribbean. The movement of 
capital and skilled people still suffer from the inability to reconcile the need to exercise some degree 
of national control in these areas with the advantages associated with greater access to investment 
and skills. Company laws suffer from major deficiencies, while the fundamentals for greater use of 
national stock-markets are yet to be put in place.
Apart from the incomplete and deficient legal and institutional framework, fundamental 
objectives are yet to be articulated in a coherent and comprehensive fashion to give credence to the 
policy and strategic framework. There is need for a clear vision of the role structure and orientation 
of the agricultural, industrial and service sectors in order to devise an appropriate policy within the 
liberalization process, or these countries could end with a diminished production capacity, dependent 
on outside sources for almost everything. What part of local requirement will be met from domestic
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production and what part form imports will influence protection and incentive policies. The 
proportion of output exported will depend not only on foreign demand but on prices, design, quality, 
marketing, efficient delivery systems, service back-up, etc. Competition is a complex concept that 
involves much more than relative prices or quality. Technology and the mobility of factors make 
possible the production of a wide range of goods in countries with limited resources.
The private sector is not only in need of developing, but has to work more closely with the 
public sector. It is only in partnership can capital markets be developed and effective competitive 
and export strategies be formulated. A key area, which perhaps lies at the heart of Caribbean 
underdevelopment and retrogression is access to modem technology and its adaptation to local 
circumstances. National institutions have proven to be extremely weak in this area and their role, 
their capacity, output and relationship with the private sector need to be reviewed. The framework 
to encourage the protection of intellectual property and to safeguard the right of inventors and 
innovators has to be strengthened.
One recent study51 has found that 30-50 per cent rise in the demand for skilled workers can 
be attributed to the spread of computer technology. Other studies indicate that while computer-based 
technologies may reduce the demand for unskilled workers, overall employment can still be 
increased. The unemployment problem requires action on a broad front and how the region treats 
with technology and capital accumulation is a critical one. Increased efficiency may lead to some 
labour displacement in the short term, but the likely impact on competitiveness and growth can 
generate a level of activity that could increase employment opportunities. In the new global setting 
it is difficult to use defensive mechanisms to protect jobs in an inefficient or high cost environment. 
Increased efficiency and exports go hand in hand, but this need not lead to less employment where 
people are provided with opportunities to acquire the relevant skills and training that could increase 
their productivity. The separation of the education system from development strategy in the 
Caribbean provides the major explanation for the unemployment dilemma. A study of how this 
situation has persisted for long will provide an instructive insight into the causes of poverty and 
underdevelopment.
Organizational and institutional challenges in increasing policy effectiveness and delivery
The post-war development experience, and experiments with structural adjustment packages, 
have demonstrated in unmistakable terms that poverty and underdevelopment involve very complex 
factors and processes which do not easily lend themselves to simplistic solutions and approaches. 
Out of these experiences, however, have come useful lessons which should guide governments and 
aid agencies as they seek to put in place more effective policies and programmes which need to take 
account of specificities ignored or downplayed in earlier reform efforts. The tendency to approach 
heterogeneous situations with standard or near-standard prescriptions, often with little or no local 
inputs, has yielded limited results, and this has prompted the need for caution. A policy which works 
in one situation may not be effective in another because of assumptions made about underlying 
conditions and institutional development. A seemingly ‘good’ policy may get a bad name not only 
because of inadequate conceptualization, but because of poor implementation (including initiation 
in the wrong sequence) or because it is not supported by the necessary institutional and 
organizational reforms which are crucial to its success.
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The time-frame for bringing about change has also tended to ignore the importance of 
particular political and social environments, and this has been a major factor in explaining the lack 
of significant success in bringing about lasting or fundamental changes beyond improvement in 
selected accounting variables. As a result of stabilization and structural reform programmes, internal 
and external balances have improved in some cases, but little impression has been made on basic 
structural factors or on prevailing levels of poverty. Though some growth has been achieved, 
vulnerability to external shocks remains critical and slippage and retrogression remain an ever­
present possibility. Structural adjustment programmes in the Caribbean have increased frictional 
employment in a situation where there was already a large body of structural poverty. There is a 
tendency to see the poverty created by SAPs as ‘transient’ or ‘temporary’ and should be treated in 
a particular way. Many of the poverty alleviation or amelioration schemes appear to take this 
perspective, particularly since poverty now seems to cover an increasing section of the middle class. 
If the ‘cosmography’ of the poor is not properly defined and understood, there is growing fear that 
the transient poor could become an integral part of the chronic or structural poor.
The reliance on market reforms to instigate resource reallocation, factor mobility and increase 
efficiency has floundered in the face of an unwieldily and inefficient public sector (notwithstanding 
some piecemeal reforms), an inadequate rate of physical and human capital development, a 
regulatory framework giving confused signals, institutions with unclear missions and deficient 
capabilities. The political rhetoric has not been supported by action that is sufficiently quick, 
adequate or imaginative. In an open economy functioning in a competitive international 
environment, the existence of powerful disincentives to production compounds disadvantages related 
to resource endowment and structural factors with deep historical roots. In the first generation of 
reforms a great deal of naivete was displayed in the assumption that in all circumstances a quick 
supply response could be expected through the establishment of a ffee-market framework and 
macroeconomic stability assisted by a ‘lean and mean’ government. Very little attention was paid 
to the effects of budget cutbacks on the functioning of the State itself, the capabilities and structure 
of the private sector, implications of the limited pool of entrepreneurial talent, the problems of credit 
access in particular social settings, the operations of the banking sector, ownership patterns in the 
economy, the availability of land, the reform of factor markets, the power of vested interests, the 
legal framework governing competition, the enforcement of competition laws and the protection and 
enforcement of property rights and contracts. Not surprisingly governance has become a major issue 
in many developing countries in the context of straining administrative structures, technically weak 
civil services and the failure of centralized approaches to development to effect significant positive 
change. Even where laws exist, enforcement is often a problem because of lack of will or inadequate 
implementation capacity. In many areas reorganization and the creation of a framework that 
increases motivation and initiative may prove more effective in increasing administrative efficiency 
than greater public spending.
One of the heroic assumptions of the competitive market-driven model is that once 
responsibility is shifted to the private sector and the government knows its place and role, the pace 
of development would change and poverty would be reduced. The expected supply response has not 
materialized in many cases, and some countries in the Caribbean have become more dependent on 
traditional activities. Against this background, questions are being raised about the role of ‘market 
signals’ in situations of imperfect markets or where markets are not functioning properly. There are
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some activities which are crucial to development, but it is not easy to relate inputs to outputs in these 
areas, and because they involve high risks or are associated with long-term returns, the interaction 
between the State and the private sector takes on special significance. It is now well established that 
simply increasing the levels of public spending do not necessarily lead to an improvement in the 
quality of public services or more productive facilities. Attention has to be paid to delivery systems 
which in the Caribbean involve administrative management and accountability cultures which 
require strong political will to change.
Issues in poverty and social services reform
Because of the attention which poverty issues receive, both nationally and internationally, 
it is often tempting to discuss poverty, as if it is a phenomenon distinct and apart from economic 
development. In situations where the concern is with the adequacy, or shortcomings of social 
mitigation or amelioration programmes, the question is often how to improve these to increase their 
efficacy in the short term in order to create an environment of stability. The more fundamental and 
long-term challenge, however, is to reduce poverty and this requires a combination of appropriate 
economic strategies and effective social policies. Trained, educated and healthy human beings are 
not only an objective of economic and social policy; they are a means to greater production and 
incomes and a higher standard of living.
While growth can help in reducing poverty, the relationship is not a simple and unambiguous 
one. Studies on growth-poverty reduction elasticity in the LAC region has ranged from -0.84 to 2 
depending on the databases, time periods and poverty definitions.52 The effect growth has on 
income distribution may depend on a stage development. One hypothesis holds that inequality 
increases with income at the early stages of development and decreases at higher levels of income. 
There is also the view that the more unequal is the distribution of income, the greater the growth rate 
needed to make any dent on poverty. This view is seen as a possible explanation for the minimum 
impact of growth in the LAC region which evidence indicates to be ‘notoriously inegalitarian’53. 
In the 1990s, it is estimated that only 4.5 per cent of regional income accrued to the lowest quintile 
of income earners, as compared to 52.9 per cent of regional income to the highest quintile of income 
earners. The concentration of assets (e.g. land) also helps to explain the impact of growth on 
poverty. With respect to structural reforms, the effect of these on distribution of income depends 
on several factors. Among them are the size and role of the traded goods sector and the relationship 
of the poor to that sector. The instrument of real devaluation of the exchange rate which features 
highly in structural reform programmes affect the producers of traded goods and the consumers of 
traded goods differently. “From the point of view of poverty, the most favourable situation for 
adjustment is in the countries where the poor are producers, but not consumers of traded goods. The 
least favourable situation is one in which the poor consume but do not produce traded goods”.54
One of the effects of stabilization and structural adjustment policies in the Caribbean has 
been a reduction of employment in both the public sector and the private formal sector. Real wages 
have also fallen and the poor are to be found both among the unemployed and the employed. For 
some countries of the region, the annual growth rate of employment has been growing at a faster rate 
than the annual growth rate of the labour force. Not only has the unemployment rate remained high, 
however, but the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has estimated that 94 of every 100 new 
jobs created in the LAC region between 1990-1995 were in the informal sector.55 It has been noted
that these jobs are associated with low wages, job instability, lack of benefits and often poor and 
unhealthy conditions. There is some controversy, however, over how this problem should be 
approached. On the one hand, it is felt that greater accessibility to financial, technical and land 
resources could improve conditions in the informal sector, but the sector will have to be brought into 
the formal regulatory framework. There is an opposing view which takes a dim view of 
‘ formalization’ and argues that attempts to ‘ formalize’ the sector would be counter-productive, since 
it is too much regulation that may be stifling entrepreneurial activity in the formal sector.
There are good reasons why governments of the region need to be concerned as much with 
existing poverty as with the long-term measures to reduce poverty and achieve self-sustaining 
growth. Poor nutrition, unhealthy living, inadequate education and training reduces the quality of 
labour and the ability of a country to extricate itself from the poverty trap. In the long term, the 
effect is felt on human development and on production capacity. Growth hinges critically on human 
development, physical capital accumulation and the productivity of the these two factors. Human 
development is recognized as “one of the most, if not the most important determinant of long-term 
competitiveness and productivity growth .... Healthy and well-educated workers lose fewer work 
days to illness, are more productive at work, have greater inter-sectoral mobility, and have longer 
working lives.” A number of studies have shown that education is the variable with the strongest 
impact on income equality and poverty. One study shows that “on average, about one-fourth of total 
inequality can be explained as inequality between individuals grouped according to their level of 
schooling.”57
As indicated earlier, spending by Caribbean governments on the social services has by no 
means been negligible. Public expenditure in education as a percentage of GNP for the LAC 
region in 1990 was 4.3 per cent (approximately US$50 billion per year) as compared to 4.6 per cent 
for all countries. The ratio was higher than those of South and East Asia. Figures available for 
Barbados, Belize, Suriname and Jamaica in the 1990s indicate ratios of over 5 per cent as compared 
to less than 3 per cent for Chile and Peru. As a percent of GNP, public expenditure on health 
amounts to 3.55 per cent (not including 2.7 per cent for private expenditure), in the LAC region as 
compared to 3.22 per cent for all countries. Theoretically, a vary high proportion of the population 
(in the case of Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and the Bahamas, over 95 per cent) have access to 
health services. With the advent of stabilization and structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s, 
public spending in real terms has fallen in a number of cases, and this has impacted on the education 
system and quality of health care provided. One study has noted that despite the gain of recent 
decades, the LAC region’s “average health and education levels today are lower than would be 
expected for its level of economic development, especially when compared with other regions of the 
world.” With respect to the education system, there are three specific areas where there is growing 
concern in the context of the need to increase competitiveness and reduce income inequality and 
poverty: low levels of academic achievement, the lagging of average educational attainment of the 
labour force behind that of other regions, and inequalities in educational opportunities which 
contribute to high income inequality and slow growth.60 High drop-out rates (particularly among 
the poor) at both the primary and secondary levels, limited access to tertiary education, poorly 
motivated and trained teachers, unsatisfactory standards of physical facilities and sanitary conditions, 
unavailability of books, equipment and materials contribute to the present situation. Writing with 
respect to health and education systems in the region, the study has noted that the “failures in social
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service delivery are principally the result of inefficiencies in the systems themselves” and that 
“greater progress is more likely to come from gains in efficiency than from increased spending.”
The main reason for so much attention being paid to education is that it holds the key which 
can break the poverty circle. Educated and trained people are more mobile and can earn higher 
wages and salaries than those who lack learning and skills. Poverty, however, can be self- 
reinforcing, since poor children are often less prepared to enter school and physical conditions of 
schools in poor areas are often of a lower standard than those where the non-poor reside. Lower 
standards in public schools which the vast majority of the poor attend also contribute to lower 
performance.
With respect to health, spending by LAC countries on health as a percentage of GDP is 
higher than other developing areas of the world. Some of the impact of this spending can be seen 
in falling mortality rates and higher life expectancy. Mortality rates in the Caribbean are among the 
lowest in the LAC region. The health systems in the region, however, are also in serious crisis, and 
many of the deficiencies have come to the fore with the reduction in government spending. The 
unavailability of drugs, non-functioning equipment, the decline in physical facilities and inadequate 
professional care reflect the declining quality of health services and have become common in most 
countries, leading to an increasing number of people, who can afford it, to seek coverage in the 
private sector. The poor still depend on government social services.
The reorganization of the health sector involves a range of issues for which there are no 
unique answers since conditions vary widely from country to country. Among these are the role of 
the public and private sectors, the funding of health care, the balance between curative and 
preventive approaches and the administrative and organizational system for delivering the services. 
In the Caribbean, the administration of both the health and education systems have been highly 
centralized and, as often happens with all such systems, management and accountability issues have 
undermined their efficiency and their ability to meet the needs of the people who use them. Poor 
services accompanied by high costs point to the need for urgent restructuring of the social services 
delivery system that are critical to the development and functioning of people.
From both a social and development point of view, it is important to create a healthy and 
educated community. The importance of investment in human capital for economic growth has long 
been recognized. A healthy and educated community also creates conditions less conducive to crime 
and anti-social behaviour. Spending on health and education however has to be accompanied by 
effects to create opportunities for employment. The rate of growth of both human and physical 
capital and increasing productivity are critical to the expansion of production capacity.
Whatever concept one may have about the role of the State in post 1980s period, it certainly 
cannot exclude the formulation and implementation of an imaginative and effective regulatory 
framework. Because of the liberalization of the economy and the orientation towards a more market- 
oriented framework, many of the old regulatory institutions set up in a ‘control’ environment may 
have to be closed or restructured and new ones put in their place. Regulations themselves may have 
to be pruned, and more relevant and effective ones put in operation. The decision to have foreign 
investment play a larger role in the economy will also influence investment codes, purchasing of 
land, the incentives programme, access to local capital markets, competition policy and the tax
system. The need to closely monitor the effects of development on the environment will also place 
greater responsibilities on government agencies. With the down-sizing of governments, the private 
sector may also get more involved in the provision of infrastructural services and in this type of 
arrangement more innovative regulatory arrangements will be required. The need for faster and 
more efficient decision-making will not only require a more transparent framework, but reform and 
restructuring of the highly centralized public service whose role must be to provide a higher quality 
of social and economic services to the general community. Salaries, incentives, working 
environment and administrative structures have to be responsive to performance needs. The critical 
role of the civil service to overall development should not be underestimated. The civil service 
should be able to attract highly skilled people.
The challenge to the financial system
With the decline of the capital stock in some Caribbean countries, including the most 
wealthy, particular concerns are raised. Obsolescence and the effect of budgetary problems on 
maintenance have compounded the problem stemming from the fall in real annual investments in 
most countries.
The pace of physical capital accumulation is widely accepted in both developed and 
developing countries as a critical determinant of growth and development. In the Caribbean, more 
open policies towards private foreign investment has reduced neither the need nor the urgency to 
increase domestic savings and investment rates. If anything, the unpredictability of foreign capital 
flows and its concentration in certain sectors underscores the need for a policy framework that could 
lead to a higher level of savings and encourage the flow of resources to lagging sectors, not 
particularly attractive to foreign investors but of critical importance to development. Nurturing the 
saving/investment process is in itself part of the development challenge in terms of increasing self 
reliance and forging linkages between the real and financial sectors. The culture of controls is being 
questioned not only in the context of the negative effects on savings and the disposition of investible 
resources, but also in the context of the cost of funds, the establishment of more open systems and 
a lowering of exchange controls which have been a salient feature of economic management until 
quite recently.
Despite the shift to a more friendly attitude towards private foreign capital, Caribbean 
countries with one or two exceptions have not been successful in attracting significant amounts. 
Failure tp achieve a persistent high-level growth rate, an opaque regulatory framework, even with 
respect to intra-Caribbean investment and infrastructural facilities below competitive standards 
provide some of the explanations. Some governments have signed bilateral treaties with certain 
industrial countries and entered international agreements as a signal of commitment to encourage 
private foreign capital, but the decision-making bureaucracy at the domestic level is still to be 
improved. Air transport to and from the Caribbean can often be a complex and painstaking 
undertaking. Even entering and leaving some countries can be a hassle.
In the Caribbean, because of fears of wrong sequencing and the nature of fiscal and balance- 
of-payments problems, reforms in the real sector have taken place at a faster pace than in the 
financial sector, where the implementation of certain structural, monetary and prudential regulations 
continue to raise questions about their effects on efficiency and the implications for raising the
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saving and investment rates. The adoption of new laws in certain cases has gone some way in 
addressing some of the problems arising from recent bank failures and the growth of non-bank 
financial institutions. There has been some attempt to ffee-up deposit and loan rates and increase 
the independence of the central banks, but policy action is needed in certain areas, such as 
deficiencies in prudential regulations and supervision, the use of high reserve requirements to control 
banking activities, a more transparent relationship between banks and non-banks and a more explicit 
policy on competition among financial institutions. While the experience of other countries offers 
useful lessons in reforming the framework of laws and operational practices within which the 
financial system functions, Caribbean governments have to pay particular attention to their own 
circumstances in devising sequencing strategies and moving to new forms of controls. For instance, 
given the dubious links between interest rates and savings, Caribbean countries will need to be 
careful in adopting a real interest rate policy, particularly in the light of a history of relatively low 
inflation rates. At the same time, governments cannot be unmindful of interest rates spreads and 
their effects of investment in situations with limited competition.
Banks are the most significant financial intermediaries in Caribbean countries. Generally, 
however, their number in each country is small, creating an oligopolistic type of financial market 
which has raised questions about the prevailing degree of competition and efficiency. One study has 
found that operating costs as a ratio of total assets in the Caribbean averaged 11 per cent in Jamaica, 
9 per cent in Trinidad and Tobago and 85 per cent in Barbados as compared to 3.34 per cent for 
insured banks in the United States. Though there has been some attempt to attribute this situation
to intense regulations, a recent study by the IMF on Trinidad and Tobago points to market structure. 
“Bank profits in Trinidad and Tobago have risen to record levels in the past two years. The spread 
between deposit and lending rates has widened to a degree not explained by reserve requirement 
changes. The prime lending rate is close to 17 per cent in an economy with both fiscal and balance 
of payments surpluses in recent years and low inflation. Cost-saving technological advances have 
not been shared with customers and the number of banks has been unchanged at six, after a 
consolidation from eight banks in 1993.”64 The study further concludes that the “large size of 
interest rate spread in Trinidad and Tobago suggests a capacity for monopolistic pricing.”65.
A major concern facing Caribbean countries hinges not only on measures and policies to 
increase savings and channel financial resources to productive use, but how to attract and retain 
savings. A conducive macro-economic environment and governments’ commitment to sound fiscal 
and monetary policies aré critical. In a liberalizing environment there is need for new and 
imaginative regulations to deal with the greater mobility in the movement of savings across national 
frontiers. For example, the decision to allow residents to hold foreign currency accounts in local 
banks could become a conduit that drains savings from the local currency savings/investment stream, 
if regulations are not in place to encourage the banks to put foreign currency savings at the disposal 
of the national economy. Badly conceived measures can also be counter-productive. For example, 
the taxing of interest income from foreign currency accounts in local banks could drive these savings 
abroad and discourage new flows. This problem has to be handled imaginatively if the wrong signal 
is not to be give rise to fears that governments are not to be trusted. Non-interest bearing reserves 
in the central bank are not helpful in such situations.
Developments of active capital and stock markets both at the national and regional level 
should rank high on the list of measures required to satisfy the varied needs of savers and investors.
This is necessary for the efficient distribution of risk-bearing. The range of financial institutions and 
securities needs to be looked at carefully not only to meet specific investment needs in a situation 
where risks and returns vary, but to provide opportunities to savers. Venture capital funds are slowly 
taking their place in the financial landscape, but there exists a range of practices and regulations 
which stand in the way of more rapid development of capital and stock markets. In Caribbean 
countries because of the tradition of family enterprises, the number of pub lie companies is small and 
this influences the stock exchange listing. Many companies cannot meet the requirements for 
inclusion. Some companies prefer to meet capital needs from borrowing rather than from selling 
new stocks. The informational infrastructure is lacking in most cases.
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Table 29
Commercial Banks’ Interest Rates in Selected CARICOM COUNTRIES, 1980-96
End of Barbados Guyana Jamaica Trinidad & Tobago
Period Deposits Loans Deposits Loans Deposits Loans Deposits Loans
1980 5.6 11.0 11.5 13.88 8.75 15.86 6.06 11.70
1985 4.8 10.9 12.5 12.00 18.57 25.46 6.26 13.41
1986 3.5 10.2 12.00 15.00a 17.35 26.92 6.08 13.25
1987 3.7 . 10.3 12.00 15.00a 14.95 25.40 6.03 13.47
1988 4.5 11.1 12.00 15.00 14.30 24.94 5.83 12.05
1989 6.3 12.7 32.25 37.60 20.20 28.15 5.90 12.04
1990 6.1 12.1 28.10 32.44 24.50 31.59 5.53 11.73
1991 7.4 15.0 29.20 35.22 27.50 34.03 5.50 11.77
1992 5.0 12.6 18.17 29.76 23.00 46.04 6.34 12.76
1993 4.8 11.3 10.86 18.24 39.80 46.60 6.53 13.08
1994 5.0 11.9 12.81 20.80 27.85 45.79 6.50 13.81
1995 5.2 11.8 12.81 20.39 26.22 48.56 5.68 12.91
1996 5.0 11.9 10.50 18.46 20.79 42.19 6.39 14.24




In the absence of exchange controls, and given the easy movements of funds which this 
makes possible, domestic policies have to be particularly sensitive to perceptions arising both from 
local developments and external factors. The exchange rate is susceptible not only to trade 
performance but to capital movements, and may move in directions not appropriate to the immediate 
requirements of the trading sector. The adoption of flexible exchange rate arrangements by some 
Caribbean countries, may remove some of the pressures on domestic policies to help restore external 
balance, but themselves can help create imbalance when, rates assume levels consistent with capital 
account developments but inappropriate to the trading needs of the economy. In the Caribbean, 
foreign participation in local stock markets has not been significant, but direct investment flows can 
exert a large influence on exchange rate movements. Exchange rate regimes in the Caribbean remain 
far from settled as Central Banks continue to search for an institutional and operating framework that 
provide signals truly reflective of basic or ‘fundamental’ conditions. The experience both in the 
Caribbean and elsewhere that the exchange rate can come under pressure, even when ‘fundamentals’ 
are moving in the right direction should alert the authorities of the need for greater understanding 
of exchange rate changes and of the need to search for measures to deal with extreme volatility. The 
exchange rate is the most important price in an open economy and can easily overturn inflation and 
other objectives necessary for macroeconomic stability.
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66 67A recent United Nations study has indicated that while real GDP per capita increased by
37 per cent in the developed economies between 1980 and 1996, it declined by one per cent in the 
LAC region and doubled in the case of Eastern and Southern Asia. In nominal terms, per capita 
GNP in the CARICOM region (excluding Haiti) averages around US$2,700. While this does not 
compare favourably with that of the developed economies, which ranges between US$20,000 and 
US$40,000, or with that of some of the newly industrializing countries like Singapore (US$27,000), 
or Hong Kong (US$23,000), it is higher than that of a large number of developing countries. It is 
also not far behind that of certain second-generation Newly-Industrialized Countries (NICs) like 
Mauritius (US$3,400), Malaysia (US$4,000) and Thailand (US$3,000). Besides the growth in per 
capita income a range of other social indices point to a steady improvement in the quality of life over 
time.
Notwithstanding their small size, limited resources and frequent vicissitudes, Caribbean 
countries have been able to attain a standard of living that places them among the top rungs of the 
developing countries. With the decline of traditional activities, dwindling aid flows and changes in 
the international environment, there has been some retrogression; and even to maintain the present 
standard of living, not to mention improving present social conditions, is becoming increasingly 
difficult. The failure to put in place a strong and diversified production base has left Caribbean 
economies in a vulnerable position, and forging the terms on which they interact with the global 
economy now has to be done in a more open and competitive setting that requires a different kind 
of mind set.
The fact that certain Caribbean States have been overtaken in the development race by some 
countries over which they enjoyed clear advantages in the 1960s, must raise questions about policies, 
attitudes, habits and approaches to governance and development. More intriguing is the observation 
that spending in such critical areas, like health and education, has by no means been insignificant. 
This would seem to signal that there are issues at stake other than finance. The post-war 
development experience and the results of the first generation of structural adjustment programmes 
point not only to the importance of policy, but to the quality of institutions, the legal and regulatory 
framework, the level of savings and investment, greater attention to research and development, and 
the calibre of governance and administration.
Structural reforms have started in both the real and financial sectors, but there are still 
problems with scope, the pace of change, sequencing, transparency and a clearly articulated long­
term strategy of development. With the shortcomings associated with the import substitution policy, 
greater emphasis is being placed on export-oriented industrial development, but the policy 
framework for the transition is far from clear. There is some doubt in the literature about whether 
exports cause GDP to grow or the other way around, but the relationship between import-substitution 
and export development may well be one of emphasis. The scope for efficient import substitution 
should not be downplayed. With respect to the role of agriculture, a declining share of this sector 
in GDP was once viewed as a sign of development. In the Caribbean it could be seen as a reflection 
of failed agricultural and general development policy. There is every reason why agriculture should
5. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
be embraced as part of the general effort to increase import substitution, develop exports, create 
employment and reduce poverty. Agricultural development can serve as a basis for industrialization 
seeking to achieve a higher local content.
It has long been acknowledged that growth does not necessarily lead to development. One 
can also have growth taking place without any significant impact on poverty, unemployment or 
inequality. Broad-based growth, however, can help in creating employment opportunities. The issue 
of employment strategy cannot be separated from policies designed to improve the quality and range 
of the human capital stock. The existence of unemployment side by side with the demand for certain 
kinds of skills, to some extent, reflects the problem. Education and training cannot take place in a 
vacuum, but must be geared to technological requirements and development objectives. Curricula 
review and education delivery systems have to rank high on the reform agenda. A poorly functioning 
health system can also undermine the performance of the human capital base in an environment 
where fitness is critical to productivity and economic survival. In the present age, how a country 
equips itself technologically is also crucial to competitiveness and increasing per capita income. 
Technology affects all sectors of the economy, but some sectors have more access than others. 
Observations are often made about the effects of technology on employment, but technology can also 
save capital. In the medium and long term, technology properly used can increase employment and 
lead to a more secure employment base.
Stabilization and structural adjustment programmes have worsened the poverty situation in 
the Caribbean. In the short term, some poverty alleviation measures have been undertaken, but 
because of certain deficiencies their impact has been limited. Failure to act urgently in creating 
growth and employment opportunities could well see an enlargement of the chronic poor base, 
resulting in increased social instability. The fundamental challenge is to create perspectives which 
could increase the pool of entrepreneurs, make the business ethic more pervasive, encourage more 
purposeful use of savings and allow governance and administrative structures to emerge which can 
lead to greater participation in the development process. The centralized approach to development 
in the Caribbean has stifled initiative and increased dependency on the State. The bureaucracy 
created has been costly. Result-oriented institutions and a business culture have to become an 
integral part of civil administration.
Despite a shift in paradigm which emphasizes the private sector as the ‘engine of growth,’ 
the operational relationship between the public and private sectors in many areas remain far from 
clear. Markets are not perfect and a government still needs to intervene at critical points. Some 
goods and services can be provided both by the State and the private sector, but because of the 
social implications, the State may want to play the dominant role. There are some areas which 
demand a joint role, given the financial requirements and the critical function of the activity. One 
such is R&D and the transfer and adaptation of technology, which have not received adequate 
attention in the Caribbean development process.
It is generally accepted that a high level of savings and investment is a major factor in 
development. The importance of macroeconomic stability to increasing savings and investment of 
rates is widely acknowledged. Traditionally, the tax system has been used in the Caribbean to 
provide incentives to encourage private savings, but with the constraints on revenues, this has 
become more difficult. Increasingly, the trend is to use non-tax avenues, such as stock-market
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development and pension arrangements, to encourage savings. In an effort to mobilize savings and 
to achieve more efficient financial intermediation, the tendency is to encourage greater competition 
in the financial sector. In most instances, adequate and transparent regulatory framework is still not 
in place. While the central banks have acknowledged the costliness of some traditional control 
instruments, new approaches have been slow in emerging. A major challenge is not only to mobilize 
savings, but to encourage their use in productive investment. An increased level of domestic savings 
may not only lead to a higher level of capital formation, but also to reduced dependence on foreign 
resources. A robust financial sector has a key role to play in development, but building the financial 
infrastructure needs careful attention. Sequencing is particularly important, and this needs to be 
informed more by practice than theory. Every situation has its own specificities.
The competition for foreign investment is leading to the creation of a more investment 
environment. The role of local investment, however, should not be underestimated, and a great deal 
more attention needs to be placed on the encouragement of small and medium-sized businesses. 
Investment policy also has to take a long view and recognize of the need to protect the environment 
and to make optimal use of national resources. A competitive framework is intended not only to 
meet consumer needs but must have a clear development thrust. The pace of change in the global 
policy framework is such that many developing countries are unable to gauge the impact on their 
own economies. The decision-making process has to become not only more efficient, but more 
broadly-based. Whatever the international regime, countries have a moral obligation to reconcile 
international obligations with genuine national interests.
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1. In the continuing effort to advance political integration among themselves the small islands 
of the Eastern Caribbean established the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) in 
1981 to “strengthen links between themselves by uniting their efforts and resources and 
establishing and strengthening common institutions which could serve to increase their 
bargaining power as regards third countries.” Members of the OECS are Antigua and 
Barbuda, British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Lucia and Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines. Montserrat and the British Virgin Islands are still British 
dependencies. The Eastern Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) was established in 1968 to 
promote deeper economic integration among members of the group functions as a subgrouping 
within CARICOM.
2. At the CARICOM Heads of Government Meeting held in Jamaica in July 1997, Haiti was 
accepted as the fifteenth member of CARICOM on a conditional basis.
3. Webb (1997, p. 1).
4. See Webb (1997, p. 1).
5. IDB(1995,p. 194).
6. IMF (1995, pp. 69-71).
7. See John Page in Birdsell and Jaspersen (1997, p. 33).
8. See John Martin in Ramsaran (1995, p. 27).
9. See Bourne (1986).
10. See S. Edwards in Burki et al. (1995, p. 84).
11. See S. Edwards in Burki et al. (1995, p. 84).
12. World Bank (1997e, pp. 3-7).
13. BIS (1997, p. 101).
14. United Nations (1997, p. 3).
15. See Harris ( 1995).
16. World Bank (1993d, p. 4).
17. J.G. Williamson in Ranis and Schultz (1988, p. 29).
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18. St. Rose (1996).
19. World Bank (1993; p. 3).
20. Baker (1997, p. xiii).
21. Baker (1997, p. xiv).
22. ILO(1997,p. 12).
23. IDB (1996, pp. 331-336) and World Bank (1997h, pp. 50-66).
24. IDB (1996, p. 248).
25. Siebert (1997).
26. World Bank ( 1996h, p. 21 ).
27. WTO (1996, p. 38).
28. WTO (1996, p. 36).
29. WTO (1996, p. 30).
30. World Bank (1997g, p. 134).
31. See Nurse and Sandiford (1995, p. 4).
32. See Sutton (1997).
33. WTO (1995, p. 16).
34. See Sutton (1997).
35. Demas (1981, p. 10).
36. Demas, (1981, p. 2).
37. The West Indian Commission (1992, p. 386).
38. The members of the ACS are: CARICOM countries (including Haiti and Suriname, but
excluding Montserrat which is not independent) Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela, 
Guadeloupe, Guyana and Martinique are associate members.
39. Though the admission of Haiti more than doubles the present population of 6 million people, 
the per capita GNP of the expanded group is less than US$1,500.
40. Evans (1997).
41. See Theodore (1997).
42. Duncan (1997).
43. Lustig (1995).
44. Bardhan (1997, p. 59).
45. Ramamurti and Vernon (1991, p. 75).
46. See World Bank (1994a, pp. 3-4).
47. World Bank (1994a, p. 4).
48. World Bank (1995a, p. 145).
49. World Bank (1991, p. 9).
50. United Nations (1997, p. xx).
51. BIS (1997, p. 25).
52. See Burki and Perry (1997, p. 88).
53. Burki and Perry (1997, p. 89).
54. Lustig (1995, p. 62).
55. Burki and Perry (1997, p. 91).
56. Burki and Perry (1997, p. 91).
57. Lustig (1995, p. 27).
58. IDB (1996, pp. 332-339).
59. IDB (1996, p. 242).
60. Burki and Perry (1997, p. 67).
61. IDB (1996, p. 242).
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62. Burki and Perry (1997, pp. 98-99).
63. Williams (1996, p. 88).
64. IMF (1997, p. 50).
65. IMF (1997, p. 51).
66. United Nations (1997a, p. 233).
67. Exchange rate basis (1993 dollars).
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